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PREFACE (,. 
This thesis was written over three years, from May 1990 to May 1993, at the 
Economics Department of the European University Institute in Florence. The order of the 
chapters reflects, accidentally, more or less the order in which they were written, even though 
later corrections and amendments render a dating imprecise and perhaps uninteresting .. 
The thesis was written under the supervision of Louis Phlip~'W[~ .~eserves grateful 
acknowledgement for the abundant time he has invested in reading, disc11ssing and criticizing 
the essays. If they are readable, he is to thank. He is the co-auth~;,pf two 1of t~ essays, Oil 
Futures and Strategic Stocks at Sea (Chapter 2) and Oil StociJ/ ~;dla Squeeze Preventing 
Mechanism (Chapter 3). The former appeared in a book edited by ~uis Phtips and Lester D. 
Taylor: Aggregation, Consumption and Trade- Essays in Honor of H.S. Houthakker that was 
published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in Dordrecht in 1992. The latter is a working paper 
of the Economics Department of the European University Institute. For the thesis, I rewrote 
the introduction and made small changes. 
Chapters 3 and 4 were to a large extent written while I was a visiting student at the 
Department of Economics at Stanford University. This visit was most kindly made possible 
by Peter J. Hammond who also provided extensive comments on different versions of Chapter 
4. For this and for his hospitality he receives many thanks. 
The final version of the thesis benefitted substantially from the many comments I 
received from Ronald Harstad and Stephen Martin. 
Valeria Fichera provided data and information for Chapter 3: Grazie. 
Dorothea K. Herreiner provided many valuable comments on Chapters 1, 3 and 4 at 
early stages when the notation was not yet comprehensible: Mange tak. 
Mrudula Pate! deserves warm thanks for chastising me into better performance on 
Chapter 3 and for her "constant comments." 
Chapter 4 on Bargaining and Efficiency in a Speculative Forward Market has a very 
long history and innumerable commentators are thanked. The paper was presented in an 
extremely preliminary version in the first EUI workshop on price formation mechanisms on 
11 June 1991. A more developed version was then presented in the EUI Students' Workshop 
on 10 December 1991 and a still incomplete draft in the Students' Workshop during "Summer 
in Tel Aviv", July 1992. Participants in all these workshops are thanked for comments and 
discussions as are J0rgen Rugholm Jensen, Alan P. Kirman, Mordecai Kurz and Robert 
Waldmann. Ronald Harstad and Ebbe Hendon deserve special thanks for extensive comments 
on different drafts. 
I have enjoyed the collaboration of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies where 
especially Paul Horsnell and Cristina Caffarra provided data and clarifying explanations at 
various stages. 
Last, but not least, Jochen P. Lorentzen is thanked warmly for good company during 
four years of studying in Villa Schifanoia and for the running, hiking and 'solving-the-
world's-problems' that has made this less of a tedious undertaking. 
Badia Fiesolana, May 1993 
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Essays on. the Determination and Formation of Pri~es in 
European Crude Oil Markets 
1. Crescendo Storico 
Un 'Opera in Quattro Atti 
di 
H. Peter Mp/lgaard 
Overture 
,ff 
I ' 
The exploration and development of the Brent field and other fields in the North Sea 
commenced in the late 1960s as a response by the major oil companies and by Western 
governments to the cartelization of the petroleum exporting countries. This process was 
spurred by the first oil price shock in 1973. The first oil was produced in 1975. At that time 
there was no tradition for trading crude oil on markets. The majors and OPEC were used to 
post prices, and so there was no obvious organization for selling new non-OPEC oil and 
indeed it was not obvious that the oil should be marketed at all, given the dominance of 
integrated oil companies. 
Yet a very peculiar market for Brent- the 15-Day market- developed over the years. 
Starting from occasional forward trading, a highly developed, organized forward market 
institution emerged. Its functioning resembles that of a traditional futures market except for 
the decentralized and non-regulated nature of trading. Compared to the standard model of 
futures trading, this particular market diverts in at least three important ways: 
1. The spot market is highly concentrated and major oil companies trade in the market 
so the spot price can be manipulated; 
2. There are frequent squeezes in the market: another example of manipulation; 
3. Trading in the market has proved highly speculative. 
Later again, in the mid-80s, a futures market, the International Petroleum Exchange 
of London, was in fact introduced. This market only gained importance as the Gulf crisis of 
1990 evolved. At that time Brent had become an internationally important marker alongside 
with West Texas Intermediate and Dubai. 
Today we have a unique situation of coexisting forward and futures markets for the 
same good. Including the spot market this makes three markets for the same good: Rather 
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than having a 'missing market' there seems to be one market too many. 
2. Allegro Cantabile 
The following four "acts" deal with these issues. In the first a~t: .,f'fr~tegic Inventories 
in Two Period Duopoly", the backdrop is entirely theoretical and,i,lei,tmotif is i9Poduced that 
is going to reappear in different forms in the following two acw"t;~;J!:~on7yntfated markets, 
how does the ability to store goods affect pricing? How can prices be manipulated? The main 
players are rival producers that use inventories in playing games with each other. Stocks make 
competition fiercer by providing a vehicle for committing to raise second-period output in the 
Cournot case or to lower the price in the Bertrand case. If the firms were to cooperate, they 
would not hold strategic inventories in this act. 
The second act, "Oil Futures and Strategic Stocks at Sea", takes a broader view on the 
scenery including all three markets on three stages. Stage 1: The International Petroleum 
Exchange performs like a thick futures market which can be used to hedge against extrinsic 
uncertainty but also against the intrinsic uncertainty that is created by the forward market on 
stage 2. The forward market (the 15-Day market) is a small club of speculative traders, 
including the producers, that enter forward contracts knowing that this will affect the storage 
decision on stage 3. On stage 3, the spot market, we hear the leitmotif from the first act 
performed as a duet by a Cournot duopoly. As the act finishes we are left with a better 
understanding of how futures positions, forward contracts and stocks can be used to 
manipulate spot prices and how a foreseeing speculator knowing this will trade on the futures 
and forward market. The overall system is characterized by a good deal of complexity and 
certain themes need to be developed and enlarged. This is done in the last two acts. 
In the third act, "Oil Stocks as a Squeeze Preventing Mechanism", we concentrate on 
the forward and spot markets and introduce a new player: The squeezer. The leitmotif is now 
played in a completely different key and in a certain sense backwards compared to act one. 
We recognize the protagonists: The producers. The plot is as follows: Squeezes are registered 
occasionally on the 15-Day market. The squeezer accumulates forward contracts and creates 
artificial scarcity by refusing to close out, exploiting imperfections in the decentralized market 
clearing. The artificial demand in turn creates a price surge and the possibility of a squeeze 
thus introduces additional uncertainty about the spot price. Squeezes therefore render the 
market institution less palatable to other market participants (traders and refineries) who may 
find other ways of accomplishing the economic functions of the forward market (for example 
an organized futures market). The producers thus have a long term interest in keeping market 
clearing smooth, for example by supplying stocks to squeezed traders. The extent to which 
such self-regulatory stocks should be held is analysed in the context of a repeated game and 
the conclusion is that unless the probability of a squeeze is very small, self-regulation is 
2 
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possible. This shows that there is a role for inventories if firms cooperate contraf.y to the 
result of the first act. 
The fourth and final act is played by a set of players that we only met briefly in the 
second and third act: The traders. Here producers are ignored completely as the focus is on 
the process of trading in the forward market. The 15-Day market is predominantly 
speculative, a fact which contradicts the assumptions that lead to. ze;;·s~~culation theorems. 
We therefore set up a stochastic game model of a market with a· S!Jlall null)ber pf speculative 
traders that differ only with respect to the expected spot price alijJ;·P9~sibly) Jhh respect to 
risk aversion. Contracting is done after pairwise negotiations in rafliJd'ri'i inat~hes. The Markov 
. ' 
perfect equilibrium of the model can mimic the 15-Day market and need not be efficient in 
the sense that it belongs to the bilateral core. 
The third and fourth act show that the 15-Day market is very imperfect and that the 
organization of this market leads to more uncertainty than necessary. The point that was made 
in the second act is therefore emphasized: Trading in this peculiar forward market creates 
intrinsic uncertainty that could be avoided with a different organization of trade (for example 
an emerging regulated, centralized futures market). Considering these imperfections, it is 
remarkable that Brent is used as an international marker, i.e. in the price formation of a host 
of other crudes all over the world. 
3. Staccato or: The Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions and Good Inconsistencies 
If all the above sounded as bel canto to you, dear reader, this is where the dissonances 
appear: Once upon a time, when I embarked on this project, I thought the way to model the 
European oil markets using game theory would be to do bits and pieces in every chapter and 
then collect these bits and pieces to solve the puzzle in the end, with a grand final model 
encompassing all the other, preliminary studies. Dear reader, this isn't it! Rather, the different 
chapters provide different and somewhat contradictory views on the 15-Day market. Let me 
use the next few lines to point out the inconsistencies to you. 
1. In Chapter 2 on price determination, it is taken for granted that the forward market 
leads to an efficient outcome. In Chapter 4 on price formation, this event is shown to 
happen with a positive probability (if time allows), but not with certainty. As already 
mentioned, this only emphasizes one point that is made in Chapter 2: Agents on the 
real futures market (the International Petroleum Exchange) may take positions partly 
as a hedge towards the uncertain outcome of the forward market. 
2. In Chapter 2 the speculator is risk neutral, whereas in Chapters 3 and 4 speculators 
are risk averse. I think the latter is a more realistic assumption, although the risk 
3 
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neutral speculator has a long tradition in financial economics. Traditionally, suppliers 
and demanders are seen as more risk averse than speculators, and the formulation 
where the former are infinitely risk averse and the latter risk neutral takes this view 
to its extreme (bar for risk loving speculators). Empirically, the magnitudes of risk 
aversion coefficients are under discussion and it is difficuU7tq"see why integrated oil 
companies should be more risk averse in their trading .stra'tegfds''than big Wall Street 
trading houses. The results in Chapter 2 are qualitatively roblist 1to th,? introduction of 
risk .. av~rsion. in the speculator's utilit: function,i~,~~ua~t}til:f and prices in 
eqmhbnum wtll of course change accordmgly. J ·· ,' 
3. In Chapter 2 the producers are assumed to engage in Cournot behaviour, which is 
somewhere in the middle of the scale between pure cooperation and pure competition. 
In Chapter 3 it is shown that the producers should cooperate albeit this emerges as the 
result of an infinite repetition of non-cooperative stage games. The two studies 
emphasize different aspects of oil stocks and should be seen as complementary. Maybe 
the reason why producers do not cooperate on squeeze preventing stocks is that the 
non-cooperative strategic stocks dominate. However, it does not seem quite reasonable 
to assume a non-cooperative business environment for the market. This connects us 
back to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 which analyses the strategic effect of 
stocks as a function of four different paradigms reflecting the assumed interaction 
between producers: Competition, Bertrand, Cournot and Cooperation. Note that the 
discussion of stocks is theoretical by force: European producers are very secretive 
when it comes to the size of their stocks - remarkably so, when compared to the 
excellent statistics available for American oil stocks. This shows that market 
participants attach importance to these statistics and therefore that they are important 
strategic variables, but it is at odds with the informational assumptions of the games 
we have analysed. 
4. One inconsistency that is running through the thesis is the simplicity of the modelling 
compared to the complex real world. This is not a theme that will be elaborated here. 
Any theory needs some level of abstraction and I have tried to make reasonably 
realistic assumptions that are discussed throughout. This procedure has at times 
rendered the models more complex than they would have been if they were there as 
an intellectual exercise alone. The partial equilibrium approach is not without its 
pitfalls: In practical terms we have treated the system of North Sea oil markets as a 
more or less closed system ignoring possible effects from the world supply and 
demand for crude oil. This criticism bears particularly on Chapter 2 on the short run 
price determination that is supposed only to depend on factors within the market. This 
ignores that the price level of North Sea crude oil depends on a great many external 
factors. 
4 
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5. In the last three essays it is assumed that spot prices follow a normal distribut·ion. The 
advantage of this is that the distribution can be fully described by two parameters, 
mean and variance. Combined with an exponential utility function, the agents' 
preferences can then be represented by a function that is linear in mean and variance. 
This formulation is widely used, especially in financial eco,!lo\l)ics, because of its 
simplicity. A drawback is that since the support of the norlpal:disttlb"dtion includes the 
entire real line, there is a positive probability that realiz~d,prices b7com,? negative-
an obvious nonsense. The results carry through with mori)f~f~}able distributions, e.g. 
a log-normal, but at an increase in complexity. The judg~;h( was~that since the use 
of the mean-variance model is well-known, the reader could be· spared the extra 
nuisance implied by more complicated distributions. 
4. Formazione Determinata 
What is the difference between 'price determination' and 'price formation'? 
To me, price determination is the ascertainment of the forces that determine 
equilibrium prices. In the game models of Chapters 1, 2 and 3, equilibrium is essentially a 
matter of consistency of beliefs at some level or other. No out-of-equilibrium dynamics are 
specified and therefore we are not informed how this equilibrium could be reached. The multi-
stage models we concoct for this purpose have simultaneous move stage games. What we get 
is in-formazione determinata: equilibrium prices depend in this and that way on stocks, 
demand, the number of rivals and so forth. 
Price formation, to the contrary, explains what prices you observe out of equilibrium 
and where dynamics take prices. This approach is taken up in Chapter 4 where we construct 
a bargaining type model with this in mind. At each stage, moves are sequential. We consider 
a truly dynamic model which is an extension of the usual steady state models of bargaining 
in markets. Market participants meet in random, pairwise matches. The state of the market 
evolves according to a Markov process that players can control only partly. If one expects a 
tatonnement leading to equilibrium we may disappoint. What we get is formazione in-
determinata: the dynamic Markov perfect equilibrium may and may not take the market to 
the static equilibrium. The static equilibrium will only obtain after certain fortunate histories. 
5 
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A Reader's guide 
Each chapter has a breakdown into an introduction, sections on modelling and a 
concluding section that puts the modelling into perspective. References are found at the end 
of the thesis. The page before each chapter contains an outline of ~llat';<))Japter and an abstract. 
; ·)·'' '1!' 
It is beyond the scope of the thesis to give a comprehensive des'ciiptive account of the 
North Sea crude oil markets. A main source has been The M,4rk~t foriNortJJ Sea Crude Oil 
from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (Mabro et al. (i~J?)~;and1 ~h~~;~ader is referred 
to that and to the other references made in the text for further parficulars. However in 
Chapters 2 through 4, the empirically relevant characteristics of the market are outlined (and 
stylized). This way I hope that the reader is not left with the feeling that something important 
is untold. 
Microeconomics employs one vocabulary, game theory another, futures markets a third 
and the North Sea crude oil sector seems to have developed its own lingo. The latter is 
explained (I hope) to those who understand the three former. One question I am always asked 
is: Why on earth is it called the 15-Day market? 'The answer, my friend, is blowing in the 
wind.' - (Or see footnote 1 on page 67). 
6 
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CHAPTER 1: 
Strategic Inventories in Two Period 
Oligopoly 
7 
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ABSTRACT: A general model of two-period duopoly is set up and it is shown how 
inventories can serve a strategic purpose, for example by providing a commitment to raise 
second period output. The strategic effect of inventories depends on the convexity of the cost 
function, on the cost of storage and on whether the "business regime" is competitive, 
Bertrand, Cournot or cooperative. It is shown how the model encompasses existing models 
in the literature. A closed form of the strategic inventories is then found for a parametrized 
two period, n-firm oligopoly 
8 
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f.,. 
0. Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with strategic inventories in two period oligopoly. By 
inventories I mean finished goods made to stock and stored at the manufacturer's level. These 
if.J.f •. - 'J!!:> 
inventories typically account for around thirty percent of all manufactntersf stocks (see Ph lips 
(1983) p. 68). This definition leaves out stocks of raw materials anq·goods~ip-pr~ress as well 
as inventories of goods made to order. /~6··, 1 . • • ~ 
As to the motives for carrying inventories, the literat~?/t K·pic4lly ·distinguishes 
between three such: the speculative motive, the precautionary motive (buffer stocks) and the 
transaction motive which leads to the familiar production smoothing. In addition to this, 
Phlips and Richard (1989) are concerned with the intertemporal discrimination motive in a 
dynamic oligopoly model with demand inertia, where the price a firm sets in one period 
affects the demand for its products in the next. Intertemporal price discrimination arises 
because firms equalize discounted marginal revenues over time. 
Inventories are said to serve a strategic purpose if they are held with the explicit 
purpose of affecting the rival's decisions in later periods. As it will turn out, these strategic 
inventories are closely related to the convexity of the cost functions and cannot for that reason 
be studied independently of the transactions inventories. For the sake of realism and for com-
pleteness we will also include buffer stocks, but typically treat them as constant in which case 
they do not matter much. The speculative motive is completely ignored. 
We solve our models using non-cooperative game theory and only shortly touch on 
the cooperative case in Section 1.5. On the other hand, we shall assume a "friendly 
environment" in the sense that firms are not actively trying to drive each other out of 
business, to merge or to take over. It may make most sense to think of the two firms and the 
two periods as a going-concern situation. We thereby disregard the strategic purpose of inven-
tories in entry deterrence emphasized by Ware (1985). Ware shows that inventories can be 
used as a credible threat by the incumbent to dump prices below marginal costs in the post 
entry game since the opportunity cost of supplying a unit of inventory is zero. 
In Section 1 we put forth a generalized framework of a duopoly with inventories and 
show how these can serve a strategic purpose. The generalization lies in the general treatment 
of the demand and cost function and in the way different "business regimes" are included by 
means of conjectural variations. Conjectural variations allow us to discuss the model under 
four different "business regimes": Competition, Bertrand price setting, Cournot quantity 
setting and Cooperation. We then show how this model encompasses existing models that 
typically assume Cournot conjectures, i.e. a regime of non-cooperative quantity setting. 
Section 2 parametrizes the general model by postulating linear, homogeneous demand 
and quadratic cost functions, but generalizes the analysis to n-firm oligopoly to find closed 
form strategic inventories. Section 3 concludes. 
9 
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1. Two Period Duopoly with Inventories 
The purpose of this section, which constitutes the core of the paper, is to set up a 
general framework to analyse the strategic role of inventories in duopoly and to present a 
number of results under different assumptions about firms' bel~efs,~~,egarding their rival's 
behaviour and the cooperative or non-cooperative character of the g~m~. 
We shall require our solutions to be subgame perfect '!P:d ~olve ~he.~me backwards, 
starting with the subgame in period two. This first step highl'ilf}l~ 1the c,~mparative statics of 
a duopoly with inventories. We make use of the concept of no:action ffmctions to set up a 
rather general static second period game. 
Treating inventories in a static framework is, of course, a contradiction in terms. 
Inventories should be treated as a state variable that implies that decisions on production and 
sales in the first period affect the outcome in the second.' We therefore move backwards one 
period and study the sales and production decisions of the first period. 
It should be emphasized that inventories are the only source of dynamics in this 
model. In particular, demand is assumed to be intertemporally separable and independent in 
the two periods. This is not necessarily a natural assumption in a dynamic model with a 
storable good for at least three different reasons. First, if the good is durable, a high demand 
in the first period will tend to lower demand in the second period. Second, since the good is 
storable, consumers (which could be other firms) might find it worthwhile to carry out the 
storage themselves. Third, consumers might respond to price differences between different 
suppliers with a Jag as in Phlips and Richard (1989). 
The sections are organized as follows: In 1.1 we set up the model and develop a 
general notation. Section 1.2 describes the sales game of the second period in general terms. 
Section 1.3 describes the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, and shows how asymmetry in the 
ability of firms to hold inventories can yield the Stackelberg outcome as a Cournot-
equilibrium. Section 1.4 then describes how firms divide their period-1 production between 
sales and inventories and illustrates the strategic effect of stocks implicitly. Section 1.5 shows 
how our model is related to other non-cooperative models in the literature and comments on 
a cooperative model. 
1.1 A General Two Period, Two Firm Model 
This subsection provides a generalized framework for discussing the two period 
duopoly. Variables can have two subscripts: The first identifies the firm and the second 
1 Kirman and Sobel (1974) set up an oligopoly model as a stochastic game with Markov 
strategies. 
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denotes the period. Firms are indexed by i and j where i, j = 1, 2, i ,. j. Time is indexed by 
t = 1 ,2. Subscript "•" symbolizes an aggregator.2 The model consists of a set of demand 
functions, a set of cost functions regarding production, a set of identities connecting sales and 
production in the two periods, and a set of functions for the cost of storage. 
The (inverse) demand for the goods of firm i is given by 
ap. . . 
P,1 = P,1 (q1•1 ,q2 ,1 ) > 0 with~< 0/ , .,11, (1) 
q~, /".I{}' J/1 
ftJrc~~·. ,, 
i.e. the price of firm i's product, p,, is assumed to be a downward ~lopini function of the 
firms own sales, q,,1• The products are assumed to be substitutes so that 
ap. 
__ 1,1 < 0. (2) 
a q. ],I 
In many applications it is assumed that goods are homogeneous in which case the demand 
system can be written 
P.,l = P.,,(ql,l - q2) (3) 
(4) 
The cost functions are supposed to depend on contemporaneous output only. We shall 
generally assume that variable costs, c,, are an increasing, convex function of the amount 
produced, x, 1: 
c. = C. (x. ) 
1,1 1,1 l,l 
(5) 
c. = 
dC,, 1 
"' 
0 
1,1 dx. 
1,1 
(6) 
' 
d2C. 
C;,, = 
1,1 
"' 
0 2 
d.xi,l 
(7) 
2 By this I mean a broadly defined aggregator: it can be used 1) as a placeholder; 2) to 
symbolize a sum over periods or agents; or 3) to symbolize a Cartesian product. 
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c (0) = 0. 
'·' 
(8) 
Inventories, S 4,, are related to sales and production through the identity: 
s - s 1 = x. - q. , t=l,2. 
l, I 1,1- 1, t 1, l 
(9) 
Following Phlips and Thisse (1981) we assume that initial s~?.ck~, S401, a~'¥terminal stocks, 
S1 •2 , take the value, §_1, at which cost of storage is minima1AJf4'?:rea~9n 'for such an §_ 1 to 
exist is that in general it is neither costless to carry inventories: ~or to ~xperience stockouts. 
For a more elaborate argument, see Ph lips (1981) pp. 106-7. The following change of 
variables will prove convenient: 
s = S. - S . i,l l,t -; (1 0) 
Identity (9) can then be written: 
5 ;, 1 = xi, I 
- qi,l (11) 
qi,2 = xi,2 - si, I 
Again following Ph lips and Thisse (1981) we assume that the cost of storage, 11,1 , can be 
described by a positive, strictly convex and twice continuously differentiable function which 
takes its minimum for s1 1 = 0, i.e. 
(12) 
df. I j < j < (13) i. = -'·- = 0 for s. 1 = 0 ' 
' ds. 1 '· 
'· 
> > 
,/- d2Ji,l 
> 0 for s1, 1 ., -s .. (14) l; = --ds2J -, 
'· 
Equations (1-14) constitute the basic model of the duopoly. To find a solution to the system, 
we superimpose a game structure. This structure can be cooperative, but most of the time we 
shall assume it to be non-cooperative. In any case, firm i basically has four decisions to make: 
how much to produce and how much to sell in either period. A strategy for firm i thus in 
general consists of a vector 
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0,· ~ ~ q. 1 ' x. 1 ' q. 2 ' X. 2 I . 
, I, I, I, I, 1 
(15) 
For a strategy to be feasible it has to satisfy non-negativity of all amounts and the identities 
(11). Given inventories in period 1, firm i thus only has one decision to make in period 2, and 
a feasible strategy can be represented by a three element vector: 
o. = (x. 1,s. 1,x. 2 (s 1 ))., (0, -s.,o), I I, I, l, 11, -1 
',11: 
(16) 
I' 
f !' . 
Let the set of feasible strategies for firm i be called L1• Pay-offs are total, discounted profits. 
For each of the players, profits in the two periods are given by: 
(17) 
- C. 1(x. 1) - F 1 - I 1 (s. 1) I, I, I, 1, 11 
(18) 
- C. 2(x. 2) - F 2 ' 1, I, I, 
where F4, represents "fixed costs," i.e. costs that do not vary with the level of output or 
inventories. The pay-off of firm i is then 
(19) 
where IS; is firm i's discount factor. The game is now given by r = (L1, L2 , n1,., n2 •• )· 
In the non-cooperative game, the firms strive to maximize n, . given some beliefs3 
regarding the reaction of the other firm on the market. Such beliefs, or conjectural variations, 
were introduced by Bowley (1924). Following Dixit (1986) we formalize these conjectural 
variations by 
(20) 
v, ·' thus tells us how firm i believes that firm j will react on a given change in its own sales. 
Four standard cases are readily interpreted as different specifications of the conjectures, v4,: 
3 or expectations: thus superscript e. 
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a. Competitive Conjectures: 
b. Bertrand Conjectures: 
c. Cournot Conjectures: 
d. Constant Market Shares: 
v. = 
'·' 
v. = 
'·' 
V. = 
'·' 
ap,,,!aq,,, 
ap ;aq 
I, t j, I 
(21) 
Competitive conjectures are derived from requirement that i believe that her own price will 
not change if she changes sales. Taking account both of the direct effect and of the indirect 
effect via the rival's expected reaction yields (21.a). Bertrand conjectures (21.b) are derived 
from the requirement that i believe j' s price to be independent of her price. In the case of 
homogeneous goods both competitive and Bertrand conjectures are -1, so i expects j to match 
a change in output with an offsetting change keeping prices constant. Cournot conjectures are 
zero (21.c) and with constant market shares (21.d), firm i expects firm j to match any 
percentage change in output one to one. Note that the conjectures are listed in order of 
increased implied collusion. Furthermore it should be noted that if both firms hold constant 
market shares conjectures, the outcome will be identical to the outcome of the cooperative 
joint profit maximizing game if the demand functions satisfy Slutsky symmetry, i.e. if 
a P,,, /oqj,, = opj,, /oq,,,. Slutsky symmetry is trivially satisfied with homogeneous goods. 
In general conjectures could be constructed and combined in any conceivable way, but 
they are best interpreted "as if:" under the assumption that both4 players hold competitive 
conjectures, the model produces an outcome as if there were a reason for the players to end 
up in competitive equilibrium. Given a small number of players, this may not be a natural 
assumption, but it serves as an illustration just as an Edgeworth box can be used to illustrate 
a competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy. In a one shot game, the natural 
assumption is Nash conjectures and that amounts to Bertrand conjectures if both firms are 
price setters or to Cournot conjectures if they are quantity setters. There is reason to be 
particularly wary of using combinations of conjectures, e.g. one player holding Cournot 
conjectures and the other consistent conjectures ( cf later), this leading to the Stackelberg 
outcome, since it forces a fundamentally sequential play into the strait-jacket of a 
simultaneous move game. Finally, constant market shares conjectures are not nice either, since 
we want to model an inherently non-cooperative environment and the story needed to achieve 
cooperation would involve infinitely repeated play - at odds with the assumption that there 
4 Read: all players in the n-person game. 
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are only two periods. Having said this, we continue using conjectural variations'·without 
further excuses but limit all interpretations to the four cases mentioned above where we can 
postulate that the model works "as if" and where we can use well developed intuition.5 
These are the basic game theoretical settings. We will generally assume that the 
decision process of the firm can be described in the following way: InJ?e~~?d 1 firm i decides 
on how much to produce in this period, i.e. on x41 , and on how .mueh t61sell in this period, 
i.e. on q1.1, or equivalently, on how much to store for sale in the .f!ext perjod, i;{· s41 • These 
decisions then become common knowledge. In period 2, the on'l'V,;cdecision to' i'nake is how f/J (!j 1// 
much to produce, since the inventories carried over from period Y)i\-e giv~n. In each period 
decisions are taken simultaneously. For behaviour to be sub game perfect, the game should be 
solved backwards thereby ensuring that the second period solution is consistent with any first 
period outcome. The next section thus solves the sales game of period 2. 
1.2 The Period-2 Sales Game 
The problem that firm 1, say, faces in period 2 is a purely static one: 
Max n:J,ixi,2'x2~2;si,I's2,I) (22) 
{x,j 
where x2:2 denotes firm 1 's beliefs with respect to the output of firm 2. The perceived first 
order condition is 
= ((aP1,2 + aP1,2 dq2,2)(x + s ) _ P )dq,,2 _ c = o. 
a a d 1,2 1,1 1,2 dx 1,2 q1.2 q2,2 q/,2 1,2 
(23) 
In the case of an interior solution, sales increase with production at the margin so dqjdx42 
= 1 and (23) can be written 
(24) 
To the contrary, in the case of a corner solution dq42 /dx42 = 0 and 
5 Note, however, that there is a conceptual difference between the empirical use of 
conjectural variations to measure the degree of imperfect competition in an industry and the 
theoretical use of the concept to model beliefs. See Tirole (1989) pp. 244-245 and Bresnahan 
(1987). 
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- ci,2 < 0 ' (25) 
smce increased production only increases variable costs, not sales revenue. The profit 
maximizing production is then zero and the perceived profit maximiaing decision is to sell 
'· "' ,- ,,-
out of inventory alone. The corner solution obtains when, V xi2 > 0, 
,' /' I 
tJ/ L- f 1 
P1,2k,I' q2:2)sl,I - F1.2 > ni,2(xi,2' x2:2; sJIJ'($;J , .. (26) 
' 
This can happen if the firm's own level of inventory is very high, if the sales of the other 
firm is expected to be very high or if marginal costs are very high. Without further specifi-
cation of the demand and cost functions we cannot say anything precise about the intervals 
for which the corner solution obtains. 
Arvan (1985) shows that in a Cournot duopoly of identical firms producing a 
homogeneous good and facing a strictly concave inverse demand function, an upper level of 
inventories exists such that for all levels of inventory above this level, sales are equal to 
inventory and production thus zero.• 
Here we concentrate on the case of interior solutions for both firms. The second order 
condition for firm 1 then is 
and 
I 
- CJ,2 - q (a2PJ,2 + 1,2 2 
aql,2 
where (27) 
(29) 
Observe that a1,2 is the first partial derivative of the perceived marginal profit function w.r.t. 
q1,2 (x1,2) and b1,2 similarly the first partial derivative w.r.t. q2,2 (x2,2). The slope of the "best 
6 Arvan (1985) also shows that an even higher level exists such that for all levels above 
this level it does not even pay to sell the whole inventory. Since we assume that the demand 
functions are known and that producing and holding inventory are costly activities this cannot 
maximize profit. We therefore disregard it. 
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response function" or reaction curve of firm 1 is then given by r.,. 
(30) 
Of course, firm 2's behaviour can be described by a set of equations likre -;0~7-29). Consistent 
. . :. +;' '\;(, 
conJectures can now be defmed as v2,2 = r1,2 and V1,2 = r2,2 • Note·that here "consistency" is 
meant in terms of an untold dynamic story about how equilibriu!J':}s. a~hieve~:~n terms of 
a one shot game, only Nash conjectures (i.e. Bertrand or Cb}/Jjl,f~)- ar7, consistent and 
consistency is indeed the main virtue of Nash conjectures. Inconsistency is' seen only from 
the point of view of the untold dynamic process.' 
In the case of homogeneous goods and linear demand that we are going to investigate 
in Section 2, it can be shown that -1 < r;, 2 < 0 for both Cournot and Bertrand/Competitive 
conjectures. 
Now, totally differentiating the first order conditions (24) we get the following set of 
equations: 
1,2 ___. 
b l , ds •.l 
a2.2- C2,2 
where dX:. 2 = (dx1•2 ,dx2, 2) 7 and dS:, 1 = (ds1• 1,ds2• 1 ) 7 • The solution is 
(31) 
(32) 
where E is the 2x2 identity matrix and D. 2 is the determinant of the left-hand side matrix 
in (31). Stability conditions imply that a42 < 0 and D. 2 > 0 (see again Dixit (1986)). The 
diagonal elements of the matrix in (32) will therefore be negative. If b42 < 0, the off-diagonal 
elements will be positive and the reaction functions downward sloping (this is the "normal" 
case with Cournot conjectures, cfr. later). 
Interpreting (32) is straightforward. An increase in the inventory level of, say, firm 1 
by one unit leaving firm 2's inventory constant (i.e. ds1,1=1 and ds2,1=0), ceteris paribus 
decreases the production of firm 1 by one unit because of the identity 
7 A serious discussion of this interesting problem will take us too far from the main 
argument as it would involve (i) the literature on consistent conjectures (e.g. Breshnahan 
(1981) and Ulph (1983)), (ii) the literature on quantity vs. price competition (e.g. Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983), Klemperer and Meyer (1986) and Benoit and Krishna (1987)) and at the 
limit; (iii) the literature on equilibrium selection (e.g. Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). 
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(33) 
The second term of dx1,2 /ds1,1 can be written 
(34) 
, t' . I 4 
t/,'1 _il '---~ 
This term arises because inventory does not imply increas~/ &ta'fginar c~st since inventory 
costs are sunk in period 2, whereas production does. Note the ~i~ilarit~ between the denomi-
nator in this expression and the second order condition (27). The denominator expresses the 
change in marginal profits as a result of a change in sales under consistent conjectures. The 
inverse of this multiplied by the second order derivative of the cost function, c;, 2 , then 
expresses the change in the profit maximizing sales in equilibrium given that output is 
lowered by one unit This effect modifies the direct effect In this sense, the derivative 
dx. 2 
I 
ci,2 
'· = -1 - > -1 i,j = 1 ,2, i .. j, 
ds,,I ai,2 + b. 2r. 2 l, ), 
(35) 
shows that the relative advantage of additional inventories lies in second order gains seen 
from a period 2 perspective. 
The effect on firm j's output of a change in firm i's stock is seen to be 
dx. 2 
I 
dqi,2 ], 
= 
-ri,2ci,2 
= r.2--· (36) 
ds,,I a,,2 + b. 2r. 2 1' ds. l, J, 
'· 1 
This will be negative in the case of a downward sloping reaction function (bv < 0). The story 
is much the same. We do not, of course, get the direct effect, but only the indirect effect via 
the change in the sales of the goods of firm 1. 
As to the effect on prices, it follows directly that 
dpi,2 
ds. 1 
'· 
= (a P,,2 + r. 2 a P,,2) __ - c-::,_2 _ 
aq.2 ], aq,2 a,2 + b.2r'2 
I, ), I, I, ), 
i,j = 1, 2, i .. j ' (37) 
In general we cannot say anything about the sign. In the homogeneous good case we see that 
if rj, 2 > -1, the effect will have the expected negative sign. In the homogeneous good case 
with linear demand, the effect on the price is thus negative for both Cournot and 
Bertrand/competitive conjectures. 
The next section explores the comparative statics of inventories in the homogeneous 
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good case under the assumptions of well-behaved Cournot reaction functions. '·· 
1.3 The Period-2 Game: Nash and Stackelberg Solutions 
~,;_;[.,, i_'l:'c 
Consider the case of a homogeneous good, i.e. (3) and .(4)i.apply•f A sufficient 
condition for the existence (and stability) of a unique Cournot equllil;lrium ·is fhat ~e inverse 
demand function be strictly concave," i.e. /!Jii,,' , '' I, 
' J. 1// ~f;{i·. I' 
' a2P.,2 ' , 
-..,.c.. < 0. 
2 
aq.,2 
(38) 
If the two firms are identical with zero inventories, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium has v,,2 = 
0 for i = 1,2, and the situation can be characterized by 
2 aP.,2 a2P. 2 
ci,2 < 0 0 t,2 ~ +X ' -
aq .. 2 i,2 2 aq. 2 
ap. 2 a2p. 2 (39) 
b 2 ~ + qi,2 ' 2' < 0 
'· aq·.I aq. 2 
0 > r,,2 > -1 
Reaction functions are thus well behaved and the unique Nash-Cournot equilibrium can be 
found as the intersection (N) of the two best response functions in Figure 1. 
A Stackelberg equilibrium obtains in the case where the market behaves as if e.g. firm 
1 has consistent conjectures (v/,2 = r2,2) and firm 2 has Cournot conjectures (v2,2 = 0). This 
Stackelberg equilibrium is point SI in Figure 1. The Stackelberg leader earns higher and the 
follower lower profits in SI compared to N. 
Now, assume that for some reason which is exogenous to the game, only firm 1 has 
the opportunity of carrying inventories. It can use this to shift its reaction curve to the right 
from R1,2 to R;, 2 thereby obtaining the Stackelberg outcome, S~> as the Nash equilibrium. This 
is certainly profit maximizing in the second period subgame given that costs of producing and 
carrying inventory are sunk. Whether it will be profit maximizing in the overall game depends 
on whether the discounted increased second period profit is greater than or equal to the extra 
8 To be more precise, the sufficient condition is that the inverse demand function is 
strictly positive on an interval (O,X) on which it is twice continuously differentiable, strictly 
decreasing and concave, and that p., = 0 elsewhere. See Saloner (1987) p. 184. 
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Figure 1 Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria (Nand S1) 
'I' 
r// 1, . ,1 
'l~tf: 
' 
cost incurred in the first period to which we now turn. 
1.4 The Period-1 Game: the General Case 
I.-
' 
' 
q1,2 
The result of Section 1.2 was basically that in period-2 equilibrium, the optimized profits (the 
value functions) were seen to be a function of the two commonly known inventory levels, i.e. 
lt1,2 = JtJ,isJ,J' 52 1) 
lt2,2 = Jt2 i 5 1 J' 52 1) 
(40) 
We assume that an interior solution exists for any inventory vector (s1,1 ,s2,1 ) that may 
result from the first period game. This may sound a bit heroic, and we shall discuss the 
assumption in Section 1.5. The reader will not have difficulties in verifying that a unit change 
in the inventory of firm 1 will affect its second period profit by 
In period 1 the firms have to maximize overall profits by a simultaneous choice of production 
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f.,. 
a pi 2 
= ql 2 --·- (r2 2 
. aq . 
2,2 
(41) 
and inventories: 
Max :n:.I,• = :n:.I,I + bi:n:.;,2 . 'I' 
{ } 0' ;' SI I' XI I /'/;f, ' !J}#;~:, I' 
An interior solution will, if it exists, have to satisfy the first order tonditio~s 
.'4 
' ' 
(42) 
(43) 
and (44) 
A similar set of equations exists for firm 2, and the subgame perfect equilibrium of r is fully 
characterized by the set of strategies (rqi, n si. 1) , ( q;, J> s;, 1)) that simultaneously solve this 
system, provided that the second order conditions are satisfied: 
(45) 
(46) 
where 
(47) 
and 
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(48) 
Note that fulfilled second period second order conditions (27) helP. fJ,~Ifil ( 46). 
i ~< '.i 
Subtracting the first order condition for s1,1 from that for q1•1 we''get a condition that 
the solution must satisfy: ·I' , 1 4 
/'It .-1 
aAJ f;/ip/ 1 ' ~ ~ ( 'J I 2,2',· 1,2 ~ 
cl,I + ll,J - uici,2 ~ ui r2,2 - vi,2 ci,l ___;,o:.. -- "· 
D.,2 aq/,2 . 
(49) 
This equation shows the strategic effect of inventories: if the only purpose of inventories were 
to minimize overall costs, the condition would be that discounted marginal costs be equalized, 
or equivalently, that the left hand side of (49) be equal to zero. 
Assuming stability conditions satisfied, this strategic term is seen to be positive only 
if (r2•2 - v1,:J > 0, i.e. if v1,2 < r2,2• But in general the term can have either sign. Under 
consistent conjectures, strategic considerations regarding inventories have zero effect since 
the firm can correctly manipulate the rival's sales using output from the second period. In this 
sense, the strategic stocks are seen to be based on inconsistent conjectures when these are 
deemed inconsistent with an unspecified dynamic process. However in a one shot situation 
it is perfectly legitimate for conjectures to be inconsistent In general the term is therefore 
different from zero and is seen to depend on the curvature of the second period cost function, 
c;,2 .In fact, with constant marginal costs, c;, 2 = 0, the strategic incentive to make inventories 
deviate from S ceases to exist. 
-; 
We now turn to different special cases found in the literature in order to shed light on 
different aspects of the model. 
1.5 Special Cases: A Survey of the Literature 
Almost all studies of inventory in two period, two firm models under certainty can be 
seen as special cases of the model put forth in the preceding sections. We briefly review them 
and comment on them. As it turns out, the bulk of the studies assume Cournot behaviour. 
Arvan (1985) provides in many ways the most complete and the most general study 
of dynamic Cournot duopoly with inventory. His focus is, contrary to ours, on the corner 
solutions in the second period game. As a result of the existence of corner solutions, the Nash 
value functions (i.e. (39) with v1,2 = v2,2 = 0) need not be concave in the inventories, but will 
typically experience a discontinuity for certain levels of s1,1 and s2,1. In this case, the first 
order conditions of the second period are not fulfilled, and the use of ( 40) in ( 42) is not valid. 
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Arvan next considers the case of entirely symmetric firms with identical tDst and 
demand functions in the two periods. In the case of constant marginal costs he then argues 
for non-existence of equilibrium in a symmetric model with inventories:9 
"If there were a symmetric equilibrium where both firms carried inventory from the first period to 
the second, then both firms would be using inventory to act as a leader! This i;r:-no~;~ossible when 
the firms do not produce in the second period, either when inventory is ,exhkllstei.i: OV when it is 
redundant. It is also not possible when there is production in the second ~f.ipd, since marginal cost 
is constant. This rules out synunetric equilibrium with inventory." (Arv~(1985) p-'574):4, 
/' ·!;j). 1/l ' jJj fc1 ;' ' I' 
This citation deserves a remark: We saw in Section 1.3 and Figure llhat if,,for some reason, 
only one of the firms were able to carry stocks from the first to the second' period, it would 
use this opportunity to act as a leader. We also wondered whether this would be profitable 
in the overall game. In Arvan's model nothing prevents both firms from trying to act as 
leaders. However we also know that if marginal costs are constant, the strategic motive for 
holding inventories vanishes. Indeed if c;, 2 = 0, /) 1 = 1 and c~,~ = c/,2 it follows from (45-48) 
that i1=0, but (13) then implies that s11=0 or that inventory does not deviate from S. So with 
' -, 
constant marginal costs there will be no strategic inventories. 
We therefore need cost functions to be convex. Arvan conjectures that 
"[i)n this case it is conceivable that symmetric equilibrium exists where both firms utilize inventory 
and also produce in period 2. For such an outcome to occur, costs must be sufficiently convex ... 
that there are ample leadership opportunities to cover storage cost" (Arvan (1985) p. 574, footnote 
7). 
We have shown that with with convex costs and 'inconsistent conjectures' his conjecture is 
true and that it generalizes: with competitive, Bertrand and Cournot business environments 
symmetric firms hold strategic inventories. We provide examples in Section 2. 
Two other studies, Saloner (1987) and Allaz (1991 ), both assume Cournot conjectures 
and that sales do not take place in the first period. The focal points of the two studies are, 
however, widely different. 
Saloner (1987) shows that under assumptions that normally lead to uniqueness of 
equilibrium, the existence of two production periods where first period productions become 
common knowledge in between the two periods leads to a continuum of possible equilibria. 
Saloner uses a parable, the origin of which is attributed to J.W. Friedman: Two competing 
fishermen go out in their boats and bring their catches back to the shore. There they observe 
the catch of their rival, and are allowed to go on another fishing trip before the market opens. 
Saloner does not use the term "inventory", but one would hope that first-period fish are stored 
in a cool place until the market opens! Storage costs are assumed zero and marginal cost 
9 In our model this should read "with deviations from S ." 
-; 
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F-i 
constant. The inverse demand is assumed to satisfy all conditions for unique and'stable single 
period Cournot equilibrium to occur. 
Under these conditions, the fact that first period productions become common 
knowledge is shown to imply that any point on the outer envelope of the reaction functions 
between (and including) the two lowest Stackelberg equilibria maY,4J?e1iJ.SUbgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. Nothing more specific can be said. The range of pos~ibl~·~e~uilibria is illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
q 
2,. 
! 
Figure 2 A Continuum of Equili~j~ {/. 
' 
\ 11! 2,. 
I' 
,• 
~------~------------~~--------------+q 1,. 
Allaz (1991) studies a model where each firm has two decision variables in the first 
period: futures and inventories. Futures are shown to serve a strategic purpose much in the 
same way as do inventories. Thus even under perfect foresight, firms could take positions on 
the futures markets in order to affect the outcome of the sales game in the second period. 
Furthermore it is shown that if futures trading is costless, strategic behaviour will be carried 
out using futures whilst cost minimization is achieved by means of inventories. 
A study which is somewhat more remotely related to ours is that of Saloner (1986). 
In fact, in a certain sense, it turns our model on the head. Production only takes place in the 
first period, but sales can take place in both periods. The price in the second period is, 
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however, determined by technical terms (obsolescence) and treated as a parameter. The 
assumption is that the firms can sell whatever they like at this technical price. The decisions 
of the first period are assumed to be made sequentially: Initially firms choose outputs, which 
then become common knowledge. Thereafter the sales decisions are made. 
The model exhibits two interesting features: First, since the di~zo~~ted second period 
price net of inventory cost is assumed to be less than (constant) )fiarginillC't'lst, supply of an 
addition~! unit f~r sale in th~ first perio.d for a give~ leve~ of prod?ctjo~ is11es.\?ostl/0 than 
an additiOnal umt of production. For a giVen production this allow~~--;[;urns to pursue a more 
aggresive strategy on the market, thereby shoving the reaction fun~ fun 'outwards. This more 
' 
aggressive reaction function however experiences a kink at the actual 'production. The 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the same as the equilibrium of the one shot game with 
the important qualification that conjectures are locally consistent which one may find a nice 
feature of the model. On the other hand, equilibrium inventories are zero so the only effect 
of introducing them as a strategic decision variable is to render conjectures consistent. 
Second, it is shown that if one firm has a first mover advantage at the production 
stage, it will not achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium because it cannot commit itself to sell 
everything it produced in the first period. Instead it will end up at a point between the Nash 
and the Stackelberg equilibrium, with the Stackelberg equilibrium arising at the limit, when 
storage costs are prohibitive or when the decline in the price due to obsolescence is very 
large. Storage costs thus provide a commitment not to hold inventory, but rather to sell what 
it produced. This is a problem of time consistency: Producing the Stackelberg output does not 
commit the firm to actually sell it. If it reoptimizes it will sell less depending on the storage 
costs. 
The cooperative study provided by Rotemberg and Saloner (1985) deserves a 
comment. Recall that if both firms share constant market shares conjectures and if Slutsky 
symmetry is satisfied, then the outcome will be collusive in the sense that joint profit will be 
maximized. In this sense, our model also encompasses the cooperative case. Rotemberg and 
Saloner see inventories as a means of punishing a deviator from a collusive understanding in 
a repeated game setting. The problem is to sustain collusion in the first place by threatening 
to revert to Cournot behaviour if the rival deviates. Again, inventories allow firms to employ 
a more aggressive strategy since costs are sunk, thus making the threat more credible. On the 
other hand, the higher the inventory, the higher is also the firms own incentive to cheat on 
the rival. The incentive constraints then imply two critical values of inventory: if the level of 
inventory falls between these two values, collusion can be sustained. If it falls outside the 
range, there is an incentive to deviate. 
10 In terms of opportunity costs. 
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2. Two Period Linear-Quadratic Oligopoly with Stocks 
In this section, a closed form of the strategic stocks is found for ann-firm oligopoly. 
We parametrize the model by postulating homogeneous goods, linear demand and quadratic 
cost functions. By setting n = 2, an example of the general model,4JfJiiection 1 is achieved. 
I 1.\{ ,, , 
The Cournot, Bertrand/competitive and cooperative equilibrium 'stocks' are calculated in a 
closed form. I show how stocks vary with the level and the ~'Iolf'! of 1de';!~d, the cost of 
,) J, '. • ' 
storage, the number of firms and the concavity of the cost fu'~}F~'. 
1
, ' 
• p~ 
2.1 The Parametrized n-person Model 
I retain the notation of Section 1 with suitable extension of the definitions to a general 
oligopoly. The set of players is N .. {1,2, ... , n}. The inverse demand function is the same in 
both periods and linear in total sales: 
P.,, = a - flq.,, with q, I .. r q,,, 
ViEN 
(50) 
Cost functions are identical across all firms and periods and quadratic in current production: 
1 2 C = yx. i,t 2 l,t , y > 0. 
Storage costs are linear in the amount stored and identical across firms: 11 
(51) 
(52) 
Discounting is ignored: b1 = 1 for all i in N. We thus have a completely symmetric oligopoly 
with profit functions: 
rci,J = P.,Jq,,~ - c.] - /.1 
'· '· 
n:i,2 = P.,2q;,2 - c.2 
'· 
ViE N (53) 
11 This formulation is an approximation of (12-14). The second derivative is zero and 
though continuous, the function is not differentiable at s1 1 = 0, so care has to be taken to use 
the right derivative around zero. Alternatively on can thin'k of the formulation as one in which 
s_, = 0, for all i, in which case (52) is just a linear storage cost curve. 
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2.2 Cournot Conjectures 12 
The Period-2 Sales game: 
The first order conditions can be written 
aT - (fJM + y E)x~. 2 - fJM 5.,2 = (] ,·i' (54) 
, . I './. 
,r ' , '' /'I<:. i I 
where M is an nxn matrix with 2's in the diagonal and 1 's elsel~/e'; T <\~ an nxl vector 
' ' 
of 1 's and E is the nxn identity matrix. x. 2 and s_ 2 are the nxl vectors of x,,'s and s,,'s 
' ' 
respectively. Let A = (fJ - y) (fJ + y + fJn). (fJM + yl)·1 is then an nxn matrix with 
(y + fJn)/11 in the diagonal and - fJ/11 off the diagonal. Manipulating the first order 
conditions leads to the following period-2 production decisions: 
x= a _fJs-
i,2 fJ(n-l) + y fJ + y i,l 
fly s 
t; •,1 (55) 
from which it is seen that an increase in own stocks decreases period-2 production at least 
twice as much as an increase in rivals' stocks: 
dx,,2 
ds. 1 
'· 
= 
-fJ(fJ(n+l) +2y) 
ll 
dx 2 
< -'-· = 
ds. 1 ), 
-fly 
T' Vi,jEN, i,oj . (56) 
Substituting (55) into the profit function (53) and taking the derivative with respect to the 
firms own decision variable, sp , the marginal unit of inventories is seen to affect optimal 
second period profits by 
= .l[(y+jJ)(y+2jJ)(y-nf3)a- j3y[(j3-y)2+j3y(n+1)+2j32n]s. 1 (57) 112 ' 
- J32[(j3-y)(l +ny)-(y+j3n)(l +nj3)]s,, 1 ]. 
The Period-I Production and Storage Game: 
Subtracting the first order condition for s,1 from that for q,1 we get an expression 
similar to ( 49) that can be rearranged to yield 
12 The duopoly model with Cournot conjectures, linear demand and quadratic costs 
provides the basis for the model in Chapter 2. 
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-------··---------------
1 [d:r<2 l 1 = ___ - L = -[/la a - Jl,si,I 
y dsi,I y 
- Jl.s., 1 - L (58) 
where !la' 11, and 11. are the respective coefficients to a, si, I an1_""s.:tftji.~ (57). Plugging this 
expression into the first order condition for x,1 and rearranging gives an equation in the s,/s: 
/ . I ff 
11 a- flnt -11 s -11 s /j,r'. ·,1, (59) 
a - 2 • I I i,l Jll(?t:. 11 
:r ,/ 
where the 11 's are the resulting coefficients: 
11a = (fl(n + 1) + Y)!la - Y 
11i = fly - Yf.li + fl 
11. =fly - Y/1. +fl(Jli+ (n + 1)!1. 
The n equations (59) define a system in the s,,'s similar to (54): 
(11.,a - flnt)T = Ms: 1 
(60) 
(61) 
where M is an nxn matrix with 11, + 11. on the diagonal and 11i off the diagonal. M- 1 is an nxn 
11 + (n - 1)11. 
matrix with · ' on the diagonal and 
11.(11. + n11) 
-11 
--,--.:...' --,- off the diagonal. The 
11.(11. + n11) 
solution to (61) is readily found to be 
where 
11.,a - flnt 
11i + n11. 
= /); y (y + 2fl)(y - nfl)a - nfl/);t 
fl ~ 
(62) 
Vi E N, 
0 < 3 .. 1 - (63) 
y [(n + 1) + ny (fl+y+fln)((fl-y}' -fly(n -1)-2fl2n)- fl(fln -y }((fl+y )(1 +yn) -(y+fln)(1-fln) )] . 
Note that the first part of (62) could.be found directly from (59) by postulating that since the 
oligopoly is completely symmetric, we must have si, I = s., 1 /n, V iEN. The strategic stocks 
are seen to depend positively on the demand intercept: 
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(. 
= !J.y(y + f3n)(y + 2f3) > 0 (64) 
da 
and negatively on the cost of storage: 
ds."1 
'· 
'· 
'il (65) 
/ 
,If 
i' ' /'},r:. i ' )J~ 4• ~ ,ri. I' 
' ' 
' 
2.3 Bertrand or Competitive Conjectures 
The Period-2 Sales Game: 
The firms' production is optimal when price equals marginal cost or 
yx;,2 = P.,2 (66) 
so total supply is 
q•,2 = np.,2 /y - s.,, (67) 
whilst demand is found by inverting the inverse demand curve (50). The market clearing price 
is then 
a - f3s 
• I 
P. 2 = Y f3 ' , 
. y + n 
(68) 
which depends negatively on stocks. Interpreted as Bertrand price setting this means that the 
behaviour will be more aggressive and competition fiercer since the cost of producing 
inventories is sunk (as is the cost of storage). In other words, the marginal cost of supplying 
a unit from inventories is zero. Interpreted as competitive behaviour according to which the 
firms supposedly are price takers, (68) in principle just gives the market clearing price but 
in the period before they know that they can affect prices through inventories. This is 
somewhat paradoxical and one may therefore favour the Bertrand explanation, in which case 
( 68) is the subgame perfect price. 
Equilibrium profits depend on stocks as follows: 
d:rr.;,2 - y ~( f3 ) ' ' ] 
__ - 1 - (a - f3s. 1) - f3s; 1 • ds. y + f3n y + f3n ' ' 
'· 1 
(69) 
The derivative is positive in symmetric equilibrium unless firms' inventories are very large 
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compared to demand in which case a corner solution obtains anyway. 13 Note that the 
derivative (69) goes to zero as the number of players goes to infinity: In perfect competition 
where players form an atomistic supply side, there is no scope for strategic stocks. 
The Period-I Production and Storage Game: 
/ I If 
The first order conditions for period 1 require that the rfi'~~~~al c~~t dlstorage should 
equal the marginal gain from inventories or L = d:rc,: 2 /ds,,r 'From this we get optimal 
inventories: 
1 (y - jJ(n - l))ya - (y + jJn)\ 
Y fJ (y - jJ(n - l))n - (y - jJn) 
(70) 
that again depend positively on demand (a) and negatively on the marginal cost of storage 
( L ). 
2.4 Cooperation 
If the firms cooperate they will not hold inventories in our model: s,'1 = 0. This is 
so since demand and cost functions are the same in the two periods and since storage is a 
costly undertaking. Everybody14 is better off not engaging in the costly and unproductive 
storage activity. This result highlights two important points: First, if the firms are involved 
in Cournot or Bertrand competition then the possibility of carrying stocks leads to lower 
profits than if storage were not possible. The strategic weapon cannot be ignored once it is 
there and so competition gets fiercer than would otherwise be the case leading to a prisoners' 
dilemma and an inferior equilibrium. Second, in the cooperative equilibrium of Rotemberg 
and Saloner's (1985) repeated game (cf. Section 1.5), inventory is held in order to make the 
threat fiercer. This effect is lost in our simple two period model where cooperative behaviour 
is imposed exogenously on the model. In other words, our model does not explain how 
cooperation comes about. 
na y - jJ(n - 1) a ( jJ(n - 2)) 13 To be precise: if s. < = - 1 - ::....:.--;;"-
'·' jJ y(n - 1) - jJn jJ y - jJ 
ViE N, then 
the derivative (69) is positive, but in the converse case prices are negative. 
14 i.e. among producers - not among consumers! 
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3. Conclusion 
We set up a fairly general model of two period duopoly and showed how inventories 
can serve a strategic purpose. With Bertrand or Cournout conjectures, inventories provide a 
vehicle for committing to sell more in the second period. This renders C,91lJ,J:>~etition fiercer and 
in the end the rivals end up in a suboptimal equilibrium as in the piisorl~rS'' dilemma. The 
strategic effect of inventories depends crucially on three factors: r' 
d' ' 1) convexity of the production cost function; '~~ If/ 
2) the cost of storage; /! ' , 
3) the competitive regime as expressed by the conjectures. 
,, 
' 
' 
We discussed four different such regimes: Competition, Bertrand pnce setting, Cournot 
quantity setting and Cooperation. 
We then proceeded to give a closed form example of strategic inventories in a 
parametrized model with linear, homogeneous demand and quadratic cost functions. While 
this set-up is more special, the model was rendered more general by treating an n-firm 
oligopoly rather than only duopoly. We found strategic inventories to be a linear function of 
the level of demand and of the unit cost of storage, and in addition to depend on the number 
of firms, the slope of the demand function and the convexity of the cost function. This applies 
to both Bertrand (competitive) price setting and to Cournot quantity setting. A cooperative 
oligopoly would avoid the cost of storage and not keep inventories for strategic purposes. 
In the parametrized model with identical cost and demand functions in the two periods, 
the only reason to hold inventories is strategic. This therefore nicely illustrates that it is a 
costly option for non-cooperative rivals but also an option that they cannot afford to ignore 
once it is there. Cooperative players will ignore it. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Oil Futures and Strategic Stocks at Sea 
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ABSTRACT: A theoretical model explaining the determination of prices in the markets for 
North Sea crude oil is set up. Three markets are analysed in a three-stage game in which 
market concentration increases by each stage: In the first stage, the International Petroleum 
Exchange is modeled as a thick futures market. This market is also used to hedge against the 
uncertain outcome of the 15-Day forward market, modeled in the second stage. There, a small 
club of traders enter futures contracts knowing that this will affect the storage decision and 
thereby the spot price profile. The third stage models the spot-market as a two-period duopoly 
with inventories. The strategic effect of, and interaction between, inventories and futures 
positions is investigated. 
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0. Introduction 
In his The World Price of Oil (1976), Henk Houthakker wondered why there existed 
no futures market for oil. Oil is a relatively standardized commodity that is stored under the 
ground or the sea by Mother Nature and storable above the ground and4t~a. A standardized 
futures contract is easy to design. Let us quote (p. 2): . . '· ' 1 ''" 
"For oil, there has been nothing like the Chicago wheat market, where p/.~~ 1are se/ daiiY,/g'y the 
offers of producers and the bids of consumers, with considerable particip'(tt~ntby m~rchants and 
speculators. 1 · ,/ 
Why does petroleum lack such a central market? In common with most comrn'odities that 
are traded on futures markets, petroleum is storable. While not as homogeneous as copper, it is not 
more heterogeneous than wheat, and a serviceable standard contract would not be hard to design. 
Although transportation costs are relatively more important than for most centrally traded 
commodities, this would not seem an insuperable obstacle either. Perhaps the main reason for the 
failure of a central market is that for many years the industry has been dominated by integrated 
companies that handle oil from the well to the gasoline pump. Merchants, brokers, and other 
intermediaries are relatively unimportant; as a result, arm's length transactions have traditionally 
been less prevalent in petroleum than in many other raw materials. The significance of this point 
is that the integrated companies appear to be losing much of their control over crude oil, so that 
arm's-length transactions will become more common. In due course, an central market may 
emerge. 11 
In the eighties, Houthakker's forecast became reality. In the US, the Nymex crude oil 
contract for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) was successfully launched in 1983, as a result 
of the increased volatility of oil after the Iranian revolution. In the meantime, North Sea oil 
was discovered. The need for "forward" trading of Brent oil was felt for the same reason and 
led (around 1986) to a standardized contract for Brent crude oil, on what began to be called 
the "Brent 15-Day market". Initially, the pairwise contracts were "forward" in the strict sense 
of the word, that is, the particular seller had to deliver to his particular trading partner. 
Gradually, this market developed into a futures market, that is, a market where a large 
proportion of the trade was for hedging and speculation purposes only. On top of it, the 
International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) launched - with mixed success - a classic crude oil 
futures contract', copied from the Nymex contract, in 1983. Today, two futures markets for 
Brent crude exist on top of each other: the 15-Day and the IPE. The latter has a centralized 
open outcry exchange, a clearing house and a growing number of participants, including the 
majors, oil traders and locals. The Brent 15-Day market, to the contrary, is in the hands of 
a club of producers and traders. 
The emergence of these markets motivates the present chapter, which tries to 
simultaneously model the oligopolistic interplay of the majors who produce North Sea oil, for 
whom stocks at sea have a strategic role, and the presence of two futures markets for Brent 
crude on which these majors are also in a strategic situation, given their size and small 
1 Its modifications are described in Phlips (1992). 
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number. To put is simply, this paper is an attempt to combine the modelling of strategic 
stocks from Chapter 1 with an effort to give a game-theoretic explanation of how two futures 
markets for the same natural resource work when the corresponding spot market is controlled 
by a few producers. The basic approach is the one developed by Phlips and Harstad (1990 
and 1991). 
<;/if, -,t~_·· 
We confine the analysis to the minimum oligopoly nrodeftliat allows for strategic 
interaction between suppliers, that is, a duopoly. The game·proceeqs in ;pree stages. In the 
first stage, the producers meet with an anonymous futul,iwrket,' whfch is supposed to 
mimic the characteristics of the !PE. Having determined thgJ'uhires:price and positions, we 
model the 15-Day market as the second-stage subgame, where oil cdmpanies trade bilateral 
futures contracts among themselves and with a speculator. These 15-Day contracts will 
depend on the positions already taken on the IPE. In the third stage, the companies then play 
a two-period extraction game. They each have a known total to extract over the two periods, 
but can use stocks of crude oil at sea and the extraction profile to manipulate prices so as to 
render their IPE and 15-Day positions more profitable. This comes about because the maturity 
futures price is taken to be the second-period spot price. 
Time plays a role only in the two periods, 1 and 2, of the extraction game of the third 
stage. The two previous stages modelling the two futures markets allow the producers to 
precommit themselves to certain sales (or purchases) in the second period of the third stage. 
One can imagine that the !PE (in the first stage) opens and closes in period -0 leaving enough 
time for the producers to sell or buy !PE futures as they wish. When the IPE has closed, in 
period +0 the three market participants agree on their 15-Day contracts (in the second stage). 
When the 15-Day market closes, the extraction game of the third stage takes place. At this 
stage, the two producers decide on the optimal extraction, sales and storage profiles over the 
two periods. Only after this third stage will the stochastic demand be revealed and it is in this 
sense that time does not play a role in stages one and two modelling the futures markets: No 
relevant information is revealed during or between these two stages. This assumption allows 
us to focus on the strategic and speculative motives of futures market trading. We shall return 
to the interpretation. of time in relation to the real world markets in section seven. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces the necessary 
notation for the spot market, which is described as a fairly traditional duopoly extracting an 
exhaustible resource. Everything is kept nicely linear or quadratic but the results carry through 
if these assumptions are substituted by appropriate convexity conditions. The following four 
sections then unravel the game backwards. Section 2 solves the Cournot duopoly for the 
extraction game. The production schedule is unaffected by the futures markets while the sales 
depend on the net position taken by the producers on the two futures markets. To close this 
gap, inventories must necessarily depend on these same net positions. Section 3 analyses the 
strategic use of stocks by changing the basic model of the spot market slightly so as to 
highlight the strategic effect of holding inventories. These strategic inventories are also found 
to depend on the futures positions as well as on the producers' beliefs regarding the future 
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spot price. Section 4 then recedes to the second stage, modelling the 15-Day market.'The set 
of contracts that are mutually beneficial to the market participants (i.e. the (bilateral) core) 
is characterized. This will be a large set depending on price expectations and the futures 
positions taken on the IPE. Section 5 takes us back to the first stage where the producers' 
optimal positions on the IPE are modelled. Given the potential multi£lisity of outcomes of 
the imperfectly organized 15-Day market, the IPE serves as a vehicle fol'the producers to 
specula.te and hedge not only against the uncertainty on the spot ,r::'ar~et· bqt a~s~ against the 
non-umqueness of the 15-Day market. ,./iJJ, ·:·) ., • • 
1. Setting the Stage: Duopoly, Storage and Futures 
~y~t;~' , • 
' 
. 
' 
Since the play of all three stages focuses on the cash market we shall begin our story 
there. Two companies, A and B, supply a homogeneous product, crude oil, to a spot market. 
Extraction takes place in two periods, 1 and 2, but each extractor (i=A,B) has a known 
maximum :X/ First-period production can however be stored in tankers rather than being 
sold immediately. 
Let the first (alphabetical) subscript refer to the companies and the second (numeric) 
to the period. q denotes sales and x production. We impose the constraints 
i = A,B (1) 
on total production and sales. Stocks at sea, s;, are produced but not sold in the first period, 
that is, for i = A,B 
(2) 
(3) 
so that the tankers have to be delivered in the second period. 
Production and storage are not costless activities. We assume that production costs, 
C, are convex and, for simplicity, that they are quadratic in the number of barrels pumped: 
2 In the North Sea, the maximum production of Brent blend is approximately 21 million 
barrels per month for technical reasons. Each producer is entitled to a certain predetermined 
fraction of this according to ownership and participation. Thus, the maximum production is 
for this reason given in the short run. What determines capacity in the long run is a different 
matter which will not be pursued here. 
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(i~A,B; t~1,2). (4) 
The cost of storage, 1, is taken to be linear in the number of barrels stored, 
(i ~ A,B; j~O), (5) 
and the profit of company i thus becomes 
(6) 
where p1 and p2 are the spot prices in the two periods and pF and N; are the futures price and 
the net position resulting from the two first stages of the game. 
To complete the description of the spot market, we propose linear inverse demand 
functions' to determine the spot prices: 
p, ~ a - b q, where q, ~ qA, + q8,, t ~ 1, 2 , (7) 
and where the strength of demand, a, is a stochastic variable which is perceived by the agents 
as being distributed normally with unknown mean d and known variance Var(a) = 1: 
a- N(d,1) . (8) 
The participants on the futures markets hold different beliefs E;(a) on d: they assign 
probability one to their own belief (their subjective probability distribution) and probability 
zero to the beliefs of the other players. We are thus in a situation of inconsistent prior beliefs 
3 In earlier papers [Brianza, Phlips and Richard (1990); Phlips and Harstad (1991 and 
1990)) the specification q, = a'- ftp, leading to the inverse demand curve 
a' 1 
P, ~ 7f - fJ q, , 
was chosen. While this gives us a natural interpretation of a' as the level of demand, the 
notational simpler version with a = a'!fJ and b = 1/fJ has been chosen here. The 'strength' 
of demand a and the 'level' of demand a' are related through a = a'b. 
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in the sense of Selten (J 982).4 (. 
The risk averse producers' ex ante payoffs are modelled according to the mean-
variance model: 
K 
W, = EJO) - jVar(il) , (9) 
where K; measures constant absolute risk aversion5• ;" . 1 ' 1 If 
The expected profit is readily found by taking i's expectaW'~~~f (6)1,T~e· variance of 
the profit can be shown to be ' · ,' 
Var(il) = (x, - Nf . (10) 
We shall leave the modelling of the 15-Day market and the IPE for Sections 4 and 5. Here 
we follow many a good theatre play and first offer the solution to the final stage in which the 
strategic effects of stocks are highlighted. 
2. Stage Three: Cournot Duopoly and the Extraction Game 
First note that the variablitiy of profits arises from the unhedged part (x, -NJ of total 
extraction. It is unaffected by the time profile of sales or production. In order to decide on 
these time profiles, the companies maximize W, with respect to x,,, q,1, x,2, q,2 and s,, which 
amounts to maximizing expected profits subject to the constaints (1-3). 
Manipulation of the first order conditions leads to the following extraction schedule: 
4 It will take us too far from the main argument to discuss the origin of the differences 
in beliefs. We take it for an empirical fact that traders act on differences in subjective 
probability distributions (agreeing to disagree) even if they hold the same information (which 
they thus interpret differently), optimism and pessimism being inexplicable motivations for 
trading. Everyday futures and financial markets are crowded with busily trading agents that 
share the same information, thereby rejecting any zero-trade theorem. On optimistic and 
conservative standards of behaviour, see Greenberg (1990). On rejecting the rational 
expectations hypothesis, see Lovell (1986). On informational differences leading to different 
positions, see Stein (1987) and p. 27. 
5 This follows automatically if the underlying preferences are represented by a utility 
function that is exponential in profits and if profits follow the normal distribution. See for 
example Newbery and Stiglitz (1981 ), pp. 74-75. This utility function is used repeatedly in 
Chapter 3 and, especially, Chapter 4. 
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r... 
i=A,B (11) 
cl 
-
2j o2:x, 2j l(l;=A,B xi2 = X. - = + lif 
' 
·4 { 'jf'. cl - c2 cl + c2 cl + c ' 
. 2 
(12) 
where the first term represents cost smoothing: .If 
' ' 
c2 (13) 
b2 = 
cl 
= 
c1x 
= 
~cr:2 
-
1 2 
+ ~c2x2 c, + c2 c1x c2x 2 c1x 
(14) 
The chosen quadratic form of the cost function implies that comparing the total cost of 
producing a given quantity, x, in one period to the total cost of producing the same amounts 
in both periods is equivalent to comparing the marginal cost, c,x, in this period to the sum of 
marginal costs and again equivalent to just comparing increments, c" in the marginal cost. At 
any rate, (11) has the natural interpretation that the higher the cost of production in the second 
period is (the higher bJ, the more should be produced in advance in period 1. Vice versa for 
second-period production: the higher the cost of first-period production is, relatively speaking, 
the more of it should be postponed to the cheaper second period. The second term of (11) and 
(12) compares the costliness of storage to that of production. As in Chapter 1, we find that 
the higher the cost of storage, the less should be produced in advance and the more should 
be postponed to the second period. Note that the optimal extraction policy does not depend 
on the futures position taken. 
The sales schedule for company A, say, is found to be 
+ 
1 j 
6b 
1 j 
6b 
and its stocks of crude oil can therefore be expressed as• 
6 Using (2-3), (1 1) and (15). 
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M = bl - bl = 
1 y = + 
b 
1N 1 . 
- B- -YJ, 
6 6 
cl - cl 
cl - cl 
12 
(cl + cl) 
where (17) 
and (18) 
'1;(. 
/ )1. ,1/ ;, . 1 
'J/M; I' 
'• 
' ' ' 
(19) 
That sales depend on the net short futures positions in the manner shown in equations (15-16) 
is in perfect concordance with the findings in Phlips and Harstad (1991) (see their equation 
(6)). In addition, we find that sales depend on the term j/b which relates the marginal cost of 
storage to the slope of the inverse demand curve, and thus to the marginal revenue of the 
operation. We see that higher marginal cost of storage yields lower stocks and thus lower 
second-period sales. First-period sales will be correspondingly higher. 
The size of inventory holdings is given by (17). The first term shows the cost-
smoothing purpose of stocks. If c1 > c 1 so that t.b > 0, a part of second-period sales should 
be produced in the first, less costly period and stored. This operation should take the cost of . 
storage into account, as indicated by the fourth term, from which it is seen that higher cost 
of storage lowers the optimal level of stocks, as should be. The second term of (17) shows 
that if producer A has precommitted herself by taking a short position on the futures markets 
(NA > 0), then part of this quantity will optimally be met by sales from stocks. If the rival 
takes a similar position (NB > 0), this lowers the profitability of the operation, thereby also 
lowering the optimal level of stocks for company A. Aggregate stocks (sA + sB) depend 
positively on the aggregate net position (NA +NB). 
Before discussing the strategic use of stocks, let us examine the expected spot prices: 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
p is the price that would be obtained in both periods if the futures markets and the storage 
facility did not exist. Net short futures positions (N, > 0) represent a binding commitment to 
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furnish the second-period cash market with a certain amount of crude, and to the htent that 
this amount is already sold at the price pF, the companies 
manipulate prices by lowering p 2 (and therefore raising p 1). 
3. The Strategic Use of Stocks 
have a common interest to 
/ ' i '_/ 
d't,
1 
'·'" The strategic use of stocks is in many ways similar to tha~ tutur~~ positions. Indeed, 
by undertaking a larger production in the first period and storin~i 7some of it for sale in the 
second period, the companies incur the extra cost of production and the cost of storage in the 
first period. In the second period these costs are sunk and the supply from stocks is costless. 
Stocks therefore represent a credible commitment to raise second-period sales, thereby 
offering a potential position as a Stackelberg leader. 
In a more general model, the strategic effect of inventories would imply that total 
production were increased and that the average price were lower than if storage were 
impossible'. The producers are trapped in a suboptimal Nash equilibrium because both are 
trying to position themselves as leaders. Most of this strategic effect is so far lost in our 
model since the oil companies are required to produce and sell a given total (see (1 )). What 
is left is the direct effect of storage on prices, whereby higher cost of storage discourages 
holding inventories and leads to higher immediate sales. 
To illustrate this point we change the model slightly for the sake of this section. It is 
crucial that the companies be allowed to determine the size of total production. We therefore 
abandon the second equality of constraint (1) and only require total production to be sold by 
the end of period 2. To keep things simple we also assume that demand only materializes in 
the second period, which implies that everything that is produced in the first period is stored: 
(23) 
(24) 
The situation is more complicated than before since uncertainty now not only pertains to the 
average price that results from a known total production, but involves the determination of 
this total itself. 
Maximization of W, with respect to x,2 results in the following sales for company A: 
7 See Allaz (1991) and Chapter 1. 
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(, 
qA 2 ~sA + ~ {b[D.(a) - b(s8 -sA) - b(N8 -NA) - K8 (s8 -N~ - KA(sA-N) 
- (b+c2 +K~[Eia) - b(sA+s8 } - (b + KA)(NA-s)Jt 
(25) 
4· '~~~ 
where D = (2b + c2 + KJ(2b + c2 + KJ - b2 > 0, D.( a) is the differe~ce1i;h Yipinion (EA(a) -
E8 (a)) on d, (s8 - sJ is the difference in stock levels and (N8 - NJris similqrly t\)f difference 
in futures positions. ( s, - N J represents the unhedged part of stocki'f,§~ fllat the 'Mo last terms fllt1 '/~' , .. 
in the first square brackets represent the different risk valuation oftimhedg!;ld stocks. 
The effect of an increase in the stocks of company A is seen to increase its own sales 
by 
(26) 
whereas it will decrease company B's sales by 
1 
--c2b < 0, D 
(27) 
so that total production and thus total sales are increased 
(28) 
while the spot price at maturity is lower, 
1 ~ - _bc2 (b + c2 + K8 ) < 0 , D 
(29) 
than would otherwise be the case. 
The expressions for the sales quantities (25) can be substituted back into the payoff 
functions (9) which then can be maximized to find the subgame-perfect first-period production 
(or, equivalently, stocks). These will depend on the beliefs about the strength of demand and 
on the futures positions taken at an earlier stage: 
(30) 
(31) 
where the coefficients v,, <jl,, ljJ, and w, depend on the original parameters of the model, b, c1, 
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c2, KA and K8 , as reported in the appendix." 
The main difference in comparison with the solution to the model where total 
production is given (see (11-19)) is that the beliefs regarding the strength of demand enter the 
production/storage/sales decisions explicitly (see (25)). Intuition suggests that production 
depends positively on the agent's own expectations regarding the str!',ngt)l of demand (i.e. v, 
> 0) and negatively on the rival's (i.e . .p, < 0) but this may not lie trli'~"'for all parameter 
constellations. Another difference is that risk aversion affects . decisi'iln m,Jking at the 
production level. This was not the case when total production wtf~Ifn, be,cau£e in that case 
uncertainty regarding the strength of demand only affected profits, throug6-the average price 
p that pertained to the given quantity (see (20-22)), whereas here the total' quantity can also 
be chosen freely. This renders the decision process much more complex. In a sense, the effect 
of changing the model to allow for strategic stocks has been to replace xA and x8 in (11-16) 
by EA(a) and E8 (a) in (25) and (30-31), and to render the corresponding coefficients more 
complex. 
Summarizing, we have found that the production, sales and storage decisions of the 
two rivals of the duopoly cash market depend on the futures positions taken in advance. If 
there is a constraint on total production, then this enters the decisions, and storage mainly 
serves as a cost smoothing device. If the decision is not present (or not effective) then the 
agents' beliefs regarding the strength of demand are important, and the inventories serve a 
strategic purpose (in addition to the cost smoothing). The two companies are trapped in the 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma type: The effect of 
simultaneously positive stocks of crude oil will raise total production (30-31) and lower the 
spot price at maturity (29). The cooperative outcome, obtained if both agree not to store, 
would yield higher profits, but then each company has an incentive to defect (26), thereby 
making the other firm worse off (27). Since both firms simultaneously try to act as 
(Stackelberg) leaders by precommitting themselves to higher sales through inventories, a sub-
optimal Nash equilibrium results! 
We now move on to describe the futures markets and find the futures positions that 
are so crucial for the sales, storage and production schedules. 
8 We subsume the cost of storage in the cost of production of the first period. Since first-
period production is not sold, the storage and the production decisions are essentially one and 
the same. 
9 The incentive to try to act as a leader depends crucially on the convexity of the cost 
functions (i.e. on c1 and c2) as also noted by Arvan (1985). The more convex the cost function 
is (the higher c1 and c2 are), the higher are the strategic inventories. For this reason it is 
difficult to separate the cost smoothing and the strategic motive for holding stocks. 
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4. Stage Two: The 15-Day Market 
As mentioned there are two futures markets for North Sea crude oil: the !PE and the 
15-Day market. The 15-Day market, which is the subject of this section, is characterized by 
there being only few big participants in the market. The functioning oft,~~ jlilarket is described 
in Mabro et al. (1986), eh. 12, in Phlips (1992) and in Chapter 4. It is '1;~rfinformal, self-
regulating club of North Sea producers, oil traders, refiners and br<!fkers, 'ea~h o~hich is in 
the market for a variety of reasons" (Mabro et al. (1986), p. 169/iJt~~e mark~(participants /lJf'/·?' ,, 
bargain about standardized forward contracts via telephone and the agteed-upon contracts are 
then telexed. This bargaining can only be realistically modelled at the cost o'f a considerable 
increase in complexity10• We shall refrain from this here and simplify the model to highlight 
the role played by our two producers, A and B. 
To be specific we assume that only three agents take part in the 15-Day market: A, 
B and an oil trader, S, who is not interested in the crude oil per se but only in buying 
(selling) crude oil on the 15-Day market with the expectation of being able to sell (buy) it on 
the spot market at a higher (lower) price. In the literature, such agents are referred to as 
speculators or, in a somewhat imprecise choice of words, as arbitrageurs. Here we call them 
speculators. 
So far the two futures markets have been described crudely by an aggregate futures 
price pF and the quantity, N,, by which a producer i (i = A,B) is net short. We now have to 
be more specific. Let F, denote the net position of player i on the !PE and f. the net position 
on the 15-Day market, i.e. 
i=A,B,S. (32) 
We concentrate on the 15-Day positions in this section. Each of these f.'s results from 
potentially four different contracts 
!, = ~ - !/. + h - t: •. (33) 
where i = A, B, S, i "' j, j "' k, i "' k and all !' <: 0 
and where h signifies that i is selling to k. In our model, agents are trading on differences 
in beliefs regarding the future spot price. This being the case it will never happen that two 
contracts are set up where an agent i both sells to and buys from another agent at different 
prices, cf. Lemma 1 of Chapter 4. If the futures price is equal in the two contracts it will only 
be the net position that matters anyway. We shall therefore let the signed quantity 
10 This is the topic of Chapter 4. 
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' 
r.,. 
(34) 
denote the net position of i vis-a-vis j. fu > 0 implies that i takes a short position (sells 
futures) in the contract with j. We take this to mean that~ = [;i and /j~ =J). Then note that 
'J¥·· '/:_'•" 
' :. ~:i ',f V 
/j; = -[;i = -[;i, so that net positions on the 15-Day market can be written:. 
t.s - t.s 
/' 
i' I , 'tf /I./; ; ; AJM: ,, 
' 
' ' 
where[; > 0 if the player is net short in total on the market. Note that fA + [ 8 + fs = 0. 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
The three agents, A, B, and S, trade on the expected spot price in period 2 and they 
all know that the spot price is formed according to (21-22). That is to say, they know that the 
producers' net positions will influence the spot price or, to put it more polemically, that the 
producers will manipulate the time profile of spot prices, raising the first-period price where 
all sales are cash and lowering the second-period price where part of the sales have been 
made in advance (assuming that they are net short, i.e. that NA + N8 > 0). All this is common 
knowledge for the market participants and it will not discourage the speculator from trading 
on the market. What the market participants do not agree upon is the mean value of a. Each 
has his firm opinion E;(a) on this. They thus expect three different mean spot prices E;(p:J 
= p~ according to their different beliefs on d and according to (21-22). It follows from (8) 
that they perceive p 2 as being normally distributed with mean p~ and unit variances. 
4.1 The speculator's payoff 
We assume that the speculator is risk neutral" and thus maximizes expected profit: 
(38) 
where p~i is the price of the contract that S agrees upon with i. A contract is fully described 
by the pair (p~J, /;). The expected profit can be rewritten using (21-22): 
11 To assume that he is risk averse does not change the analysis substantially. 
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where 
/ 
and F =FA + F8 is the producers' joint net position on the IPE./j; 1 ., ''"?~· 
' 
4.2 The two producers' payoffs 
I; 
' 
' 
(39) 
(40) 
The producers' payoffs from trading on the futures markets are found by substituting 
(15-16) and (20-22) into (9) and subtracting the profit that would have been made on the spot 
market in the absence of the futures markets. This leaves us with the following expressions 
(41) 
(42) 
The first term on the r.h.s. of these expressions illustrates the immediate gain from having a 
futures market: pF is the average futures price and p; is the spot price that i would expect in 
the absence of futures markets. If pF > p; then A should, ceteris paribus, take a net short 
position NA > 0. The third term indicates the advantage of hedging the uncertain profit. In the 
case of complete hedging X,. = NA and the term is effectively optimized. The second term 
shows the strategic effect on the spot market profits of having a futures market. This term 
occurs because taking futures positions provides a credible vehicle for precommitment of spot 
sales or purchases. Note that, for example, A's payoff varies proportionally with 
(43) 
and that the futures markets affectA's output even if he does not participate, namely via the 
rival's net position on these markets. Indeed, if NA = 0, -w,:ur varies in proportion to 
(44) 
B's net position will always affect A's payoff positively in the absence of costly storage (j=O). 
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This comes about because a producer with zero position responds to the rival's'·position by 
shifting sales to the period with a higher price, If storage is possible at a cost this is no longer 
true for all values of N8 , as illustrated by Figure L 
Figure 1 The effect of a unilateral futures position on the rival's profit 
If B is long in the range 
I' 
,j'' i 
'1//;( 0'' 
' 
( NA = 0 ), (45) 
then A's optimal response on the spot market is to shift sales (see (15-16)) with N8 /b from 
period 1 where the price is then low (see (20)) to period 2 where the price is higher (21), 
Since the optimal extraction is independent of the futures positions (11-12), this operation can 
only be done by means of increased inventories (17). But increasing stocks has a cost, and 
so for small, long positions, B forces A to incur a loss since the cost of increasing the stocks 
dominates the extra expected revenue. 12 
The producers of course realize the strategic interdependence of their futures positions 
- an interdependence that stems from the effect of these positions on the equilibrium spot 
12 Note, however, that this result may be sensitive to the specification. 
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prices and quantities. Indeed, when taking positions on the futures markets, the producers 
weigh the speculative, the strategic and the hedging motives according to ( 41-42). 
The payoffs of the two futures markets can be split up according to the market that 
gives rise to them, or, put differently, we find the subgame perfect equilibria by maximizing 
the payoff of the second stage, the 15-Day market, for given positions on the IPE, before 
solving the first stage. t" f'i ,,, 
The ex-ante payoff stemming from the 15-Day market (incltJding thi~ matket's effects 
on the spot market payoff) can be written: /'/if/., · ,/1. 
/Jit~f", I' 
w~S = (p~~ - p A)f\B + (p~~ - pAnS - 'tJf.s i'tBSy> / 
KA (46) 
- 't2Af.s + 'tJBs + 't4A!AB - 2 (jAB + !As/ ' 
where 
't/ = _!_b > 0 
/8 
= -
1 bF 
"[2i 9 
7 
. + K.(x-. F) 
-} - ,. ; 
/8 I I 
i=A,B 
-.!__1· - K(x. -F); 2 I I l i = A,B. 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
In the following, superscript "15" is used to indicate that the variable has to do with the 15-
Day market. 
4.3 The contract curves 
Now, what can we say about the solutions to the 15-Day stage, without imposing 
further structure on the game? We require that any contract (p~j,[;) belongs to the contract 
curve between i andj, i.e. it must be true thatMRS;(p~j,[;j) = MRSlp~j,[;), where the marginal 
rates of substitution are given implicitly by ( 46-47) for the producers and (39) for the 
speculator. For example, the contract between the two producers should obey 
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awls A 
15 
a tAB MRSAB apAB = = = A 
awl' 15 A apAB 
a tAB 
These requirements are fulfilled if [;j = 0, that is, 
contract. Less trivially, if [;j ,. 0, (52) leads to 
aw;s 
15 
apAB 
= MRS;8. 
awts B 
(52) 
a tAB 
'll 
if the ,~:· 1parti~ipan~ do not enter a 
; ), IJI ~f:1·f · I' 
' 
' 
which apply to the contracts (p~~,JAB), (p~~,JA5 ) and (p~Lf85 ), repectively. Phlips and Harstad 
(1991) use an equivalent approach and find a similar system of equations." The main 
differences are that the producers' positions on the !PE, FA and F8 enter on the r.h.s. because 
they too can be used for hedging purposes; that their joint position on the !PE (F) enters 
because of the strategic effect of futures on the spot market (a feature which the two markets 
share); and that the cost of storage shows up since taking a futures position (on either market) 
changes optimal inventories (17). 
The equational system (53-55) cannot be solved to obtain a unique set of three 15-Day 
contracts. There are two reasons for this. The first reason has to do with the fact that 
individual rationality points to a range of possible prices depending on the quantities. The 
second reason arises because (53-55) only determine the net positions !M /8 and fs uniquely, 
not the decomposition on the three quantities JAB, fAs and f85. We discuss each point in turn. 
4.4 Individual rationality 
First, note that the futures prices, p~j, do not appear in (53-55). All we can say about 
these prices is that they should be individually rational according to (39) and ( 46-4 7). 
Individual rationality simply states that any contract should contribute a non-negative amount 
to each player's payoff since a zero contribution can always be achieved by not entering the 
13 See their equations (13). In Chapter 4, Section 4.1 we discuss a simplified version of 
their model. 
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contract. This requirement puts the following bounds on the prices: For the (pfj,,JAB) contract: 
PA - KA(:XA -FA - fAs- ~JAB) - ~j 
15 
s PAB s 
Pn - Ks(xs - FB - fss + ~!As) 
for the (PiLLs) contract: 
1 • 
+ -} 
2 
l 
r)'' - .; 
:s b )f.s - ~b(F + fss) - KA (x A - /Ji(;r,11) A ('AB 
15 
sPAs s 
~b(F + 2/As - fss) + ~j 
and finally for the (p~i,f8s) contract: 
A _19 b(F f . ( K, Pn - + As) + 2 
PA - !...b(F - f S 6 AS 
for fAs > 0; 
for fss > 0. 
+i!....j 
fB 
+ .!.__}· 
18 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
Note that the above three inequalities are true under the condition that /A8 , !As and Ins be 
strictly positive. For each of them the inequality is reversed if the sign of the quantity is 
reversed. Observe also the following: The range of futures prices that are acceptable for the 
two players involved in a contract depends on the futures positions taken by the producers 
on the !PE, on the quantities of the other 15-Day contracts, on the expected spot price and 
on the cost of storage. This range may or may not be empty, depending on the values of these 
variables. In case the range is empty, this corresponds to the players agreeing on the contracts 
(p~j,J;) = (0,0) which is always a possibility. This just means that these two players do not 
find it profitable to enter a contract. 
Equation (56) says that if A is selling to B (JAB > 0) then A will require a higher 
minimal sales price 
1) the more she has already hedged on the !PE (FA), 
2) 
3) 
the more she has already hedged in a contract with the speculator (/A5), 
the higher is her spot price expectation (p A), and 
4) the higher is the cost of storage (j). 
Buyer B will accept a higher maximal buying price 
1) the more he went short on the !PE (F 8), 
2) the more he went short in a contract with S (/85), 
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3) the higher is his expected spot price (j) 8 ), and 
4) the higher is the cost of storage (i). 
Note that the cost of storage raises the minimal selling price and the maximal buying 
price by the same amount, thus preserving the spread. Further, obs.61'V!l}; that the minimal 
selling price is increasing and the maximal buying price is decreasing i~· th~ quantity JAB of 
the contract. This ensures that the individually rational contract m~j\)llvolvt:i a ~i,iJ1te quantity. 
Indeed, it can be shown that the contract must satisfy either ')J (>; ~·. 
1
, 
. ' 
' ' 
o < J..B < 2 (fJB-j)A + KA(xA-FA-JA,J - KB(xB-FB-J~,J) (59) 
KA-KB 
in the case of A selling to B, or 
when B is selling to A. 
The analysis of the contracts where the producers.are selling to the speculator (57-58) 
follows the discussion above with the following two qualifications: Firstly, increased storage 
costs increase the producers' minimal selling price a bit more than the speculator's maximal 
buying price. Secondly, if K)2 < 1:1, the minimal selling price will be falling in the size of 
the contract. However, the speculator's maximal buying price will decrease at a much faster 
rate in J;s, thus still ensuring finite positions. The equivalents of (59-60) are 
(61) 
(62) 
Equations (56-62) all imply individual rationality by securing that each contract adds 
positively to the payoffs. Each player can, however, secure himself a minimum payoff without 
participating in the 15-Day market at all. Individual rationality then implies that payoffs 
should satisfy: 
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(63) 
(64) 
'· 
ES(ITS) ;;, 0 . . (65) 
I' l './ 
)/h. i '//, 
Note, though, that the minimal payoff of producer i may becom~ ~<lti.ve jf the rival k takes 
a position fkS E }0, -2(F +jib) [, where j and [are used to indicate that the' interval is open. 
4.5 Net 15-Day positions 
The second observation on the system (53-55) is that it exhibits linear dependence in 
!As• !As and / 85 implying that the quantities of the contracts are indeterminate. This can be 
remedied partly by manipulating the system (53-55) using the identities (35-37) to find the 
net positions: 
j;_ = e[Ks(Ps- PA) - ~b(PB - PA) - (KAKB + ~bKA)(xA -FA) 
- .!..bK8 (x8 - F8 ) - ..!_K8 (bF + jJ] 9 18 
t; = e[KA(Ps- Ps) - ~b(ftB - PA) - (KAKB + ~bKB)(xB- FB) 
- ~bKA(xA- FA)- ;
8
KA(bF + j)] 
e-1 = K K + .!..b(K - K) 
A B 9 A 8 
(66) 
(67) 
(68) 
(69) 
Net positions are thus uniquely determined by the parameters of the spot market, the 
speculations about the spot price and the positions already taken on the !PE during the first 
stage, but the distribution on individual contracts cannot be found. 
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4.6 The bilateral core f. •• 
The set of contracts described by equations (53-69) consists of those contracts that are 
individually and coalitionally rational at the same time and is thus basically the (bilateral) 
core. By substituting (66-69) into (53-55) the core can be describ~p .~ the set of contracts 
((p!J,J~,(p~~!As),(p~~fd} that satisfy the following equations simultah~ously: 
where 
, _ !__ (K 1 b) " 1s " 1 b , g 2 A - 9 JAs <PAs < g + 6 JAs 
, 1 (K 1 b) f. 1s ;, 1 b f. g - 2 B - 9 BS < PBs < g + 6 BS 
I' 
' 
' 
if fAs > 0 
if f85 > 0 
g = e[~b(K8ftA - KAft~ + KAK8 ft 5]- ~E>bKAK8 (xA + x 8 -F) 
- .!_eK K (bF - j) + !...j 
18 A B 2 
g' = e[~b(KBpA + KApB) + (KAKB + ~(KA + KBJ)Ps] 
-~E>bKAK8 (xA- x8 - F)+ ;8 e(KAK8 - ~(KA + K8 J)(bF + j) - !...bF 9 
- KAjJB) + (KAKB- ~(KA - KBJ)Ps] 
-F) + .!_eb(KA + K8 )(bF + j) - !...bF 54 6 
(70) 
(71) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
The linear system for the quantities (70· 72) has one degree of freedom implying that 
the quantities will be uniquely determined once one quantity is known. (Fix for example f. 8 . 
Then (70) uniquely determines !As• whilst (71) uniquely determines /85• These quantities will 
be consistent with (70).) 
Once the quantitites are known, (73-75) determine the ranges of prices acceptable. 
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;>, 
Note that each of the inequalities is reversed if the corresponding quantity becomes n'egative. 
Also note that the lower bound appears to be decreasing and the upper bound increasing in 
the quantity. This somewhat surprising result has to be interpreted in the light of the 
constraints on quantities: If a contract becomes larger (say JAB) and the price "spread" 
therefore increases then the other contracts become correspondingly sm~ll~t:<fAs decreases and 
f85 increases one-to-one with JAB but JAB and f85 have opposite signs iri· B's''payoff function). 
The three ranges that bound prices are determined by the g;·s given in eq.\)ations (76-
78). The first term in each of these consists of a weighted a~iT1of t~e' tliree agents' 
expected prices, j) A' Pa and Ps• the weights being functions of K,;} Ka anti b. The second 
term depends on the degree to which the producers have hedged their production on the IPE. 
In case they hedged fully on the IPE (i;. + x;, = F), the term drops out. In case they hedged 
less on the IPE, the bounds on prices will be lower, implying that it will be more costly for 
the producers to hedge on the 15-Day market. The last two terms of the g's depend on the 
producers' !PE position and on storage costs and basically incorporate the strategic effects of 
futures and storage on spot prices. 
This core is never empty and always non-unique (in fact: infinitely large). We will not 
elaborate on the solution to the 15-Day stage here (that is done in Chapter 4), but simply note 
that, a priori, there is no means to pointing out a subset of the core as being more likely as 
a solution. 
5. Stage One: The International Petroleum Exchange 
The !PE, as described in the introduction, is a formal futures market with an open 
outcry exchange and a clearing house. We therefore assume that a single price, p 1PE, will be 
determined on this market. The question then is what positions FA and F8 the producers 
should take. 
The expected payoffs arising from the !PE are14 
14 Using (41), (42), (32) and (9). Recall that F is the joint position on the !PE. The •'s 
are given by (48-51). 
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=(piPE- PAJFA -ciF- .!_j(7FA - 2FB) 
!8 
- ~KA(xA -FAY + EA(W~s(FA,FsJJ 
(79) 
w;PE = (piPE - PBJFB - ciF - ;sj(2FA - 7F~J 
- .!..K8 (x8 - F8 l + E8(W~5 (FA,F8JJ / . · 1 
2 /'.t:' )'f 
(80) 
J/1;; {/ 1' 
where EA(W~5(FA,F s)) and E8(W~5(FA,F s)) are the payoffs that A antf B expect to gain from 
the 15-Day market depending on what solution they expect to prevail. This could be 
formalized by claiming that they hold one subjective possibility distribution, h1, on what the 
size of, say, JAB will be and other subjective distributions, Jz1', h'j5, h~5 on what the price will 
be, conditional on the quantities. These probability distributions could be thought of as 
representing the way in which agents think the 15-Day market works. 
A's expected value of !AB will then be 
00 
EA(j'AB) = Jf.nhA df.s (81) 
and her expectations with respect to the two other 15-Day quantities therefore 
(82) 
00 
and 
(83) 
-00 
Her 15-Day price expectations will be, 
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(84) 
'il 
g + ;u;- LnJ 
E 15 JAB) = f 15 hAS d iS )1 (85) A (PAs PAs A !JJM, ,1 
'lA· I I • t IJI g - Z(Kio- gb)(jlo- JAB) ~ ,1 ;~ , I; 
' ' 
' 
and 
g'' .. ~u:;- t,.,s> 
15 
!AB) f 15 hBS d 15 (86) EA (Pss = PBs A PBs · 
g -;(K8 -~b)(f~+fAJJ) 
Note that the net positions on the 15-Day market J;" depend on the position taken on on the 
IPE, so that the limits of the integrals in (84-86) depend on FA and FB. 
The expected value to A of the 15-Day transactions can be found by taking the 
expectation of (46) using (81-85) and (66-69). This will give the payoff EA(W~5(FA,F s)) which 
occurs in (79). A similar exercise can be done for B by substituting (hA>h'}',h':(,h~s) by 
(hB,It}/',lt}f,h~s) in (81-86) and taking the expectation of (47). This will identify (W~PE, W~PE) 
in (80). If the two sets of subjective probability distributions are common knowledge (to be 
precise: if A knows B's and B knows A's probability distributions and this is commonly 
known) and if the two players take the !PE positions simultaneously, a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium will result where A maximizes WtE with respect to FA and B W~PE with respect 
FB. 
Note that when the two producers take positions on the !PE they do this for the same 
three motives as applies to the 15-Day market: A speculative, a strategic and a hedging 
mo1tiv,. are at play in (79-80) that readily compares to ( 46-47). In fact, the four first terms of 
·,(79-80) capture exactly these effects. But according to the fifth term, the producers realize 
that the position they take will have an effect on the unknown solution to the 15-Day game. 
So this adds another motive for trading on the !PE to the three well-known: optimization 
. taking the non-unique outcomes of the 15-Day game into account. 
6. The Model and the Oil Markets 
The model that was put forth above is based on several abstractions compared to the 
real world. One important abstraction is related to the treatment of time. The model can be 
seen as a snapshot in a sense that will soon be made precise. The real world is rather a 
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continuous series of rolling and overlapping snapshots. This section discusses how t'he model 
could be interpreted and what would be necessary to create a moving picture. 
The interpretation of our game in terms of real world actions starts with the 
observation that the 15-Day market requires the producers to give the purchasers a 15-day 
notice before delivery. This notice specifies a three day range within whi.~h delivery will take 
,,..;;: :r~ 
place. The oil traded thereby goes from being undated to being dated:·; ffom being traded 
forwar~ to being traded spot. These fifteen days co~respond t~ ou!pfrio~ 11 a: ~e extraction 
game smce the future and the forward markets for ml to be dehvt!"~~ IJ~, this peru:ld are closed. 
Cargoes that are lifted but not sold during this period represent aJ;ri&eas~:in stocks that can 
be sold in period 2. 
In order to make period 2 of the extraction game correspond to the real world we 
adopt a strong abstraction: Assume that all cargoes of a given month are lifted within a given 
delivery range. In other words, the delivery month is collapsed into this range. Assume for 
concreteness that all September oil is to be delivered between the first and third of September 
of a given year. Period 2 of the production game could be interpreted as this period 
(September 1-3). This then would correspond to the maturity of the 15-Day contract. The 
fifteen days prior to September 1st (i.e. August 16th-31st) would constitute period 1. 
The two futures markets are collapsed into points in time. We can interpret this by 
assuming that on the 15th of August the 15-Day market opens. This is technically the last day 
that forward oil can be traded for delivery on September 1-3. So the market closes before 
August 16, and will not reopen until period 2 where, by definition, the maturity price is 
identical to the spot price. 
The IPE closes the trading of paper barrels referring to a given delivery month in the 
middle of the previous month, that is to say, well before the 15-Day market stops trading this 
delivery month. In fact, what is the first forward month on the IPE is normally the second 
forward month of the 15-Day market, and the maturity price of the IPE is the 15-Day price 
on the closing day. The latter fact is ignored in the model and the maturity price on both 
futures markets is chosen to be the spot price of the second period of the extraction game. 
The first feature is however modelled by Jetting the IPE precede the 15-Day game. In other 
words, we assume that the IPE opens and closes only once prior to maturity, on the 14th of 
August. 
In reality, of course, the oil markets are much more dynamic than our model allows 
for. First, a sequence of extraction games are played and stocks are increased or decreased 
between them. Stocks therefore serve as a state variable in a dynamic game. This may change 
the strategic effect of inventories since it is no longer true that everything that was produced 
but not sold in one period has to be sold in the next. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Rotemberg 
and Saloner (1985) see inventories as a means to sustain high collusive prices by threatening 
to flood the market if a rival deviates. 
The two futures markets are treated as one-shot situations in our model. In the real 
world, these markets are open every day and trade different contracts (up to six months 
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ahead) simultaneously. This implies that there may be much more dynamic interaction going 
on than presented here. For example, informational intricacies have been ignored by assuming 
that the subjective probability distributions and all strategic features are common knowledge. 
This leaves the difference in subjective probability distributions unexplained. A natural 
explanation of this involves differences in information (asymmetric information or incomplete 
a.. >'''-''~ 
knowledge) or optimistic/pessimistic behaviour as noted in footnote :1. Al'i'nmdel of a futures 
market for a storable good explaining the reasons for existence liS we11
1
as t~e effects of 
asym~etric informatio.n is fou~d in Stein (1987). His model, hoW$t'f1: doe~ nofan~lyse the 
strategic aspects of mventones and of futures but concentrt/& ·on ri,l;k shanng and 
' ' informational externalities. 
Lastly it should be noted that the structure of the three markets has been simplified 
in the model. Obvious examples are the lack of explicit modelling of refineries, of 
intermediate products and of vertical integration. We are concerned with these problems in 
our current research. 
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Appendix to Section 3: Strategic Stocks 
This appendix is offered as an aid to the reader who wants ··to obtain a full 
understanding of the model demonstrating the strategic use of stocks. Recall that we made 
the following assumptions: 
(A. I) There is no exogenous upper bound to production, i.e. no!,, i = 'A,.B. tf 
,dJJ·,i· ·J ~#;f' ,, 
(A.2) There is no demand in the first period, implying that the production, of the first period 
has to be stored, and that sales (in the second period) equal total production over the two 
periods, cf. (23-24). 
The profit functions are given by 
(87) 
= ( N ) C1 2 c, 2 FN SB - XB2 - B P2 - -SB - -'-XB2 - p B ' 
2 2 
(88) 
Note that the cost of storage is subsumed in the period 1 cost function: The decision to 
produce in period one is essentially the same as the decision to store, and we do not need two 
cost variables to describe the decision. All other assumptions remain unchanged, i.e. the 
demand curve is stochastic, linear and downward sloping (7-8) and the producers' utilities 
from profits follow the mean-variance model (9). 
The last decision the producers take regards second-period production: They take this 
decision by simultaneously maximizing their payoffs (9) with respect to their respective 
decision variables (xA"'x82) taking the stocks (sA>s8 ) and the net futures positions (NA,N8 ) as 
given. This results in the following second-period production for A (the expression for B is 
similar): 
b 
xA2 = D[A(a) + b(s8 -sA) - b(N8 -NA) + K 8 (s8 -N8 ) - KA(sA -NA) 
b+c +K 
+ ~ 8 [Eia) - b(sA +s8 ) - (b+KA)(NA -sA) 
(89) 
which is comparable to (25) and where 
(90) 
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(91) 
The multipliers (26-28) follow directly from (89) and (29) follows with the additional use of 
(7). 
The second-to-last decision the producers take regards how n:rtifc~'f9t produce in the 
first period or, equivalently, how much to store. Substituting the optimized second-period 
productions into the payoff functions and performing a simultan~~is maxiinizll,(;j(Jn of these 
with respect to the stocks (taking net futures positions as given), J#~~btain,, 
1' ,/ 
(92) 
(93) 
where 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
(98) 
(99) 
(100) 
(1 01) 
(102) 
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f.,. 
PN, = c2 (2b + c2 + K8 )(b T KA)(l - ~) - c2 b2 > 0 (103) 
= be (2b - K 2 A I' ;' 
(104) 
(105) 
(106) 
(107) 
(108) 
The signs of the parameters are indicated where possible. The sign of the most important 
determinant, [2, is however undetermined but will generally be positive. Sufficient, but not 
necessary, conditions for non-negativity of Dare, for example, that simultaneously c2 > 1 and 
(c1 + c:J2D > b2c,(l + b2/D). But these requirements are not easily interpreted. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Oil Stocks as a Squeeze Preventing 
Mechanism: 
Is Self-Regulation Possible? 
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ABSTRACT: Squeezes are registered occasionally in the forward market for Brent crude oil. 
The squeezer accumulates forward contracts and creates artificial demand by refusing to close 
out, exploiting imperfections in the decentralized market clearing. The artificial demand in 
turn creates a price surge and the possibility of a squeeze thus introduces uncertainty about 
the market outcome. Squeezes therefore render the market institution less palatable to other 
market participants (traders and refineries) who may find other ways of accomplishing the 
economic functions of the forward market, so the producers have a long term interest in 
keeping market clearing smooth by supplying stocks to those squeezed short. The extent to 
which such self-regulatory stocks should be held is analysed in the context of a repeated 
game. Unless the probability of a squeeze is very small, self-regulation should be possible. 
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0. Introduction 
A squeeze is, broadly defined, a market manipulation in which a market participant 
obtains market power by accumulating a position in forward trading that is large compared 
to supply in the underlying spot market. A corner is defined as the acq~il,i,Qn of one hundred 
~ ' p:r· 
percent (or more) of the supply. Kyle (1984) distinguishes between~ thi:1iwo concepts by 
arguing that corners lead to the exertion of monopoly power on ,the. spot1 mat,Jft whereas 
squeezes exploit deficiencies in the clearing of forward tradinl~W!· the pur~ose of this 
chapter the distinction is a matter of degree, and as Kyle mention/ tihd we ~hall argue later, 
it is of little importance for results whether manipulation occurs in forward trading or on the 
spot market. 
Squeezes and corners are concepts that are normally brought to bear on futures 
markets where they are made possible by two features of the market: 
*Trading is anonymous; 
*The volume of trading is huge compared to that of the underlying spot market. 
These features allow the squeezer to quietly build up a substantial long position that they then 
refuse to close. By threatening to take delivery the squeezer drive up prices from the 
competitive level at which the futures were bought, thus rendering the whole operation 
profitable (see Anderson & Gilbert (1991) and Telser (1992)). 
The same two features are also what makes futures markets an attractive way of 
trading by providing low transaction costs and high liquidity (cf. Telser (1981 )), so futures 
exchanges have tried to regulate markets in order that squeezes not destroy these advantages. 
Regulatory measures include: 
1) Delivery options, i.e. the possibility to deliver substitutes thereby expanding the size 
of the underlying spot market (see Duffie (1989) pp. 323-4); 
2) Cash settlement, i.e. traders have the right (or obligation) to settle by a purely 
financial transaction (see Telser (1992) and Kyle (1984)); 
3) Position limits, i.e. the position of a single trader must not exceed a certain limit (See 
Kyle (1984)); 
4) Additional supply, i.e. somebody holds regulatory stocks that are sold in case of a 
squeeze. 
Kyle (1984) concludes that cash settlement only transfers the problem from the futures market 
to the spot market in that the settlement price is related to the realized spot price and that the 
imposition of position limits is vulnerable to agents colluding in the squeeze. Delivery options 
and regulatory stocks seem to be the most effective ways of reducing squeezes in futures 
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markets. Both expand supply and render a squeeze more costly and/or less likely. '·· 
Weiner (1992) reports on the infant oil futures markets in the United States in the 19th 
century. Interestingly, he notes that there were frequent squeezes even before the futures 
markets were organized as such: 
f4 1fr;-
11While it is difficult to gauge the extent of trading of 'futures' before1''fMf advent of 
futures exchanges, it must have been extensive, judging from the reporting in th~ trade press on 
'corners'." (Weiner (1992) p. 7) ;A~ 1 I , /f 
This shows that the existence of a futures exchange is not a neces:~~~ tond\tion for squeezes 
to occur. There being forward trade is, to the contrary, a necessary condition, but not all 
forward trading allows for this: for a squeeze to occur it has to be the case that the volume 
of the forward market exceeds the volume of the underlying spot market (Telser (1992)). 
In 1949, Working predicted that the era of squeezes would soon be over: 
"Corners are, or were, consequences of an excessive freedom of enterprise which seems 
largely a thing of the past in American futures markets. The British grain trade has never permitted 
either corners or significant squeezes in its futures markets. Squeezes continue to occur in 
American futures markets, though they can and should be eliminated.'' (Working (1949)) 
But recently the organized British forward market for crude oil has permitted 
significant squeezes. On the 11th of January, 1988, the Weekly Petroleum Argus (WPA) 
reported: 
"Someone has got a lot of January Brent unsold. The name most frequently mentioned 
in this connection is Transworld Oil [TWO], a Netherlands based trader presided over by the 
buccaneering John Deuss who also owns a refinery in Philadelphia. Who if anyone is behind Mr. 
Deuss is a matter of speculation and Argus can report only that two traders out of three think there 
is an Arab Gulf state in the background. 
The story begins at the end of November when TWO begins to accumulate claims to 
Brent for January lifting. That seemed odd at the time. The Opec ministers were about to meet and 
it would have been hard to find anyone in the oil industry optimistic about the outcome. To take 
a long position in crude to be lifted after the ministers had finished their deliberations appeared 
foolhardy. [ ... ] 
There was a precedent.ln April TWO had succeeded in cornering 15-Day Brent for lifting 
at the end of the month and had collected a premium of up to a dollar and a half over dated crude. 
That manoeuvre was clearly profitable in itself. [ ... ] 
When the manoeuvre was repeated in December the major Brent producers, Esso and Shell, let it 
be known that they would do all in their power to frustrate it. Some cargoes were released from 
their corporate systems and other similar North Sea crudes, together with Nigerian, were made 
available. But they failed to prevent a serious distortion from developing in the spectrum of oil 
prices. 11 
This chapter is an attempt to understand the economics of self-regulating duopoly. The 
basic question is whether and to what extent oligopolistic producers will carry regulatory 
stocks in order that a squeezer not create artificial scarcity on the spot market. The last 
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paragraph of the quotation from the WPA suggests that this type of self-regulation d0es not 
work. 
Let us begin by explaining the jargon used in the quotation. First of all, "Brent" 
designates Brent Blend, a mixture of the production from seventeen separate oil fields in the 
North Sea. Much of the Arabian oil imported in Europe is priced with reference to the price 
# '"'li"'-
of Brent, which explains why Arab states may have an interest in pusliingthis price up. Esso 
and She!~, ~ho control the production of Brent, have a long-term in~er~st in feep~ the Brent 
market hqUid. l'l· . . · • 1. 
On any given day, there are two prices for Brent. The "datJl~1[rice !S: for a cargo that 
' ' is lifted or to be lifted into a vessel on a particular date: the dated price is thus what is called 
the spot price in standard literature. A "15-Day" price is for a "paper" cargo and can be "first-
month" (for delivery on an unspecified date next month), or "second-month" (for delivery in 
the second month to come), etcetera. A paper cargo is a claim to 500.000 barrels of Brent to 
be lifted at an unspecified date in a particular month to come. Dates of lifting must be 
determined 15 days in advance. 1 For April liftings, these dates can thus be determined up to 
the 13th of April.2 Consequently, during the first two weeks of April there exists 
simultaneously a 15-Day April price (for still undated April cargoes) and a dated April price. 
A premium for 15-Day April Brent over dated crude is thus the (positive) difference between 
the price of a paper April cargo and a dated April cargo. 
Section 1 gives the evidence on the price distortions that resulted from the April 1987 
and January 1988 squeezes and three subsequent squeezes. The distortions occurred on the 
15-Day forward market and implied huge premia of first-month Brentover both second-month 
Brent and first-month West Texas Intermediate (WTI). The latter is an American crude that 
is a substitute for Brent and is traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). 
Section 2 sets up a model of a market with a potential squeeze. In Section 2.1 we 
examine the incentive to squeeze and for the producers to prevent the squeeze under the 
assumption that the producers coordinate their effort by setting up regulatory stocks. The 
opposing interests of the players are: Short-term profit to the squeezer against long-term profit 
to the producers. The question is whether and to what degree it pays to prevent a squeeze. 
In Section 2.2 we then analyse whether the oligopolists' decision to keep regulatory stocks 
is any different from the monopolist's (it is not) and whether this affects the scope for 
cooperation in the repeated game (it does). 
Section 3 concludes by pondering why regulatory stocks are not held even though this 
study indicates they should be. The realism of the assumptions of the model is discussed, as 
1 To give the buyer time to charter a tanker and send it to Sullom Voe (Shetlands) where 
the loading takes place. Hence the name "15-Day market". 
2 Since a loading date is in fact a three-day period. With 30 days in the month, the last 
loading period starts April 28 and 28-15=13. 
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are variations of the model. 
1. Squeezes on the 15-Day Brent Market 
,
74 11i" "t" • This section illustrates the price effects of the two squee2:es mentioned m the 
introduction and gives an account of the major squeezes on the l,lDpy ·m:j.rk~t;?ince then. 
'I!~ e ,, · 
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Figure 1: The April 1987 Squ'eeze'' 
(10th of March to 15th of April 1987) 
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Figure 1 covers the period from 10 March to 15 April 1987 and represents' the 
premium of first-month Brent over second-month Brent and the premium of first-month Brent 
over first-month WTI. From mid-March the premium of first over second-month Brent started 
to climb up to $ 0.50. In the first week of April, it suddenly increased to $ 1.60 within 5 
3 The sources are Platt's for Brent prices and Nymex for WTI prices. Note that for Brent, 
the months change as of the lOth of any particular month. Until 9 March, the first month is 
March. From 10 March to 9 April, the first month is April, and so on. For WTI, the first 
month is April until 20 March. As of 23 March, the first month is May. 
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days. That this was due to a squeeze and not to market fundamentals is confirmed by the fact 
that the premium of first-month Brent over first-month WTI followed the same pattern, 
although WTI is a close substitute to Brent. 
How does such a squeeze arise? To close out a position on the 15-Day market, there 
are two possibilities. The first is a "bookout" whereby a number of. participants agree to 
~a .-.;&" 
cancel their contracts with a cash settlement. These participants have. c6&tN1cts that can be 
arranged in a chain starting and ending with the same participant. A squee~er h~ never sold 
forward an~ thus will not appear in a bookout. The contracts thi~':/,~fplear;d' 6'y a bookout 
are not pertment to the squeeze. ~ i( · 1 • 
' ' The second way of closing out a position is to pass on a 15-day notice to take delivery 
along a "daisy chain". The chain starts when a seller with entitlements to Brent serves a 15-
day notice to take delivery to those who have buying contracts with him for April delivery. 
A buyer who receives such a notice can either accept it or pass it on to somebody who bought 
from him. The squeezer accepts the notice and thus builds up his stock of claims to Brent for 
April lifting. 
What happens if a participant cannot close his position? If a participant without 
entitlement to Brent has sold a contract to the squeezer on the forward market and if the 
squeezer refuses to construct a bookout by selling the contract back to the participant, then 
the participant has a legal obligation to deliver Brent to the squeezer in April. The participant 
must buy a cargo on the spot market thereby creating an artificial demand for spot Brent. The 
squeezer has bought a significant amount of the entitlements to April Brent and thus more or 
less controls supply. With an inelastic supply and an artificially increased demand the spot 
price goes up. The other possibility is that the squeezer agrees to sell a paper cargo back to 
the short participant so that a bookout can be arranged. This time the squeezer sets the terms 
of the paper trade. This leaves the spot price unchanged but raises the 15-Day price. A 
mixture of these two types of squeezing is of course also a possibility. 
The squeeze results from the fact that the market participants (apart from the squeezer) 
on average are net short and the squeezer is very long in the market. In case of a corner, the 
squeezer has complete control over the dated April cargoes, so that the sellers have to buy 
from him at a premium. Implicit in all this is the idea that the integrated producers are not 
willing to supply cargoes from the stocks they hold for refinery (or other) purposes.< 
4 Tax considerations may be involved: individual producers may have preferred to retain 
oil on their hands rather than selling it at arms-length at a higher price since they are taxed 
on the average of prices from the first day of the month preceding delivery (here 1st March) 
and ending on the middle day of the month of delivery, (WPA, 1st June 1987). This reasoning 
ignores the effect of producers' sales on the price, which is central in the analysis of section 
2. 
69 
Mollgaard, Peter (1993), Essays on the Determination and Formation of Prices in European Crude Oil Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/54657
Figure 2: The January 1988 Squeeze 
(10th of December to 15th of January) 
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In late november 1987, TWO began buying January cargoes at a price at parity or 
even at a discount to February cargoes. On 10 December 1987 (see Figure 2) a new price 
squeeze started, pushing the premium of first-month (January) over second-month (February) 
up to $ 1.37 within fifteen days. During the same time span the premium over first-month 
WTI climbed to $ 1.66, while dated Brent remained at a discount of about 50 cents per barrel. 
It is only in the second week of January that dated cargoes were sold at a small premium. So 
the squeeze happened on the 15-Day market, not on the spot market. 
Figures 3-6 give detailed evidence on the daily deals of the January 1988 squeeze as 
published by the Weekly Petroleum Argus.5 TWO is reported to have had control of almost 
all dated January cargoes in the second half of December. (Around the 1Oth of January it also 
owned the majority of the remaining undated January cargoes). Intuition suggests that TWO 
built up its long position at a time other longs were selling. Figure 4 shows that the majority 
of trading took place in the first three weeks of November. On one particular day, more than 
50 deals were reported. This alone exceeds a month's production. Since the second half of 
December, that is, once the dating of January cargoes started, almost no deals were reported. 
That is the period during which, supposedly, TWO squeezed by refusing to close the market's 
open interest. 
5 Similar data do not exist for the April 1987 squeeze. 
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Figure 3: The January 1988 contract 
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Figure 4: January 1988 contract 
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Figure 5: February 1988 contract 
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Figure 6: February 1988 contract 
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Figure 3 shows that the period of active trading in November was also a period of 
moderately decreasing prices. On a given day the differences in price for deals made were of 
moderate size reflecting a near concurrence of spot price expectations. Figures 5 and 6 show 
similar data for the February 1988 contract. This pattern of trade is typical for the 15-Day 
market. The important thing to note is that a squeezer can easily hide in this kind of data: The 
# '''~·-
trading is decentralized and nobody keeps track of the traders' position~, ~0 the squeezer can 
quietly buy up contracts from different traders each of whom has al'moderale shprt position. 
In the first week of January the premia wer~ falling (See~i!~,re 2). B/the 11th of 
January the squeeze was over. The fall of the premm may have ol!'eW telate'g to some extent 
' ' to Esso's and Shell's announcement that they would supply stocks from their corporate 
systems. At any rate, TWO had to take delivery of 41 out of the 42 cargoes produced in 
January and did not push the dated premium to high levels. 
It is worth noting that Esso in March 1988 proposed to its trading partners that sellers 
be given the option in the standard contract of substituting a number of other grades of crude 
oil from North Sea fields for Brent, in an attempt to deter a repetition of the squeeze. 
Substitution would incur a premium of 30 cents per barrel. Delivery options of this kind are 
as mentioned a standard way of avoiding squeezes in futures markets. After some discussion 
the proposal was not accepted. This alternative squeeze preventing proposal suggests that Esso 
had abandoned the idea that the main producers could deter squeezes by threatening to make 
stocks available. 
Figure 7 shows how the differential between Platt's quotations of the average price 
of paper barrels for delivery in the first and second-month evolved from 1987 to 1991. The 
six peaks that can be identified (marked I-VI) are potential candidates for squeezes and in fact 
five of them (I-IV and VI) were. The huge peak between V and VI was caused by the Gulf 
Crisis that led to a maximum differential of 3.1 $/bl on 17 September 1992. The maxima of 
the six potential squeezes are given in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: Five Squeezes 
Peak Date Maximum Differential Differential 
2nd-Month 
I 08/04/87 1.60 $/bl 8.9% 
11 31/12/87 1.37 $/bl 8.1% 
Ill 03/08/89 0.75 $/bl 4.6% 
IV 06/11/89 1.53 $/bl 8.1% 
VI) 10/01/90 1.17 $/bl 5.8% 
VI 12/04/91 0.90 $/bl 4.7% 
1) Due to unexpectedly strong demand for hcatmg OJI, cfr. text. 
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Figure 7: Five Sgueezes in the 15-Day Market 
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The two first peaks (I and Il) are the two squeezes that were mentioned above and 
they both led to price surges that reached maxima of more than eight percent (measured as 
the differential over second-month price ).6 The third and fourth squeezes were supposedly 
carried out either by a Wall Street refiner or by a trading house. Weekly Petroleum Argus 
wrote about IV: 
•. 
11The premium for November 15-Day Brent over December widened from 40 ~/bl between 
Friday morning and Thursday evening. / 1 I 'tf 
This premium has talked wider all week [27 /10 - 2/11/89] but in such segrfo.tx. bi1•t it appeared an 
attempt to force up the November quotations and price reporting seM(~·" felt manipulated. 
However both numbers given above were confirmed and there is conjectufe that one" party sold 
short in expectation that the spread would close in. But it was eventually forced to cover at almost 
double the premium at which it bought [sold?]". (Weekly Petroleum Argus, 6/11/89 p. 8) 
And: 11 ••• The price of North Sea crude is blUrred by the pressure on November Brent which some feel 
is rubbing off on December prices. The possibility that an extra Brent cargo may be fitted into the 
November programme helped reduce November prices slightly but they remain out of line with the 
rest of the market. The monthly recurrence of so called squeezes since the summer, partly due to 
the reduction in Brent production, is angering traders who feel the future of the 15-Day market in 
jeopardy .... (Weekly Petroleum Argus 13/11/89 p. 8). 
The quotes show two important effects of a squeeze: first, a market participant that 
for speculative reasons had taken a short position had to cover at a large loss; and second, 
market participants are getting discontented with the market because of squeezes. Furthermore 
it shows that the possible availability of an additional cargo reduced the effect of the squeeze. 
These observations constitute a crucial part of our modelling of the market in Section 2. 
Occurrence V was as mentioned not a squeeze. This can be seen from the fact that 
spot prices rose even more than first-month prices, and the cause of this was an increase in 
the demand for heating oil. Platt's Oilgram Price Report of 2/1/90 noted: 
11 
••• With Brent now turning wet into the second-half of Jan, and with the absence of any squeeze-
related play in Jan Brent, paper and wet Brent are acting in unison. 11 
Thus there seems to be general agreement that this was not a squeeze. 
Occurrence VI was a squeeze that was carried out by a large, Chinese trading house. 
The story was however not commented by the Weekly Petroleum Argus, nor by any other 
commentator thatwe know of and we are relying on confidential information in this case. 
Summing up, we have identified five major squeezes in the 15:Day market for Brent 
crude oil in the period 1987 - 1991. The immediate effect of squeezes is that some market 
participants incur losses out of line with normal speculative gains and losses. The long-run 
effect is that market participants are worried to a degree where they feel that the future of the 
entire market is at stake. Finally, if extra cargoes (read: regulatory stocks) were available, the 
6 This measure may overestimate the size of the squeeze slightly if the market is in 
backwardation initially. 
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..• "" 
effects of squeezes could be dampened if not eliminated. 
2. A Squeezer Round the Corner? 
74 ~!;'; 
In this section we propose a model that captures the ideas tharweM presented above. 
We first model how the squeeze affects the market and what it c~st~ tci p,revew a squeeze 
given that the producers can cooperate on holding regulatory sto'f~· ~We ~~e~' inove on to 
determining under what circumstances such regulatory stocks can, 'be sustained in a non-
cooperative repeated game. 
Two points should be borne in mind throughout. The chapter is about regulatory 
stocks, and that only. This means that the only reason to hold stocks i~ a potential squeeze. 
In particular, the producers face no other uncertainty than that arising from the squeeze so 
buffer stocks are ruled out; the price that the producers receive is constant before and after 
a squeeze so speculative stocks are ruled out; the marginal cost of production is constant 
(zero) so there is no incentive to hold transaction stocks; the time horizon is infinite so 
strategic stocks in the sense of Chapter 2 are not an issue either. 
The second point is that in this framework production always equals sales except in 
the period where a squeeze occurs in which case sales equal production plus stocks. 
2.1 The Squeezer's Game 
We ignore the presence of integrated oil companies and assume that the market 
participants belong to at most one of four groups: 
1. refineries 
2. traders 
3. producers 
4. squeezer. 
The final demand for crude oil arises from the refineries, who buy the crude on the 
spot market. The producers hedge their entire production by selling it forward. The traders 
serve as intermediaries and buy forward from the producers to sell on the spot market. Thus, 
to simplify matters, we assume that the spot market consists of refineries, traders and possibly 
a squeezer, whereas the forward market consists of producers, traders and possibly a squeezer. 
Section 3 comments on the fact that integrated oil companies operate in the market. 
Assume that the refineries' demand for crude oil takes a form that allows us to write 
the (inverse) demand that traders face on the spot market as a random variable that is linear 
in quantity, x,: 
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P, = (6.,-RP) - x,, (1) 
where a, - N(a,, v) with a,> 0 and RP is some positive constant to be determined later. We 
have E(F,) = P, = a, + RP - x,. P, can be thought of as the "mar!sr,t,~xpectation" of the 
spot price. Traders are risk averse profit maximizers. In particular their &tillty function may 
be negatively exponential in profits (u(:n:) = -e·A•; implying, s}hce :n; tollo~ a normal 
distribution, that they maximize E(:n:) -A Var(:n:)/2. Their expecte~i~off i~, thui 
A - A .r' ,/ 
d(P, - p) - d 2 "2 VarP, = d(P, - p, - d2 v), (2) 
where p, is the forard price, A is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion 
and d is the net long position of the trader (d for "deals"). A trader's participation constraint 
is thus: 
(3) 
As long as the participation constraint holds with inequality, there are payoffs to be made 
from trading in forward contracts, so the market should attract more traders implying that the 
forward price p, be competed up to equality of (3). But this argument holds for a fixed d and 
the right hand side of (3) is minimized for d = 1 (given that a deal is indivisible and that d 
> 0), so it is in the interest of the producers to have at least as many traders in the market as 
the number of deals so that each of the traders buys one forward contract from the producers. 
Seen from the producers' point of view, the risk premium they have to pay - the cost of 
hedging - is decreasing in the number of traders in the market.7 Note that (3) basically 
assumes a situation of normal backwardation in which the producers are so risk averse that 
they hedge completely. Given their (now certain) demand curve, they can go on and maximize 
profits in the usual way. 
Equality of the constraint (3) with d = 1 implies that the producers face a certain 
demand function on the forward market of the simple form: 
P =P-RP=a-x. t l I t (4) 
In this subsection we assume that the producers can sustain a cooperative outcome in 
a non-cooperative repeated game (which we then study in Section 2.2). We also assume that 
the marginal cost of production is constant and normalized to zero. The n producers therefore 
7 A similar point is made in Working (1953). See especially the section entitled "The Cost 
of Hedging". 
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share monopoly profits in each period. The equilibrium is summarized in (5). 
MonOJ20l:i outcome 
with no stocks 
Quantity: = a, x, 
2 {4 
V (5) 
Price: = 
a, 
P, 2 / 
.tf. ,j/ 1,, 1' 
2 
'J/40 Profit: a, ,, Jt, = 
' 4 r ' 
The model above can explain a volume of trade on the forward market equal to the 
volume of production and it does not allow for squeezes since all traders are net long. As a 
matter of fact, the volume of trade on the 15-Day forward market is typically ten-fold the 
volume of production and squeezes do occur. It is argued in Chapter 4 that the volume on the 
forward market can be explained predominantly by speculation, implying that different traders 
enjoy different spot price expectations. This also explains why some traders short-sell 
contracts and thus.how a squeezer can build up a large long position. We shall not pursue the 
issue of speculation here, but note that it may reduce the traders' aversion to risk that the 
market is liquid (has a high volume), since they can then, at any time, free themselves from 
whatever contract they have engaged in, incurring a moderate loss. Thus, the traders, as do 
the producers, favour a high number of trades. 
The implicit assumption that we make and - more importantly - that the traders make, 
is that the market's open interest at maturity is cleared by financial transactions using the spot 
price which is determined by the (known) production and the realization of the refineries' 
demand curve (1 ). The traders do not expect a squeeze. 
A squeezer is indistinguishable from a normal trader. The squeezer uses imperfections 
in the clearing of the forward market strategically to squeeze a temporary profit out of the 
markets. As mentioned, the volume in the forward market is bigger than the volume of the 
spot market, but the difference is normally closed by financial transactions in a bookout or 
a daisy chain as maturity approaches. However, in the 15-Day market, no participant is 
legally obliged to enter in the clearing and the squeezer uses this opportunity to squeeze the 
market: By offering a price in the high end of the spectrum, the squeezer obtains legal rights 
to a substantial part if not all of the physical cargoes. Those who sold cargoes forward 
without having them (everybody but the producers) and who therefore are genuinely short of 
oil are put in a difficult situation: they have to buy either on the spot market thereby 
crowding out the usual buyers or take the squeezer's terms on the forward market. This idea 
is modelled by assuming that a squeeze of size a' equal to the open interest of the market at 
maturity affects the inverse demand in the following way: 
78 
Mollgaard, Peter (1993), Essays on the Determination and Formation of Prices in European Crude Oil Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/54657
(6) 
P = a - a·' - x + RP' = p + (a' + RP·') 
I I I I a'> 0. 
Here the assumption is that if the traders have to buy up paper cargoes on the forward 
market (from the squeezer) at a premium in order to satisfy their contr~l'tlj_a] obligations, they 
reduce their own risk premium (that may become negative): ·· ., ; ., 
i 
,)' 1., f 
'J/1;(0 ,, 
' ,' 
RP' =RP - a' (7) 
In this case we say that the squeeze was entirely on the 15-Day market, since we will note 
a price surge only on the 15-Day market as the traders close their positions. 
The alternative is that the traders decide to deliver the oil, buying it on the spot 
market. This will raise the spot price by a' and will in the end have the same effect on 
traders' profits, but this time the spot price is affected and so we say that the squeeze is on 
the spot market. Indeed, it is this possibility of buying spot oil that puts a limit on the terms 
that the squeezer can set if the squeeze is settled in terms of paper cargoes. One could, of 
course, imagine a combination: the squeeze could be settled partly in paper barrels and partly 
in wet barrels, but this does not affect the analysis. Note that, since the producers sold their 
entire production forward, their immediate profit is not affected. 
To summarize: Within each period t, the producers first sell their production on the 
forward market to the traders. Some traders also sell forward contracts to other traders 
expecting financial settlement at maturity. The squeezer possibly buys a substantial number 
of forward contracts. Then the spot market opens. If the squeezer does not show up, those 
who bought forward from the producers clear the spot market with the refineries, and the 
resulting spot price is used in financial settlements of the remaining open interest on the 
forward market. If the squeezer does show up, short traders may appear on the spot market 
in desperate search for a possibility to fulfil their legal obligation. This would drive up the 
spot price. Alternatively, the short traders may seek a settlement with the squeezer on the 
forward market and this would drive up forward prices. 
In the normal mode of functioning there is a friendly competitive environment on the 
forward market: friendly meaning that the imperfections of the clearing mechanism are not 
exploited in a squeezing game. When a squeeze occurs, an aggressive environment results: 
the imperfections of the clearing mechanism are exploited, traders and/or refiners are trapped 
and have to pay more for the crude oil than they expected and thus observe reduced profits 
or even losses. 
A successful squeeze therefore results in a general dissatisfaction among the refiners 
or the intermediaries because of the malfunctioning and unpredictability of the market. They 
will tend to organize trade outside the market or in other markets or they get more averse to 
risk. After all, the squeeze proved that spot prices were more volatile than they thought 
initially and so a higher risk premium is required. 
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We assume (for simplicity of notation) that when a successful squeeze occurs artd if 
it occurs on the spot market, a' squeezed refineries leave the market in the following period 
to never come back, or, if the squeeze is on the forward market, that the traders require a risk 
premium that is a' higher. One could again imagine a hybrid case, but the important thing 
to note is that in all periods following a squeeze, the producers are left wi}J! ~~sJemand curve 
with an intercept that is a' lower. The inverse demand curve in all perioH~ ''following a 
squeeze is: / 
r// I '} 
'If~;€ 
l . 
' 
,If 
; . 
(8) 
The producers then have a long-run incentive to prevent a squeeze in order to keep 
the price of their hedged production from falling in the future; to keep the market liquid. They 
can achieve this by keeping stocks in order to match a squeeze if it occurs, i.e. by keeping 
stocks s = a'. The idea is that if the squeezer squeezes, then the producers throw their stocks 
on the market at the normal price to meet the artificially created demand. In a sense, the 
producers always keep a physical position of size a' to match the squeezer's long paper 
position. We assume that the cost of storage is the interest r per $ per barrel per period. 
If they hold stocks to prevent a squeeze, i.e. s = a', they have to subtract the interest 
on the value of the stocks ra·'p, from revenue in each period and reoptimizing we find that 
compared to (5) the producers raise output and lower price a bit to take the cost of storage 
into account: 
MonoQQly outcome 
with stocks 
a, - ras Quantity: x, = 
2 
a, - ras 
Price: P, = 2 
(9) 
a - ras 
Profit: Jt, = ( I y 
2 
If they fail to prevent a squeeze in period t (not holding stocks), profits will be 
(a,-a·'l/4 in all future periods instead of (a/2l The discounted loss of not preventing a 
squeeze is therefore 
Loss = 
(2a, - a·')a·' 
4r 
(10) 
where we assume a discount rate of 11(1 +r) and that the effect of a squeeze in period t 
manifests from period t+l onwards. The (reasonable) assumption underlying this modelling 
is that the producers' output is inflexible in period t so that production is decided upon before 
the squeezer reveals himself. Additional supply therefore has to come from the stocks if they 
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exist. These stocks are supposedly made available immediately. 
The price in case of a successful squeeze is the price of equation (6) taking the 
monopoly output as given: 
' p, ~ 
a, 
;- as ~ p - a' 2 I ' (11) 
so a price surge of size a' will occur on the forward market towards matuijity iL.the squeeze 
t)'i '} '.fi-
is happening there or on the spot market if that is where the sqtl~~ f10PS
1 
?P-' · 
The (gross) payoff of a squeeze to the squeezer is the size.'of his long position, a·', 
times the price difference between selling and buying, p; - p, = a', i.e. (a'/. In the case of 
a squeeze, the squeezer has to dispose of the acquired oil elsewhere and he therefore suffers 
a loss, 8, of squeezing independently of whether the squeeze is successful or not. 
The payoffs are summarized in Table 2. The producers' payoff are reported as 
deviations from an eternal monopoly profit, with the value ((r+l)/r)(a;/4) today. 
The producers' entry in the lower, right corner of the matrix is due to the assumption 
that if the squeezer squeezes and if the producers sell their stocks, the squeezer cannot 
squeeze again since he has now been identified as such and so the producers do not need to 
Table 2: Payoff Matrix for Squeezer vs. Producers 
Squeezer\Producers 
I 
No stocks 
I 
Stocks=a·'· 
No squeeze (0,0) 
(o, (1 +r)a'~a,-ra')) 
Squeeze ((a';>-e , (-8,a'p,) 
(2a -a')a' 
I ) 
4 r 
hold stocks any longer. On the other hand, the producers earn an additional profit ( a'p,) from 
satisfying the extra demand the squeezer has created. 
There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: if the producers do not carry stocks 
the squeezer will squeeze; if the squeezer squeezes, the producers will carry stocks; but then 
the squeezer will not squeeze and thus it does not pay for the producers to carry stocks. 
Letting stocks be a continuous variable allows s to take a value above zero but below 
a'. What happens if s takes an internal value? In the case of a squeeze, a number of the 
squeezed traders can fulfil their obligation by buying the producers stocks at price p, and 
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delivering to the squeezer. This modifies the squeeze to one of size (a'-s) and thus affects 
prices by (a'-s) and so the squeezer's profit, /:,.(s), becomes a quadratic function of the stocks: 
/:,.(s) ~ (a' - sl - El 
/:,.(s) ~ 0 = s ~ ~ ~ a' - Je (12) 
t"? :J~( V 
Observe that the squeezer's profit takes the value zero for s=I < a' if the cost, El, of 
squeezing is strictly positive. The square root of El translates the ,19st,of squeez,ipg into an 
equivalent number of cargoes. The presence of a cost of squee~ 0thus 
1 
Jlleims that by 
keeping stocks equal to a' the producers commit overkill, since S'tocks are costly and a 
squeeze will be unprofitable even if stocks are reduced by vEl . 
Now we exogenize the squeezer and assume that the producers perceive that there is 
an exogenous probability, a, of a squeeze of size a' in each period. This means that the 
producers do not try to influence the squeezer's behavior strategically, but that they rather 
observe the possibility of a squeeze and take it into account. 
We choose a simple model of a squeeze probability: Assume that there is probability 
a of a squeeze until the squeeze has occurred (if ever) whereafter the squeezer is identified 
and a squeeze cannot occur again. 
Production can be changed from period to period and before a squeeze occurs it is 
chosen to maximize expected single period profit: 
E(fi,(x ;a~a,r,s)) ~ (1 - a)(a, - x)(x - rs) - a( a, - x)(x - s) . (13) 
The first term says that if a squeeze does not occur (an event that happens with probability 
1-a), stocks are held in vain and the producers have to pay the cost of storage, prs. The 
second term says that if a squeeze does occur, the producers' sales are increased by the size 
of the stocks at the going price. 
The equilibrium that obtains before a squeeze is therefore 
1 
x ~ -(a - ys) 2 I 
p = !..(a, + ys) 
2 
E(fi,) ~ !..(a + ys;> 4 I 
where y = a - (1 - a)r . 
(14) 
If y > 0, i.e. if a > _r_, then the quantity is lower and the price is higher than in the 
1 +r 
situation in which a squeeze cannot occur, see (5). Conversely if y < 0. 
In the period after a squeeze, i.e. once uncertainty has been resolved, production is 
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chosen to maximize 
Il'(x ;a,,a',s) = (a -a'+s-x)x 
t I I' 
since the new demand intercept is 
a,_; = a, - (a' - s) , Vi > 0 . 
The solution that obtains after a squeeze is therefore 
1 
- a' - s) X= -(a 2 I 
1 
- a' - s) p = -(a, 
2 
IT' = 1 
-(a 4 I - a' - s)2 . 
/ 
r// J -; 
' .f!i; ' 111 .IJ. 11' 
'i( 
' 
. 
' 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
Seen from period t, the producers' expected, discounted profit takes the form of a 
complex, geometric progression: 
E(Il)= E(Il,) 
1 
-[(1-a)E(Il,) + ail) 
1 +r 
-
1 [(1-a/E(Il) + a(1 +(1-a))IT} (1-r)2 ' (18) 
-
1 [(1-aYE(Il) + a(1 +(1-a) -(I-a)2)IT} 
(1-rY 1 
= I +r E(Il,) + a I +r IT' . 
a+r r a-r 
The first term in the square brackets multiplies the probability that a squeeze has not occurred 
up to a certain period with the expected.stage.game profit before a squeeze. The second term 
similarly multiplies the cumulated probability that a squeeze happened in a given period or 
before with the after-squeeze profits. 
For later convenience, define 
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K(s;a,,a',a,r) "' 4[E([I,) + :!._rr] 
r 
= (a, - ysl + :!_(a, 
r 
(19) 
and observe that K is proportional to E(fi) and that these expressions ~herefor~ enjqx the same 
f . 1 h . . ;I;' ' . if unctlona c aractenstlcs. -'If • · 
We employ the following assumptions in the sequel: V~~~· ': 
l ' 
Assumption!: The interest rateispositive,r> 0, and uis a probability, i.e. a E [0;1]. . ..... 
Assumption 2: a;.;:. a'> Oi . 
Assumption 1 is hardly controversial. Assumption 2 is a joint assumption: Firstly it 
means that a squeeze raises prices by two hundred percent at the most, which does not seem 
restrictive given the size of the squeezes reported in Table 1. Secondly it implies that the 
market does not vanish completely in the periods following a squeeze if the squeeze is 
completely unprevented (s = 0) so that the problem is still well defined after a squeeze. 
Assumption 3 requires stocks to be non-negative and not to exceed a'. (Ifs> a', a,. 1 =a,-
(a" - s) > a, which is not a tenable assumption.) 
Lets· denote optimal stocks. We immediately get the result that if a squeeze is totally 
unlikely to occur, it does not pay to hold stocks: 
Proposition 1 (Certainly No Squeeze): a= 0 => s· = 0. 
Proof: K(s;a.a',O,r) = (a, - rs/ takes a global minimum = 0 fors = a,!r > 0. 
K(s) is real valued and continuous in s. The restriction of K(s) to [O;a'} 
therefore takes a maximum on this set. K is convex in s and the maximum thus 
is at s = 0 or s = a·'. K(O;a.a·';O,r) = a; > K(a·';a,a",O,r) = (a, - a·'r/ if a, > 
a·'r/2. But if a·'r/2 > a, the corresponding price is negative, which does not 
make economic sense.ll 
Remark: Given Assumption 2, non-negativity of prices is only an issue for 
interest rates above 200 per cent. More general comments about non-negativity 
of prices are found in the Appendix. 
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Proposition 2: A sufficient condition fors' = a'· is a > r 
1-r 
Proof: a > r = y > 0 = dK(s) > 0 ,Vs = K(a') > K(O) Ill 
1 +r ds 
Remark 1: An equivalent formulation of Proposition 2 has r < 
I; 
' 
' 
;:-·-·. 
Remark 2: r is the inverse of the present value of an eternal sequence of l's. In other 
1 +r 
words, the condition in Proposition 2 compares the probability of a squeeze with time 
preferences. 
Corollary (Certain Squeeze): a= 1 = s' =a'. 
Proof: Trivial: _r_ < 1 , Vr "' 0. Ill 
1 +r 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for s' = a' and the complementary conditions 
fors = 0 are given in Proposition 3 of the Appendix. It is clear from the proof of Proposition 
3 that the maximum must be obtained at s = 0 or at s = a·' since K is convex in s and since 
the domain is restricted to {O;a']. Here we just indicate in Figure 8 the values of the 
parameters a and r for which the necessary and sufficient conditions will always be fulfilled, 
where they can never be fulfilled and where the restrictions on a·' and a, compared to a and 
r are effectively binding. We have here chosen what we consider a normal range for r, 
namely r E {0;0.5]. We think of our basic unit of time as one month, and month-to-month 
interest rates very rarely exceed one, let alone fifty, per cent. The conclusion is that only for 
small squeeze-probabilities and (very) high interest rates is it the case that a monopoly will 
not hold stocks. 
To give an idea of the content of the Appendix (See A.l ), let it suffice to be said that 
the parameter space is four dimensional and for each vector (a,,a-',r,a)E Jl!.;x{0;1] it is 
possible to check whether stocks will equal zero or a'. However, it turns out that the 
conditions can be expressed in terms of an inequality relating (a·'faJ to some function of a 
and r, and so the problem is reduced to three dimensions: (a·',a,r)E{O;l/xll!.,, where we 
a, 
have used Assumption 2. The general necessary and sufficient condition for optimal stocks 
to be s =a' is 
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\ 
Figure 8: Regions of the Parameter Space 
t}.;j: 
'\,f 
( 
',4. 0 r// 1, ~ 
'l j' '~ lr 0 /' 
' ' 
. 
0.8 
STOCKS TO PREVENT SQUEEZE 
0.6 
0.4 
MAYBE, IF SQUEEZE IS SMALL ENOUGH 
o.
2l __ ~eea:a'ifi£ .~rr~u~~r,fi 11Ii ~,rrn~m ~~~ofiti~~m,Lll~ 
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
a"" 
v(u,r)- + f.l(a,r) > 0 , (20) 
a, 
where the functional f(Jrms or/~ and v arc given in the Appendix (Sec /\.1 ). Zero stocks me 
preferred whenever the inequality is reversed. 
This finalizes the discussion of the profitability of stocks given that the producers 
cooperate. We now I urn to n discussion or whether such coopcrntivc outcomes is sustninnhlc 
in a non-cooperative repeated game featuring squeezes and regulatory stocks. 
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2.2 The Producers' Repeated Game 
It is well known from the literature on repeated games with observed actions that 
cooperative outcomes can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games, this 
leading to payoffs over and above the equilibrium payoffs of the stageJl~~e, cf for an early 
example Friedman (1971). These results are known as 'folk theorems·' an'U' roughly maintain 
that any outcome that all players prefer to a Nash equilibrium of/the sta9e ga,me can be a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if the interest~ i~.sufficien'fly low. The 
cooperative behaviour is sustained by the threat to revert to the Na~~quili~J;'ium of the stage 
game if a deviation occurs and to play this equilibrium forever after. This punishment strategy 
is in itself (trivially) subgame perfect and it is thus a credible threat to lower the payoff of 
the deviator (and everybody else) in all periods following the deviation. If a potential deviator 
cares sufficiently about future payoffs, i.e. if she has a sufficiently high discount rate or a 
correspondingly low interest rate, then deviation is deterred by the threat. The deviator 
compares the immediate gain from deviating with the discounted loss from the eternal 
punishment starting the following period. There will be a threshold of the interest rate such 
that for all values below it, cooperation can be sustained. The questions that are treated in this 
section are whether a duopoly would hold stocks and how this and the possibility of a squeeze 
affect the scope for cooperation. 
The analysis of the n-firm oligopoly case in which a squeeze may occur and stocks 
can be held follows similar considerations but gets somewhat more intricate because the 
interest rate and the probability of a squeeze enter the profit functions in a non-linear manner. 
Before a squeeze, the firms' profits are 
~ 1,2, ... ,n 
(21) 
n n 
where x, = I; x,,, s, is firm i's stock ( s = I; s), and equilibrium profits turn out to be 
i=l i=J 
E(I1.) = (a, + ys)2 
u n+l ' Vi. 
(22) 
After a squeeze, maximized profits are 
= (a, - (a' - s) f , 
n+l } Vi, 
(23) 
where we have used that the demand intercept equals a, - (a' - s) after a squeeze of size a' 
that was met with sales, s, of stocks. 
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Importantly we get 
Proposition 7: In equilibrium, the profits of the producers in n-firm oligoply do not depend 
on their share of overall stocks (i.e. on s;), only on overall stocks, s. 
Proof: See (22-23).11 
r . I ._, 
rl/ ~, .; , .!!"/. 
Proposition 7 means that if non-cooperative oligopolists agreeJI(9t~a ce~!airi level of 
stocks would be optimal to (partially) prevent a squeeze, then it does no1iihatter whether they 
split the stocks equally or whether, say, one of them holds all stocks. This is so, because in 
equilibrium (before a squeeze) prices are set to balance the cost of holding stocks with the 
possible gain from holding these stocks should a squeeze occur. 
Furthermore, the producers will agree on the optimal level of stocks and that level will 
coincide with that of the monopolist: 
Proposition 8: In equilibrium, a certain level of stocks, s, is optimal to a non-cooperating 
oligopolist if and only if it is optimal for the monopolist. 
Proof: Expected, discounted profits are 
E(TI) = 1 +r 1 ~( a, 
a+r (n+1/ 
1 +r 1 v( , ) u 1• = "''s;a,,a·,a,r, v 
a+r (n+1/ 
i.e. proportional to the K(s) used to determine optimality of s for the monopoly 
(see (19)).11 
Remark: For a given s, single firm oligopoly profit is the fraction (2/(n+l)/ (n;,: 1) of the 
monopoly profit both in the short run (stage game) and in the long run (expected discounted 
profit). 
Proposition 8 means that the oligopoly will hold either zero stocks or stocks equal to 
a', depending on the values of r and a and possibly also of a·'fa, exactly as would the 
monopoly, so Figure 8 and the analysis in the Appendix can be applied without modification. 
The question that now comes to mind is whether the possibility of a squeeze and the 
ability to hold stocks change the firms' incentive to deviate by increasing production. It does 
and quite significantly so. Observe that the profits mentioned in the proof of Proposition 8 
are the result of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Thus if a deviator deviates from a 
situation of cooperation at time t, she will expect these profits from t+1. Since the discount 
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rate is 1!(1+r), the discounted value at t is (o+rr1(n+JF2K(s). This is the threat that·may or 
may not prevent deviation, depending on s, a', a, o and r. 
To get a bench-mark, firstly consider the standard model without the complications 
arising from squeezes and stocks. There is an incentive to deviate iff 
1 
r > _ a Co(n), .. (24) 
m 
/ . I './ 
1A' 1 1 • .rt. 
where m a (n-1/!(4n). The critical value of r, C0(n), decreases fr~;.S9 fo,r,n ~ 2 to .49 for 
. ' 
l ' n = 6 to .33 for n = 10, as also seen in Table 3. 
TABLE 3: Critical Values for r with s =a'= o = 0 
n Co(n) Co(n) 
2 8/9 .89 
3 3/4 .75 
4 16/25 .64 
5 5/9 .55 
6 24/49 .49 
7 7!16 .44 
8 32/81 .40 
9 9/25 .36 
10 40/121 .33 
In 1984 the concentration in the market for Brent has been calculated to correspond 
to 4.4 equal sized firms as measured by the inverse of the Herfindahl index (see Mabro 
(1986) pp. 40-45). The similar numbers for the British part of the North Sea and for the entire 
North Sea (i.e. including Norway's part) were 5.66 and 8.23 respectively. Since 1984, the 
British National Oil Corporation has been abolished and the Brent Blend has been redefined 
to include oil from other fields. Both of these events tended to decrease concentration 
(increase the equivalent number of equal sized firms) and for this reason, we have set n = 6 
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in the ensuing analysis. Note that a too high n tends to favour a non-cooperative outcome by 
lowering the critical value whereas a too low n has the opposite effect. The degree to which 
the critical value is over- or undervalued is indicated by Table 3. The critical value Co(6) = 
24!49 = .49 can be thought of as a benchmark in the following. 
Now consider the incentive to deviate starting from a situatign ,),<¥here a monopolist 
(and an oligopoly) would choose ,l: = 0. In this case, we require ;;· J(r"for all firms and 
assume that each firm produces I/n'th of the monopoly output.: There 1is a~incentive to //;,, .; '; '!. deviate if 
r > 
-B - yB 2 + 4aF(m-1)2/m 
2(m-I) 
')/(10 ': 
' ' 
= C(a,k,n;s=O), (25) 
a -a' 
where B = ma- a~ - I + I/m and where k = _, _ is the percentage of the market that 
a, 
remains after a squeeze. Critical values for r, C(a,k,n=6; s = 0) are found in Table 4 below. 
It is seen that the possibility of an unprevented squeeze reduces the scope for cooperation 
unless either the probability or the size of the squeeze is zero (k = 1). It is not surprising that 
the first row of Table 4 falls rapidly to zero as a increases, since a possible squeeze of size 
a' = a, eats away the entire market and all future profits. In the last row, the size of the 
squeeze is zero and its probability does not matter, wherefore we get the no-squeeze critical 
value of 24/49. The same applies for the first column where the probability is zero and the 
size does not matter. In all other cases, the value is lower than the benchmark value of 0.49. 
For a given size of the squeeze (a given k), the critical value of r falls dramatically as the 
probability of the squeeze increases - more so for big squeezes (small k's) than for small 
ones. Similarly, for a given probability of a squeeze, the critical value falls off rapidly as the 
size of the squeeze gets bigger (k goes from I to 0). 
For a= 0.4 and k = 0.5 we have the (six) oligopolists deviating if r > O.I43. But for 
this value of a and for all r between 0 and 1.3973," that is for interest rates up to 139.73 
per cent, the oligopolists should hold stocks, s = a:', according to the necessary and sufficient 
conditions and in this case Table 5 is the one to look at. In Table 5 the critical value is found 
to be C(0.5,0.5,n = 6; s = a.J = 0.435, so that the duopolists should cooperate if the (month-
to-month) interest rate does not exceed 43.5 pe~ cent. 
8 That is for r such that a = a 4 = 0.5, see the appendix. 
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&!' 
TABLE 4: Critical Values for r with s = 0, n = 6. ., 
/ I l.:.t k I a 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 ,jjy/?·8 1 i • 
1( 
' . 0 0.49 0.098 0 0 ' 0 ' 0 
0.1 0.49 0.109 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 
0.2 0.49 0.135 0.026 0.017 0.015 0.014 
0.3 0.49 0.168 0.056 0.039 0.034 0.031 
0.4 0.49 0.205 0.095 0.071 0.062 0.057 
0.5 0.49 0.246 0.143 0.112 0.099 0.093 
0.6 0.49 0.289 0.199 0.164 0.148 0.139 
0.7 0.49 0.335 0.261 0.228 0.210 0.200 
0.8 0.49 0.384 0.331 0.303 0.287 0.277 
0.9 0.49 0.436 0.407 0.390 0.380 0.372 
1 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
LEGEND TO TABLES 4 & 5: The tables show the critical value C(a,r, n=6; s) for the 
interest rate: if r is greater than the value in a cell, there is an incentive to deviate and 
cooperation can not be sustained. k is the percentage of the market that wou Id be left after 
a-a"" 
a squeeze if the squeeze were unprevented, k ~ _, _. a is the probability of a squeeze. 
a, 
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y::.t 
TABLE 5: Critical Values for r with s = a', n = 6. '· 
k\o 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 o?S~,~;. ' 1•.1: ll ''I~· /I 
. 
'0.093 0 0.49 (1.95) 0.366 0.200 0.129 
0.1 0.49 (2.12) 0.380 0.217 0.143 0.103 
0.2 0.49 (2.32) 0.395 0.236 0.159 0.117 
0.3 0.49 0.682 0.409 0.258 0.179 0.133 
0.4 0.49 0.614 0.422 0.282 0.202 0.153 
0.5 0.49 0.577 0.435 0.309 0.229 0.178 
0.6 0.49 0.551 0.448 0.339 0.262 0.210 
0.7 0.49 0.531 0.459 0.373 0.303 0.251 
0.8 0.49 0.515 0.470 0.409 0.353 0.306 
0.9 0.49 0.501 0.480 0.448 0.414 0.382 
1 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
LEGEND TO TABLE 5: The incentive to deviate describes a fourth-degree polynomial in r, 
which typically (but not always) has one negative and three positive roots. The numbers in 
Table 5 are the lowest of the positive roots. Numbers in parentheses correspond to the third 
positive root in that for these values of k and o, there were two complex roots. See also text 
after (26). 
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If s = a', the producers will deviate iff 
(n+J)2i )2 1 1 -- 1a +ya·' + K(a') 4n ' ' o-r (n-Il (26) 
The first term is the deviator's expected profit in the period in which,.Qe'jtiation ·takes place. 
: ~{ " ' 
The second term is the discounted value of the ensuing sequence of non-cooperative profits. 
The r.h.s. is 1/n'th of expected discounted monopoly profits. (261-~i\h equality_.fescribes a 
fourth degree polynomial in r (remember that y is a function of aJ@,P!r) ~~en\, in general, 
there is one negative root and possibly three positive roots. A general analytical solution to 
(26) was not found and numerical methods were applied to generate Table 5, which gives the 
first (lowest) positive root with n = 6. For interest rates above the first positive root and 
below the second, cooperation cannot be sustained, but if the interest rate is between the 
second and the third positive root cooperation is again sustainable. For interest rates above 
the third positive root deviation is to be expected again. Only the first positive root is tabled 
here since the second and the third root both are well above 1. As an example take k = 0.5, 
o = 0.4 and n = 6. Then the first positive root is 0.435 as seen in Table 5, the second is 2.698 
and the third is 4.948. 
In Table 5, the critical value of r is seen to vary much more with o than with k: the 
size of a squeeze attempt matters less now that it is prevented. 
Comparing Tables 4 and 5, it can be concluded that for all probabilities and all sizes 
of the squeeze, the case for cooperation is stronger with than without stocks. This follows 
partly from the fact that K(O) < K(a') for most of the reported values of o unless r is very 
high, so that future profits are worth more with than without stocks. In fact, if the interest rate 
is below the critical values in Table 5 (ignoring the o = 0 column), then in all but five cases 
the oligopolists should hold stocks. The five cases are the five first entries of the o = 0.2 
column. In these cases, if r < 0.5196,0 producers will hold stocks and will cooperate. The 
general conclusion from this analysis is that if the producers cooperate, they should also hold 
stocks. In a few cases the converse is true: if they hold stocks, they should also cooperate. 
A caveat is necessary here: Table 5 and inequality (26) are only valid in the 
completely symmetric case where the producers produce 1 /n'th of monopoly output and hold 
1/n'th of the stocks each. Only if the latter is also the case will each producer's expected 
profit be 1/n'th of expected monopoly profit. At first sight this may seem at odds with 
Proposition 7. This, however is not the case: Proposition 7 describes a situation of Nash 
equilibrium in the stage game, whereas (26) describes the incentive to deviate from the 
cooperative scenario. Under the restriction that then firms' stocks sum to a", the asymmetric 
case adds the following term to the right hand side of (26): 
9 
r such that o.(r) = 0.2. 
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~( 11+r n-1) 1 a·']( a') --- - Y-- (a, + ya·') - -Y2(sv - -) sv - - . 2 a-r 4n 4 n n (27) 
sv is the potential deviator's stock. (27) is the effect on cooperation of asymmetric stocks. If 
the effect is negative, deviation is more likely to occur. The term in thl!!'scyqare brackets can 
, vJ >, A;{ 
be shown to be positive for all values of Sv between 0 and a', 10 SO the effect shares the sign 
with (sv- a·'fn): If a producer holds Sv < a'/n, he is less likely to COlf~er,ate, whil~f.1.1 producer 
that holds sv > a'/n is more likely to do so. In particular, if one' ~~~cer )lolds all of tlie 
stocks, he is less likely to deviate but all the other producers would'be more inclined to do 
so. Whether they would in fact do so, depends on k, a, r and n. 11 
Deviating by increasing production may not be an issue in the Brent market, where 
one producer (Shell UK) is in charge of organizing liftings (see Phlips (1992)). A production 
schedule is compiled well ahead of time and is negotiated and approved by the other 
producers. Production is thus "observed before it happens" and the response to a deviation 
could therefore be simultaneous rather than delayed a period, thus further discouraging 
deviation. 
The overall conclusion of Section 2 is that unless the probability of a squeeze is very 
small or the (month-to-month) interest rate very high, self-regulation by means of squeeze-
preventing stocks should be possible. 
3. Conclusions and Extensions 
The first four squeezes mentioned in Section 1 (see Table 1) occurred within a time 
range of three years (1987- 1989), i.e. thirty-six months. A crude estimate of a in this period 
is therefore 4/36 = 1/9 = 0.11. For there to be any doubt that the producers should hold 
stocks to prevent the effects of a squeeze, the (month-to-month) interest rate should have been 
at least 33 pet. according to Proposition 4 of the Appendix. 12 According to the sufficient 
condition (see remark to Proposition 2), r < (119)/(8!9) = 0.125 is a sufficient condition for 
s • = a·'. This condition was definitely met in the mentioned period. (A 12.5 pet. monthly 
interest rate corresponds to an interest rate of approximately 310 pet. on a yearly basis). So 
why did the producers not introduce regulatory stocks (or other squeeze-preventing 
mechanisms, for that matter)? 
10 We assume that the price is positive so a, + ya' > 0. Then note that y s 1 and (n-
1)!(4n) < 1/4 for all n ::.: 1. The second, negative term takes its minimum for sv = a", but for 
this value it is a matter of manipulation to show that the entire expression is positive. 
11 For a more general treatment of asymmetric oligopolies, see Waldmann (1992). 
12 If r = 0.332215, a.(r) = 0.111111. 
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One partial answer is that they actually did release some cargoes in the December 
1987 squeeze and a single cargo in the November 1989 squeeze was potentially made 
available, but these efforts were far from efficient - they "failed to prevent a serious distortion 
from developing in the spectrum of oil prices". 
Another answer may be that the model may favour the incentive to keep stocks (or 
the model may be correct, but the producers do not realize this). 
One feature of the model that may seem too strong is the assumption that (a' - s) 
/ 
market participants (namely the squeezed traders/refineries) leavffttbe' madet irtrffiediately 
after a squeeze has occurred. In reality, they might leave (or reJ:J~~the amount traded) 
gradually over time because it takes time for traders to develop othe; ~arke{~ to work in or 
for refineries to find other crudes to substitute Brent. It may also very well be that the market 
participants get uptight about the market immediately after a squeeze and contemplate to leave 
it for a while, but then relax and continue trading. Indeed, it seems boundedly rational that 
the same company can squeeze twice within eight months: the traders, knowing the squeezer 
from the first squeeze, should think that trading with him again may well mean trouble. At 
any rate, if the producers think that the market will not lose "customers," their incentive to 
assuage the effects of a squeeze is of course non-existent. 
On the other hand, the increasing popularity of the International Petroleum Exchange 
(!PE) of London may be a response to the malfunctioning of the 15-Day market. The !PE 
trades futures in units of 1.000 barrels of Brent blend, i.e. 1/500'th of the size of the 15-Day 
contract. The !PE is a traditional futures market and thus features all the regulations you 
expect from such a market. The producers have traditionally favoured the 15-Day market -
but maybe their customers more and more prefer to trade on the !PE? 
Further to this, our model supposes that a squeeze can only happen once. It actually 
happens frequently. Including this in the model would require a genuinely dynamic model (the 
demand intercept would be a non-increasing stochastic variable), but ceteris paribus our one-
squeeze model would tend to underplay the role of stocks compared to a frequent-squeeze 
model. 
Another feature of the model that may seem to favour stocks is the cost of storage. 
We have assumed that this cost only arises from the interest on the value of the stocks- what 
it costs to keep the crude off the market. In the real world, there may be substantial costs to 
keeping cargoes afloat or to renting tanks in Rotterdam. This would reduce the incentive to 
hold stocks. Stocks are furthermore used for a variety of other purposes, including strategic 
motives in games between the producers (on this, see M0llgaard and Phlips (1992)), and 
producers seem to be secretive about the size of their stocks. (Our model actually requires that 
the size of the stocks be common knowledge). 
Finally, an argument that weighs against self-regulation is that some major producers 
are part of integrated oil companies: Squeezes may hurt independent refineries without 
affecting integrated refineries. In the long run, this will reduce competition among refineries 
and benefit "survivors": the integrated companies. 
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The model presupposes that the size of a potential squeeze and the probability of a 
squeeze are known. In reality, there might be more uncertainty involved. Introducing 
probability distributions over squeezes of any size (non-negative numbers of cargoes, say), 
would not alter the conclusions qualitatively. 
The real world is of course much more complex and dynamic tha14 t~~· model of 
Section 2: demand and interest rates vary with time; the producers do not fo(m l§yfnmetric 
oligopoly; integrated oil companies complicate matters further. However, it is our pelie}that 
the model and the surrounding analysis shed light on the problem. The!{i;JI). ~Jusion is'tlear: 
7lJ i'!· /' Self-regulation is possible. ,·· ,• 
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Appendix: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions, Parameter Space and Non-Negativity 
s • designates optimal stocks. 
Proposition 3: Necessary and sufficient conditions: 
s · = a' = va' + ua 2: 0 r' . 
s · = 0 = va' + ua s 0 
r' ' 
where v = fr - a and J1 = 2(yr + 
Proof: K(s) is globally convex in s: 
d
2
K(s) = 2(y2 +5!..) > 0, Va,r > 0. 
ds 2 r 
(A.1) 
(A.2) 
Thus it suffices to compare the values of K(s) at the lower and at the upper bounds fors, i.e. 
K(O) and K(a'). It is easily checked that 
va' + pa, > 0 = K(a·') > K(O) = s' = a'; and s' =a'= K(a') "'K(O) = va' + 11a,"' 0. 
va·' + pa, < 0 = K(a') < K(O) = s' = 0 ; and s' = 0 = K(a') s K(O) = va' + pa, s 0. 
va·' + 11a, = 0 = K(a·') = K(O) = {s' = 0 v s' =a'}. 11 
We state the following three lemmas without proof. (A parenthical remark on notation: a = 
a(r) is taken to mean that (r,a) = (r,a(r)). Similarly, a E ja(r), a(r)[ is taken to mean that 
(r,a): Q(r) < a< a(r). 
Lemma 1: {a = a 1 V a = a} = v = 0, where 
1 + 2r2 - 2r3 - )I + 4r2 + 4r3 
aJ = 
2r(1 + rjl 
1 + 2r2 - 2r3 + V 1 + 4r2 + 
a2 = 
2r(1 + rl 
r2 
Lemma 2: a = a3 = J1 = 0, where a3 = -------::-1 - r - r 2 
Lemma 3: {a = a4 V a = a;} = 11 = 1, where 
V 
97 
4r3 
(A.3) 
Mollgaard, Peter (1993), Essays on the Determination and Formation of Prices in European Crude Oil Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/54657
1 
- r + r3 -
1 r2 - r3 + r4 ~ r + 
a= 4 
a= 5 
2 
1 
2 
- r + r 3 
\ 4 
r(l 
1 
\ 4 
r(1 
- r/ 
+ r + r2 - r3 
-
r)z 
Vr > 0. 
(See Figure A.l) 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
1) a 2 > r/(1 +r): 
r > 0 
~ 1 - V 1 - 4r2 + 4r3 >0 
= 1 + 2r2 + 2r3 - }I + 4r2 - 4r3 > 2r2(1 + r) 
r 
= a2 > -- D 1-r 
2) r/(1 +r) > a4: 
r > 0 
+ r4 
= (1 - r - r2) 2 = 1 + 2r - 3r2 + 2r3 + r 4 > !.. + r - r2 + r 3 +r4 = a 
4 
= 1 + r - r 2 > Va 
= r2(1 - r) > - 1 - r + r 3 - va 
3) a4 > a3: 
r 
= -,...-- > a4 D 1 + r 
Let b = ( 
2
1 
+ }_r - }_r2 + r 3 + r4/ 
2 2 
and c = a(1 - r + r2/. 
It is easily checked that 
r>O ~ c > b > 0 = ./c > /b = a4 > a3 D 
4) a3 > a,: Follows from expanding the expressions and cancelling terms. 
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\ 
5) o, > o,: 
r > 0 = 1 + r2 - J ~ + r2 + r3 > r - J ~ - r + r2 + r3 + r 4 
= 1 + 2r2 + 2r1 - J 1 + 4r 2 - 4r1 > -1 - 2r - 2r1 -
=a,> o, 0 
Transitivity of> completes the proof of Lemma 4. 11 
Figure Al: The (r,o)-Plane 
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Proposition 4: Division of the Parameter Space (See Figure A.2) 
Vo E [o4 ;1], s· =a'. 
= {s· = 
'rlo<?.O oE[o5' o}, s = 0. 
'rlo<?.O. oE[O;o5], Os-fls 1 
V 
= {s· = 
r 
t),' I' ~ 
'Ill;( !1 
l 
Proof: The proof follows the division (I, II, Ill and IV) of the Proposition. 
(I) We divide this region of the parameter space into two sub-regions: 
(La) o E [o4 ; r/(1+r)] 
(Lb) o E [r!(l+r); 1]. 
. 
' 
.tt 
' . 
(I) 
(II) 
(Ill) 
(IV) 
In region (La), y < 0 , v < 0, fl > 0 and - fl I v "- 1. The necessary and sufficient condition 
(A.l) for stocks (i.e. s' =a·') becomes 
a' " 
- s _,.,. 
a, v 
But the left hand side is by Assumption 2 smaller than or equal to one and the r.h.s. greater 
than or equal to one so the condition is always met. 
Region (Lb) is exactly the sufficient condition of Proposition 2. 
(II) In this region we have y < 0, v < 0, fl > 0 and 0 < - fl/V s 1 and so the necessary and 
sufficient condition is binding. 
(Ill) We divide this region into two subregions: 
(IILa) o E [o1 ; o 3 ] 
(III.b) o E [o5 ; 0 1 [. 
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\ 
f' 
Figure A2: Regions m the (r,o)-Piane 
0 
I 
0.8 
I I 
0.6 
r 
2 
101 
Mollgaard, Peter (1993), Essays on the Determination and Formation of Prices in European Crude Oil Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/54657
(III.a): Here we have v :s; 0, 11 :s; 0 and the necessary and sufficient condition for s • = a' 
becomes 
a' u 
< -!::._ < 0 
a, v 
'"" J"'• 
.'. .{'~ ~., 
for v < 0 (off a1) and 11 2 0 for v = 0 (on a 1), both of which are impossible. So we haves' 
0 I 
= . t' ' .11 /'i~"), 11' i • 
PI~~·/,, 
(III.b): In this region v > 0,11 < 0 and -11/v 2 J, so the necessary'and sufficient condition 
for s • = a·' is a'/a, > -11/v, which is impossible by Assumption 2. 
(IV): v > 0 , 11 < 0 and 0 :s; - 11/v :s; 1, so the necessary and sufficient condition for s • = a·' is 
a'/a, > -11/v, which is binding. Note, however, that s' =a' gives rise to a negative price, cf 
below. IB 
Remark: The reader may by now wonder what happened to a2 • It is hidden in region (J.b ): 
"iias.l: aE[a2;1], v > 0, 11 > 0 and va' + 11a, 
will always hold true. For a E [r/(1 +r); a 2[ we have v < 0, 11 > 0 and -11/v > 1 so the 
condition for s • = a' is always satisfied. 
Remark: The function -11/v = f(r,a) has singularities along a 1 and o2, where v = 0. Fix r at, 
say, r = 3, and consider the function as a goes from 0 to 1 (See Figure A.3): As a goes from 
0 to a5 , f(3,a) goes from 2/3 to 1. As a goes from a 5 to a 1, f(3,a) goes from 1 to oo. As a 
goes from a 1 to a3 , f(3,a) goes from -oo to 0. As a goes from a3 to a4 , f(3,a) goes from 0 to 
1. As a goes from a4 to a 2, f goes from 1 to oo. Finally, as a goes from a2 to l,f goes from 
-oo to -4. 
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\ 
Figure A3: f(r = 3, a) 
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Non-Negativity: 
Proposition 5: Production is always positive. 
Proof: 
1 
x = 2 ra, - ys) > 0 a,> ys a -as > -(1 - a)rs , 
l .'~ ti ~l 
but the l.h.s. is always positive and the r.h.s. always non-positive}!• , 
,, ·f { 
. . 1 f.1 )Jf,;~ Lemma 5. V(a,r)E{0,1]xR., y < -1. -- < --. •. 
y V t 
I I 
' 
' 
Proof: t<-1 r-1} { 1 f.1 lJ < Yf.l} ~ a<-- = {l]>O ,f.l <0} = -- < - - ~ 
r+1 y l] 
r2 
yr - 2a < 0 y(yr + 2a) >0 a< = = > -a = Yf.l > lJ· 2+r-r2 
r-1 r2 But the condition was that a < < ----,-
r-1 2+r+r2 
, which then proves sufficient.lll 
Proposition 6: In region (IV) (i.e. {(a,r)E{0;1jx{2;ooj: as as(r)}), s' = a' implies a 
negative price. 
Proof: By Proposition 5 we have that s' > a' = a·' > - f.1 Non-negativity of prices 
a, lJ 
1 p =-(a 2 I 
a·' 
+ ya') > 0 = _ < 
as 
are negative if - > 
a, 
a, 
-E. .• 
l] 
1 
y 
1 (y <0), but by Lemma 5 we have -- < 
y 
-
11 
, so prices 
l] 
Remark: The reason for this oddity is that the expected sales less the expected real cost of 
storage become largely negative due to very high interest rates (r > 200 %) and very large 
stocks. Multiplied by a negative price, profits become positive. The choice of s = 0 always 
leads to positive prices, quantities and profits. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Bargaining and Efficiency in a Speculative 
Forward Market 
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ABSTRACT: The 15-Day forward market for Brent crude oil is predominantly speculative. 
Transactions on this market thus contradict the assumptions that lead to zero speculation 
theorems. We set up a stochastic game model of a market with a small number of speculative 
traders that differ only with respect to the expected spot price and (possibly) with respect to 
risk aversion. Contracting is done after pairwise negotiations in random matches. The Markov 
perfect equilibrium of the model can mimic the 15-Day market and need not be efficient in 
the sense of belonging to the bilateral core. 
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-~ 
f-J 
0. Introduction 
How do the participants in the 15-Day market for Brent blend crude oil get to agree 
upon forward contracts? 
The 15-Day market is a peculiar decentralized market ins\itu\ion in which a 
<L '~'<""-
homogeneOUS commodity is traded forward. The main purpose of this chaptet'is to model the 
trading procedure and to assess whether the outcome of this proced~j,re is effipientjin a sense 
to be made precise). !)f;-~ '" ·, 1 
There are other market institutions that could serve the samg, ~tirpos~s. The standard 
futures market is a case in mind. In contrast to the 15-Day market, this market institution is 
centralized. It is a priori more likely to lead to efficient outcomes since market clearing is 
made easy by the presence of a clearing house and since information is conveyed on a 
continuous basis. The International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) of London enjoys these 
characteristics but trading of Brent blend stops too soon before maturity to be a good 
substitute for the forward market This problem could certainly be remedied as has been the 
case elsewhere and for other commodities. (In)divisibility is also an issue: The 15-Day market 
operates in terms of cargoes of a standard size of 500,000 barrels, whereas the IPE contracts 
are specified in lots of 1,000 barrels. 
Here the focus is on the trading procedure of the 15-Day market institution. The 
institutional features of this market will help specify a realistic model. These features are 
outlined in Section 1, which also illustrates a typical market outcome. We proceed by 
specifying the main characteristics of an oil trader in Section 2. Section 3 discusses a very 
simple model of two such traders to give us the feel for the problem. Section 4 goes on to 
the more complicated three person version of the game in which the problems of the general 
n-person model can be illustrated and exemplified. Section 5 generalizes to an n"'-2 person, 
finite time horizon game of pairwise bargaining after random matches and analyses whether 
efficiency can be achieved under the more realistic specification of bargaining options. 
Section 6 concludes by discussing convergence to efficiency and by comparing the 
decentralized forward market with a centralized futures market 
The main conclusion is that the model catches some important circumstances affecting 
15-Day traders and that it can mimic the observed outcome of the 15-Day forward market 
The outcome is inefficient compared to a centralized market institution, but there is 
convergence to the efficient outcome as the time horizon gets longer. Measured against the 
standard model of a futures market, the 15-Day institution is inferior. Since a futures market 
(the IPE) exists and since the futures market institution has long been a well known way of 
organizing the economic functions that the 15-Day market accomplishes, it remains a paradox 
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that the market participants accept such an inferior market institution. 1 
1. The Characteristics of the 15-Day Market 
Traditionally thought of as London-based, the 15-Day market s/,nn9t be said JP have 
a proper home. However, many traders have their offices in London an'qt~t pri9,e reporting 
services are located there. The early development of the markets for Nd"rih Sea !(;rude oil is 
described in detail in Mabro et al. (1986). 
For the purpose of this chapter, a short account of the salient features of the 15-Day 
market institution will suffice: 
1) Finite time horizon: A contract for oil to be delivered in a given month' can only be 
traded during a given time interval. In order not to go into the complicated details regarding 
the timing of forward and spot transactions (on this, see Phlips (1992)), as a good 
approximation it is assumed that a given forward contract is traded during the last two and 
a half months prior to delivery. This allows around fifty trading days. 
2) Limited number of players: "Though the number of market participants m 1980-85 
exceeded 110, we found that the number of continually active players was of the order of 30-
35, and that the 10-15 top participants accounted for most of the activity. The top five 
participants comprised four oil traders and one major oil company" (Mabro et al. (1986) p. 
xx). 
3) Pairwise negotiations: The 15-Day market does not exist physically, but consists of a 
network of market participants trading via telephone. 
4) Standard contracts: The contract is of a type where the quantity is prespecified (500.000 
bl's) so that the contractors only have to fill in the agreed price. For each matching of two 
1 One explanation may be that the forward market automatically becomes the spot market 
in the sense that assignment of physical cargoes is done via chains of contracts that are left 
open when the forward market closes. This function could however be carried out in other 
ways. A centralization of this function would seem to make life easier for everybody involved 
in the market. 
2 The timing of delivery is not further specified. Only when the spot market opens will 
the delivery be known with more precision (namely within a three day delivery range). It is 
this assignment of different buyers to different slots that would be made easier with a 
centralized agency (cf. note 1 ). 
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traders this reduces the dimension of the bargaining problem from two to one: from (price x 
quantitity) to (price). The contract is binding in the sense that once it is telexed and therefore 
legally confirmed, the contractors cannot undo it before maturity and may thus end up with 
obligations to buy or sell oil on the spot market of the relevant forward month.' 
_tfi? ':t~; 
5) The clearing mechanism is important for the same reason and rnvdlves two types of 
transactions: bookouts and dais~ chains. A bookout is a situation ~~ere a n~mbe;;;-of players 
(at least two) can construct a cucle of contracts (A sells to B, B,~&'iC to .. , · . .'to A) and 
decide to close out by purely financial transfers. A daisy chain is st~l~ar bu(the chain is not 
closed to a circle: a cargo is passed on along a chain of traders and the last trader in the chain 
takes delivery. A daisy chain thus involves a cargo of physical oil at the end. 
In addition to the institutional features we note that there is a great deal of speculation 
going on in the market. Bacon (1986) notes that: 
and 
11this market has been de facto dominated by speculative deals11 (p.S) 
"[a]n important factor is the dispersion of expectations held by traders: if expectations about price 
movements are widely spread then the number of deals can be high" (p. iii). 
11All this activity ( ... ) was greatly amplified by the involvement of speculators in the market who, 
by taking views on likely future prices, tried to make a margin on buying or selling short and then 
covering their positions at a later date .... [T]here was also considerable variation in the total 
amount of trading month by month. We have suggested that an important part of this volatility in 
quantity was related to changes in the dispersion of expectations held by those speculating in the 
market. When there was consensus on the likely price outcome the opportunities for trading 
decreased and when views were very disparate the number of deals increased." (pp. 48-49). 
Take this as sufficient evidence that 
1) differences in expectations ·exist; 
2) differenCes in expectations drive the speculative trade; 
3) speculative trade dominates the l5~Day market. 
The assumption that differences in expectations drive speculative trade is in straight 
contradiction with the zero-speculation or zero-trade theorems (see Milgrom and Stokey 
(1982) and Tirole (1982) or for a survey Geanakoplos (1992)) that follow from the rational 
3 This feature is what leads to the frequent occurrence of squeezes, cf Chapter 2. 
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expectations hypothesis or from an assumption about common knowledge of common priors. 
That differences in expectations drive speculative trade therefore needs justification which is 
given in M0llgaard (1993). For the purpose of this chapter, first note that the typical real 
world speculator seems to be much more confident about his own expectation (opinion) than 
game theory with common priors allows him to be. Second, even if JW-OJ)).e have the same 
information, this need not span a unique probability distribution leading'·to ~ 'hrtique spot price 
expectation (see also Kurz (1991)). ' 1 tf 
To characterize the forward market as entirely speculative!1f~~1 obvi~us· ~bstraction. 
In reality, there are four types of market participants, viz. non-int~!lrated producers, non-
integrated refineries, integrated oil companies and oil traders, but only the two first types of 
agents can be trusted to enter the market primarily for hedging purposes, and their overall 
significance is fairly limited. The physical production of Brent blend during a normal month 
is forty-two cargoes and hence hedging can explain no more than forty-two contracts'. The 
turnover on the 15-Day market is typically ten times this number. Integrated companies 
speculate about the future forward price and trade accordingly for tax purposes.' Oil traders 
live from speculation, so it is a fair claim that the forward market is predominantly 
speculative. 
A typical outcome of the 15-Day market in terms of the number of contracts traded 
and the corresponding prices is illustrated by the trading of the September 1991 contract. 
Trading took place in the period from 21 June to 30 August 1991, see Figures 1 and 2. Figure 
1 shows the price range of concluded deals on the different days of trading, while Figure 2 
indicates the number of deals (each for a cargo of half a million barrels) on the same days. 
Needless to say, when only one deal was concluded on a given day, only one price obtained. 
This price is indicated with a dot in Figure 1. Figure 3 shows the price and the quantity 
(number of cargoes) traded on two consecutive trading days, July 24 and 25. The dataset does 
not provide an identification of the traders involved in any deal and it is thus difficult to 
know whether two cargoes sold at identical prices on a given day represent one or two trades. 
The figures confirm the impression that when a lot of trade is observed, then the price 
dispersion is also large. Note that no causality is implied, a priori, in this statement. However, 
in the model that follows, a wide dispersion of spot price expectations across traders will 
cause them to trade larger quantities on the forward market. Because of the decentralized 
nature of trading in the 15-Day market, this leads to a wider range of forward prices being 
4 This argument ignores possible hedging of other crudes for which Brent is a substitute. 
To a certain extent forward markets for other North Sea crudes exist, but they are relatively 
unimportant. It is well known from the theory of futures markets that you can hedge 
imperfectly in forward contracts for an imperfect substitute. 
5 See Bacon (1986) and Mabro et al. (1986) for a discussion of this. Clubley (1990, p. 
33) notes that it is well known that the majors are speculative traders. 
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Figure 1: Selected Brent forward deals 
for September 1991 (High - Low) 
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Figure 2: Number of September Deals 
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Figure 3: September contracts on 
July 24 and 25 
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observed. 
To capture the aforementioned features our model of the 15-Day market should include 
a finite number of players (traders/ speculators) that get matched pairwise and then bargain 
about the price of a unit of an indivisible good. They are only matched a finite number of 
times and since they are speculators they will want to close whatever open position they 
might have at maturity. 
The model is built up step by step increasing the number of interacting agents from 
one to two to three to n. 
2. A Simple, Speculative Oil-Trader 
Assume that the entire forward market is speculative. This means that no market 
participant has any interest in obtaining the underlying good, but only in buying cheap 
contracts on the forward market in order to sell them later at an expected higher price, or 
conversely, in selling expensive contracts to buy later at an expected lower price. Speculation 
is thus "sell high, buy low" with either happening first. Through most of the chapter, it is 
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aassumed that the forward market clears at maturity using the realization of the spoi price. 
Accordingly, in this model, all contracts are supposed to be held till maturity. Some important 
problems regarding the clearing mechanism at maturity will be discussed later. 
We employ two further assumptions of a technical nature: 1) The trader perceives the 
spot price as a normally distributed random variable; and 2) she is risk averse. To be specific, 
assume that her preferences can be represented by a utility functi.~'h ll!at is (negative) 
exponential in profits. The joint assumption of a normal spot price ~!Jd an exponential utility 
function allows us to express the objective function according to ~fr. rfi.ean-~ari~ce model. 
Thus the spot price, p', has a "subjective mean" p1 and is a§\;~ed t0' have a known 
' . 
variance o2 = 1 (this allows us to concentrate on differences in opinion about first order 
moments): 
(1) 
Trader I' s expected profit from a forward transaction in period t is 
(2) 
where q1,, is the price of the contract and J;,, the quantity sold. The expected profit from a 
given contract c1,, = (q1,vh) is positive if the forward price is higher than the mean spot price 
(q1,, > p1) and if the trader sells forward (J;,, > 0). Conversely, if the forward price is lower 
than the expected spot price, the expected profit will be positive only if the trader goes long 
(i.e. buys forward: J;,, < 0). 
Let hJ't) = (c1,~, c1,2 , ••• , c1,) be trader I's history of trades from the first day of 
trading (t = J) up to and including day 't. The expected profit that arises from this history is 
simply the sum of the single-deal expected profits, given that the trader's spot price 
expectation does not change over time: 
rt(h/'t)) = };(q1,, - p1Jf;,, = V(hJ't)) - p 1F(hJ't)) (3) 
t==J 
where V(h/'t)) = E';,
1 
q1,,J;,, is the (known) book value of the trader's forward position and 
F(h1('t)) = '\"< /.1 is the trader's net position. We consider a trading period short enough for L._-1-] , I 
discounting to be ignored. Given our assumptions, the objective function at time 't can be 
written 
(4) 
where A1 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, here assumed to be constant. 
The trading stops at a known date T (;d) and the trader's objective (TO) is thus: 
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(5) 
Summing up, this section proposed the following assumptions: 
Al The typical forward market participant is a speculator. 
A2 The forward market clears using the realization of the S,POt pric7 at maturity. 
.. i ) dl; ' ,If 
A3 Each··tr~derlperceivesthe. spotpri~as a normalstoeh~~~Araria,hle·.~ith mean 
PI and variance I. ·· ' · ,. 
:_-.·:--- ','_:·:.: : ' ::-,-~--::::--::::_- :-: ---:.:: _:;::::::_:_::_'::~~- _'<:'_:,:.:-:--:.:· ,'-_;::_':;:::·::_·_-_ ::.:.:._ .: ·<. 
A4 The trader has risk"averse Pr~feren~tll; that ~~n be presented by a utility function 
which is exponentialin profitS. 
From these four assumptions we derived the trader's objective function which is quadratic in 
the net position F and we formulated the trader's objective (TO). 
3. Two Traders with Differing Beliefs 
Assume for the purpose of this section that the forward market consists of two traders. 
If they trade, it must be with each other. When they agree to a contract, they know that their 
spot price expectations differ. If they have identical spot price expectations, they do not want 
to trade since trading would expose them to a risk. We thus assume that agents are endowed 
with different spot price expectations. Given expectations and expected utility maximization, 
they will want to trade if expectations are sufficiently diverse. In the following, different 
"solutions" to the two players' problems are examined. 
3.1 Axiomatic Approaches 
Name the two agents I and J. Agent I expects the spot price to be PI and J expects pJ; 
assume these expectations to be common knowledge. I and J agree that the spot price 
variance is one. They have risk preferences A1 and AJ respectively. Since they are the only 
two on the market, what one trader sells, the other must buy and we shall take f to signify 
l's short position (signed) which then is J's long position. 
Arbitrarily assume PI>pJ, set T=l and/or suppress the time-index. The two TO's 
thereby become 
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Max (q - pl)f - AJz 
' 2 
(6) 
Max -(q - P)f- AJ2 
' 2 ;4- tf.,, 
(7) 
where c = (q,f). /~, , I .rtf 
If I and J were price-takers, q would be exogenous to the tlf~l!ii anq l'hould somehow 
adjust to clear the market. Then the competitive equilibrium would be obtained, with 
(8) 
Here I buys from J a position that is proportional to the difference in spot price expectations 
at a price that is a weighted average of their price expectations, the weights being the risk 
aversion constants: If I is more risk averse, J's spot price expectation gets a higher weight 
and vice versa. The competitive equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4. 
With only two traders, or in general as long as the number of players is so small that 
any player perceives that she can influence the market outcome, price taking appears to be 
a highly artificial constraint on behaviour and the competitive solution does not carry much 
appeal, so we discard this approach. 
Let us instead turn the problem upside down: Just studying the traders' objectives and 
without imposing further structure on the problem, what can be said about the set of contracts 
that they would agree to? 
The minimum requirement on any contract must be that it contributes non-negatively 
to the contractors' payoffs, that is, that it be individually rational (IR) for both.6 This 
condition is satisfied by contracts in the set 
{(q,O)} u {(q,f): f<O' pi- A;t s q s PJ + ;t} (9) 
which is the vertical axis plus the big triangle in Figure 4. Any contract interior to the triangle 
is strictly preferred by both parties to no trade. A contract on the vertical axis trivially 
contributes zero to the expected payoff of both traders (zero volume, zero trade). A contract 
on the upper line (q = p1 + V:zA.d) of the triangle would contribute zero to /'s expected payoff, 
whilst a contract on the lower line (q = p1 - V:zA;[) gives J zero expected payoff. We shall 
require that any contract be individually rational to both. This only amounts to saying that a 
6 Or participation constrained. 
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Figure 4: Competitive Equilibrium, 
IR Contracts and Bilateral Core 
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trader only contracts if she finds it advantageous, which seems a natural and minimal 
requirement. 
A stronger requirement would be that the outcome belong to the bilateral core. This 
will be our qualitative efficiency measure throughout the chapter. The idea is that 
independently of the organization of the market, in order for the market outcome to be called 
efficient, it should belong to the bilateral core. 
Definition: The bilateral core is the set of contracts that is coalitionally rational, where the 
set of permissible coalitions is restricted to all singletons and all pairs. 
In other words, the bilateral core is the set of contract allocations that cannot be blocked by 
coalitions of one or two agents and that satisfy participation constraints. Note that in general 
this is a different requirement than Pare to efficiency. In the two-person case the bilateral core 
is identical to the core and a strict subset of the Pareto efficient allocations. For now it 
suffices to note that individual rationality of an outcome means that no singletons can form 
a blocking coalition and our two person case therefore reduces to finding the contract curve 
in the set of IR contracts. This can be done by equalizing the marginal rate of substitution 
between price, q, and quantity,[, for the two players. The bilateral core in the two person case 
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IS: 
l P1 - PI AI AI ) c: f = ' PJ - -f :$ q :$ PI - -f . AI+A1 2 2 (1 0) 
It is illustrated in Figure 4 as the vertical bar in the triangle. The quaftit/is·,the same as that 
of the competitive solution, but the price can be anywhere in the in~erval between the seller's 
(J's) reservation price and the buyer's (Fs) reservation price. lL, ' 1 · .tf 
1/},Q 
The question is whether we can rely on economic principle~,'tb·restr~9t the solution to 
the bilateral core. This is one of the recurring issues of the chapter, so we should not expect 
an easy answer. Note that the competitive equilibrium belongs to the core, as should be. 
Another solution concept that has been applied to a problem of this type (see Brianza, Ph lips 
and Richard (1990) p. 13) is the Nash-Bargaining point. Provided that the disagreement event 
is taken to be that no contract is telexed, the generalized (asymmetric) N ash bargaining 
solution which assigns weight ("bargaining power") a to I ( aE[O;l]) can be written as 
(11) 
where w1 = !..[ A1 - (1-a)] and w1 = !..[ A, - a]. This generalized solution contains 2 AI+A1 2 A 1-A1 
the original Nash point as the special case where a = ¥2: 
(12) 
where the price expectation of the less risk averse agent gets the higher weight. This price 
will coincide with the competitive price (8) only if AI= Ar Otherwise, the difference between 
the competitive price and the symmetric Nash bargaining price will be: 
> 0 (13) 
so that the seller (J) is better off with competitive pricing than with Nash bargaining if she 
is more risk averse than the buyer (I) and vice versa. 
The generalized solution (11) belongs to the bilateral core (1 0). Indeed, the bilateral 
core is equivalently described by (11) letting a run from zero to one. 
The weights in w1 and w1 in (11) have the following interpretation in addition to what 
was said about (12): The stronger I is (i.e. the higher a is), the closer is the price of the 
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contract to J's reservation price as given by (1 0). Conversely, the stronger J is, the closer q 
gets to J's reservation price. Generally, the stronger an agent is relative to the other, the more 
the forward price will reflect the other's spot price expectation. 
Since the Nash bargaining approach is axiomatic, the solution by construction enjoys 
some nice properties: it is invariant to equivalent utility representations; it is symmetric if the 
problem is symmetric; it is independent of irrelevant alternatives; $'n&'k.is Pareto efficient. 
The joint effect of these four axioms is even a unique outcome, but for our purpose we cannot 
I I ..,{ 
use the approach since we would then assume what we waJI"tL to' show ( ert'lciency of the 
outcome). Axiomatic approaches are silent on matters of ti~r4 ~and 'P.rocedures and we 
l ,' 
therefore adopt a non-cooperative strategic bargaining approach to analyse whether and under 
which conditions the outcome of the given market institution is efficient. 
3.2 Two Traders Bargaining Strategically 
The strategic bargaining model as treated in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) assumes 
that the players haggle over the price of a fixed quantity, taking turns in offering a price to 
the other and rejecting or accepting this offer. In the terminology of Rubinstein (1992), they 
attempt to partition a pie of a given size and once they agree on a partition, the game is over. 
Thus in our model, if the players are allowed to enter precisely one contract with a 
prespecified quantity, then the traders only haggle about the price. Given the finite time 
horizon, the price will either equal the seller's reservation price if the buyer is the last to 
make an offer, or the buyer's reservation price if the seller offers last. The one to make the 
final offer is the winner, and the winner takes all. It is a general feature of strategic 
bargaining models, that the offerer skims the cream off by making an offer equal to the 
receiver's reservation value (appropriately defined), leaving the receiver just indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting. This feature is exploited repeatedly throughout the chapter. 
However, the Osborne/Rubinstein (1990) approach is not immediately applicable to 
the problem at hand. First, contrary to Rubinstein's model and many other models, it is 
assumed here that players are infinitely patient but that the game has a finite time horizon. 
More importantly, we introduce indivisibilities and multiple trades: A contract c, has a 
prespecified quantity. We take this as the indivisible unit for which the traders try to establish 
a price, and assume that in each period, a trader can enter at most one contract so that 
I if I sells a contract to J at t 
!, = 0 if I and J cannot agree at t (14) 
-1 if I buys a contract from J at t. 
Accordingly, if the two traders want to achieve a forward position of a given size, F"<!:.l, at T, 
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they will have to trade in at least F periods. 
At any period, 1:, agent I enters the period with accumulated expected payoff 
G(hl"t-I);A"p1) and exits with accumulated payoff G(hl"t);A"p1), so the incremental single 
period expected payoff is 
which depends on history only through the accumulated net positioli&£~o c;ntnlcr;ng is done 
in period 1:, then g(hl"t);A1,pJ = 0. If a contract is sold (/, = I) or b'4Ught (/;,'.: -I), the price 
must be individually rational, i.e. 
f. = I = q, 2 p1 + ~' + A?(h/"t-I)) = RS/"t) 
f, = -I = q, s p 1 - ; + A?(h/"t-I)) = RB/"t). 
(16) 
We shall use RSl"t) and RB/"t) as a convenient short-hand forI's myopic7 reservation prices 
as a seller and as a buyer, respectively, and bear in mind that they evolve over time, 
depending in the shown way on I's forward position in the preceding period. If the trader is 
already net short (F(hl"t-I)) > 0) this raises the selling reservation price but it also raises the 
maximum price at which she is willing to buy. This is so, since an additional unit sold 
increases the riskiness of the overall position, whilst buying a unit reduces the short position 
and thereby the risk exposure. Figure 5 illustrates this for trader I and for a given 1:: the 
intercept of the line with the q-axis is p1 +A, F(hl"t-I)). Only when F(hl"t-I)) = 0 will the 
intercept equal the trader's spot price expectation. 
The intercept and the two vertical lines indicate the set of IR contracts to I given the 
indivisible unit. A convenient fact is 
RS,(1:) = RB,("t) + A; , i E {I,J}, V1:. (17) 
The following lemma commands full generality (that is to say it applies to all versions 
of the game independently of the number of players): 
Proof: Follows directly from (17): RS/"t) = RB/"t) + A1sRS/"t) = RB/"t) - A1 
=RS/"t) 2 RB/"t) + A 1 - A1 > RB/"t) 1111 
7 Myopic since it does not take future payoffs into account. A forward looking reservation 
price would do this and thus require backward recursion or, equivalently, subgame perfection. 
The price (20) is a forward looking reservation price in the two-player case. 
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Figure 5: A Risk Averse Trader 
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Lemma 1 simply states that if there exists a contract where I sells to J that both 
players find IR, then there does not at the same time exist a contract where J sells to I that 
both players find IR. The next lemma gives a dynamic extension of Lemma 1: 
Lemma 2: Assume that two players, I and J, are matched in period -r-1. Then RSl-r-1) s 
RBl-r-1) => RBl-r) s RSl-r). 
Proof: If the two players do not enter a contract at -r-1, then RSl-r) = RSl-r-1) and RBl-r) = 
RBl-r-1) (because F(hl-r)) = F(hl-r-1))) and the conclusion follows directly from Lemma 1 
(with strict inequality). If the players do enter a contract at -r-1, then F(hl-r-1)) = F(hl-r-2)) 
+ 1 and F(hl-r-1)) = F(hl-r-2)) - 1, so RS/-r) = RS/-r-1) + A, and RSl-r) = RSl-r-1) - A1 . 
However, from (17) it then follows that RBl-r) = RSl-r-1) and RS1 (-r) = RBl-r-1). Since the 
condition of the Lemma is a weak inequality, the conclusion will also be a weak inequality.lll 
Lemma 2 states that if, in period -r-1, there are gains from a trade where I sells to J, 
then there cannot be gains from a trade where J sells to I in period -r, given that the two 
agents are matched in -r-1. If they were not matched in -r-1 they could be matched to other 
agents in -r-1 and enter contracts that would disturb the conclusion. Here we concentrate on 
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the two player case, where I and J are matched with each other in every period. 
Remark: In the two player case, Lemma 2 implies that, in general, trade between I and J 
always goes in the same direction: I sells to J if p 1 < p1 and J sells to I if p1 > p1• 
~;;;:. ,~0' 
Corollary: If RSlt-1) = RBi-r:-1) and I and J enter a contract at -r:-1~ thefi RBJf-r:) = RS1(-r:) = 
RSJf-r:-1) = RBi-r:-1) = qJT.1 = qJT-J· 
, , I' I -
,;: i tf 
'ljl'.t. I) . 
Remark: If, in the two player case, the situation of the corolla tb'Lemrpa 2 occurs, then 
r ' 
the net positions in -r:-2 and -r:-1 are 
F(hl-r:-2)) ~ p1 - p 1 - !._ and F(h/-r:-1)) ~ p1 - p 1 + !._ 
AI + AJ 2 AI - AJ 2 
which must both be integers. In this case, the agents can cycle back and forth between these 
two positions (recall l's position is always the negative of J's), each time trading at the 
competitive price and each trade adding zero to both trader's expected payoff. In fact, the two 
positions are defined by requiring that the marginal trade adds zero to both players expected 
payoff. 
Generically, the positions mentioned in the remark will not be integers, and we have 
the following proposition determining the maximum value of the open interest which is then 
the maximum number of deals (ND) (I XJ denotes the integer part of x): 
Proposition 1: Assume without loss of generality that p1 > p1• Generically, the upper bound 
on the open interest is 
=ND. (18) 
p-p 1 rp-p 1
1 
Proof: Define b = 1 1 +_ - 1 1 +_ , bE£0,1), and assume that the number of 
AI - AJ 2 AI + AJ 2 
contracts already exchanged is F(hi-r:)) ~ PI - p1 - !._ - b , which is then an integer. In 
AI + AJ 2 
this case, RS1(-r:+1) = q + (1-b)A1 > RB/-r:+1) = q - (1-b)A1 and 
RSl-r:+1) = q + M 1 ~ RBi-r:+1) = q- MJ> 
where q is the competitive price defined in equation (8) of Section 3.1. Only if b=O can there 
be any trade. This is the special case discussed above. Otherwise, we have RSl-r:+1) > 
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RBir:+1) and no trade is possible in r:+1 or thereafter, which implies that all gains from trade 
have been exploited. Ill 
Now we complete the description of the rules of the game by the assumption that 
when I and J are matched in period r;, I makes an offer to J with prob~~ii~p: 1/2 and J makes 
an offer to I with probability 1/2. An offer takes the form of a contract;. i.d ·~ssentially a price 
at which the offerer is willing to buy or sell one unit. The receiver ,of the of[ er can take it or 
leave it; accept it or reject it. Then the game moves on to period1f;,l! · · tf 
The following proposition outlines the backward recursioKf~iinciP,te by which the 
game at hand can be solved by studying the effect of all possible actions in r; on current 
period payoffs and on continuation payoffs (i.e. the expected value of the ensuing subgame) 
and letting the agents maximize over these actions: 
Proposition 2: Let p1 > PJ and suppose that expected continuation payoffs are of the same 
form 
(19) 
for both players. Then, if I is chosen to make an offer at r;, she will offer to buy a contract 
from J at the price 
A +A 
q =RS(r:) + I J 
' J 2 ' 
(20) 
which J will accept. If J is chosen to make an offer, she will offer to sell a contract to I at 
the price 
(21) 
which I will accept. Thus, in both cases F(hlr:)) = F(hlr:-1))-1 and F(hir:)) = F(hir:-1))+1. 
Ex ante, i.e. seen from period r:-1, the expected payoff to both players will then be 
" In terms of expected utility, the effect of the assumption that in any match either of the 
two agents has probability 1/2 of proposing to the other is the same as that of assuming Nash 
bargaining between the two agents in the match. This holds true also for the n-person game 
of Section 5 if the threat points are defined to be the continuation value to each of the agents 
of negotiations breaking down. 
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I I 
v(r) ~ -(p1 - p1 - (A1 - A)(F(hfc-I)) --)). 2 2 
(22) 
Proof: v(-r+I) ;;, (A1 + A)/4 implies that F(hl-r:)) s P1 - P1 - I, wl)1cti\ensures that there 
AI -A} 
are IR contracts to be made in period -r:. Consider the case in w~~l;l/ is dose\l'lto make an 
offer to J. If J accepts, F(h1(-r:)) = F(hl-r:-I)) + I, if she rejectsAf.~(-r:)) a F(hl-r:-1)). By 
' . hypothesis, J's expected continuation payoff in the case of acceptance is ' 
1 1 
v"(-r:+1) ~ -(p1 - p1 -(A1 - A)(F(h/-r:-1)) - 1 + -)), 
. 2 2 
whilst in the case of rejection it is 
1 1 
V '(-r:+ 1) ~ iPI - PJ -(AI - A)(F(h/-r:-1)) + 2)). 
J then loses v'(-r:+1) - v"(-r:+1) = (A1 + A)/2 in terms of future payoff by accepting and I's offer 
should compensate J for this loss in order to induce acceptance. This can be done by offering 
a contract price such that g(hl-r:)) = (A1+A)/2 => q, = RSl-r:)+(A1+A)/2 => g(h;(-r:)) = p 1 - p1 
+ (A1 + A)(F(h;(-r:-1)) - 1) ;;, 0 by the assumption that v(nl) ;;, (A1 + A)/4. This last 
assumption implies that it is not optimal for the offerer to construct an offer that is certain 
not to be accepted and wait for the other to make an offer. The case where J is chosen to 
make an offer to I follows a similar argument. 
This shows that, seen from period -r:-1, with probability 1/2 a player will expect to get 
p1 - p1 + (A1 +A)(F(h;(-r:-1)) -1);;, 0, and with probability 1/2 she will get (A1+A1)/2 summing 
to: 
Eg(h;(-r:)) = (p1 - p1 + (A1 + A)(F(h;(-r:-1)) - 1/2))/2 
which is the same as (20) because F(h1 ) = -F(h1 ).& 
Remark: The expected period--r: price will be: 
p+p A-A 1 
Eq(-r:) ~ I 1 + 1 /(F(hj(-r:-1))--). 
2 2 2 
(23) 
If A1 = A1, the expected price will be identical to the competitive price. If A1 "' AJ> the 
expected price will show a trend, that will be positive if A1 > A1 and negative in the other 
case. Particular realizations of the price will be as indicated in Proposition 2. 
Equilibrium in this model is a situation in which I and J maximize G(h;(T)) and 
G(h1(T)) respectively. If the agents follow the recursive formula of Proposition 2, then 
equilibrium will be sub game perfect. There are two cases to be considered: If T < ND, there 
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are not enough periods to allow the agents to reach the upper bound on the open interest, ND: 
They have to stop trading before all gains from trade are exploited. On the other hand, if T 
;;, ND, they can exhaust the gains from trade (under the restriction imposed by the 
indivisibility of a contract). The following lemma shows that they must exhaust all gains from 
trade if they can: 
Lemma 3: Let p 1 > PI and assume that T ;;, ND. Then F(h/T)) = ND is (generically) a 
necessary condition for equilibrium. ,d',r, ' 1 tf. 
!Nr~ /: 
p -PI 
Proof: First assume that F(h1(T)) < ND. Then F(h/T)) s --:-' -:-
A1 + A1 
1 
2 
' 
- 1i, where we used 
the fact that F is an integer. If 1i .. 0, this implies that RSlT) < RBlT) so that a contract could 
be set up which would give a non-negative incremental payoff to both traders and a strictly 
positive payoff to at least one, in contradiction with optimality. If 1i = 0, we could have the 
special case where the marginal contract gives both zero incremental profit. In this case 
F(hlT)) = ND - 1, is a necessary condition for equilibrium. 
Hence F(hiT)) ;;, ND. By Proposition 1, F(h1(T)) s ND, so we have F(hiT)) = ND.lll 
Proposition 3: Let p 1 > PI· Then a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which I and J 
maximize G(hlT)) and G(hiT)) respectively. If T ;;, ND, in the first T - ND periods 
equilibrium has 
(24) 
v(T) ~ 0 (25) 
Eq(•) ~ Undefined (26) 
For both T s ND and T;;, ND, define u = 1:- max{T- ND, 0}. For 1:;;, max{T- ND, 0} (i.e. 
u ;;, 0), equilibrium has 
(27) 
(28) 
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Eq(r:) (29) 
Proof: We need to prove that we can apply to both cases the b;lc~ard recursion of 
Proposition 2 by showing that in period Twe get continuation payoffs ef th~ furm (19). If this 
is the case, then Proposition 2 showed in (22) that continuation payoffs in jlny e,.rlier period 
take the same form. The rest of the proof follows from forward re§Jiipn from 'p~riod I with 
F(h;(O)) = 0. ~,'7 ~: 
First consider the case in which T;, ND. By Lemma 3 we know that F(hiT)) = ND. 
The trading must take place in the last ND periods. Before this, any trader can reject an offer 
hoping to become the first person to have an offer accepted sometime later, without 
sacrificing continuation payoffs, so it must be the case that F(hiT-1)) = ND - I. Then 
reservation prices are RSiT) = q • - M, and RBlT) = q* - Mr In period T, there is no 
continuation to worry about, so the winner takes all. Seen from period T-1, both players then 
expect to gain 
.!__(RB,(T) - RSiT)) = b A,- A,. 
2 2 
If b;, 1/2 this satisfies the condition of Proposition 2 that v(nl) ;, (A,+ A)/4. If b < 1/2, we 
regress one period. By assumption we have F(hlT-2)) = ND - 2, so T-1 reservation prices are 
RSiT-1) = q' -Ail + b) and RB,(T-1) = q' + A1(1 + b). In case of rejection, the reservation 
prices remain unchanged in period T where the winner takes all, so in order to induce 
acceptance at T-1, the offerer should compensate the other with the amount 
.!__(RB,(T-1) - RSiT-1)) = .!__(I - b)(A1 + A1), 2 2 
which will then be the T-1 incremental payoff to the acceptor. The offerer gets the same (the 
other half). Seen from period T-2, the continuation payoff is thus 
I A, + A1 v(T-1) = -(1 - b)(A1 -A) > --:--2 4 
so we can unravel the game from T-1 backwards. 
We next consider the case in which T < ND. We then have F(hiT-1)) = T-1, so RSlT) 
= p1 +A iT- 1/2) and RBlT) = p1 - AlT- 1/2). Seen from T-1, continuation payoffs will be 
I I 
v(T) = -(p1 - p1 - (A1 + A)(T - -)). 2 2 
v(T) ;, (A1 + A)/4 iff T s (p1 - p)/(A1 +A), but this follows by the assumption that T < ND.III 
The equilibrium that is outlined in Propositions 1 through 3 can be interpreted as a 
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Markov Perfect Equilibrium: 9 If we take as state variable (i) the forward positions of the 
previous period, -r-1, (ii) the realization of who nature chooses to make an offer in the current 
period, T, and (iii) time, T, itself, then those are sufficient to determine what offer the agent 
should make and whether to accept or reject it in period T, taking the expected value of future 
actions into account. Indeed, the payoff relevant history is summarized by F(hl-r-1)) = -
F(hi-r-1)). Given a realization of the state variable, the offerer prop.\]l;es'\la,,contract chosen 
such that the price exactly compensates the receiver for the loss in continuation payoff and 
? 
leaves the re~eiver indifferent between ~~cepting and ~e~ecting. ~~}lil'lrum1 th:~equires her 
to accept. Th1s IS the essence of Proposition 2. Proposition 1 defm£{t!ie ergod1c states of the 
' .· Markov chain that the Markov perfect equilibrium can be seen as: If the market reaches a 
state in which F(hi-r)) = ND, then the two traders have no further gains from trade and will 
stop trading, so all possible future states will have this quality. Lemma 3 says that if possible 
(T;;, ND), the Markov chain should end up in an ergodic state. Proposition 3 then states that, 
if possible, the market ends up in an ergodic state, exhausting all gains from trade. This will 
happen in the last ND periods, so in the first T-ND periods, nothing happens: The forward 
positions stay zero, there are no realizations of the price since all offers are rejected without 
any loss of continuation payoffs. In the last ND periods, the J's forward position is increasing 
by one contract each period (and /'s is similarly decreasing) thus reaching ND when the game 
stops at T. This quantity is efficient, i.e. in the bilateral core, given the indivisibility. Prices 
are evolving around a trend (see (23)) if A1 "'A1 or take values randomly above and below 
the competitive price if A1 = A1. All realized prices have to be individually rational, so the 
equilibrium is efficient for T;;, ND. If T < ND, there is a trade in each period, so at the end 
of the game F(hiT)) = T and prices evolve as in the other case. This equilibrium can by 
construction not be efficient, but given the time constraint the players get as close to 
efficiency as possible. 
In short, the two trader game yields a unique Markov perfect equilibrium that is as 
efficient as possible given the time constraint. In this model the only uncertainty stems from 
who is going to make an offer in each period. The identity of the opponent is known with 
certainty. This is not the case with three or more players. 
4. Three Traders with Differing Beliefs 
This section extends the two-player results to three players as an appetizer to the n-
person game. While the extension of the axiomatic approaches is relatively straightforward, 
the extension of the strategic approach to a dynamic, stochastic game proves to be trickier. 
9 See Definition 4 and Proposition 7. 
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4.1 Axiomatic Approaches and the Phlips-Harstad Model 
It is a matter of simple algebra to extend the static analysis of Section 3.1 to a three 
trader market, thereby obtaining a simple version of the model in Ph lips and Harstad (1991 ): 
In our model the traders on the forward market have no power in the spot market, whereas 
in the Phlips/Harstad model they do. However, this simplification ha:t'ncfilliPOrtance for the 
discussion of the efficiency of the forward market. 
A straightforward extension of the notation is needed: Tl)i~tntders ~re <;M' led I, J and 
K and fu, i=I,J, j=l,K, h•j, denotes the amount that i sells to j at pri£r~Jt. If fqjs negative, then 
i buys from j as before. Suppressing the time dimension, the payoff function for, say, I now 
reads 
(30) 
The competitive equilibrium is readily found to be 
q = (A1AKp1 + A0KP1 + A01pJ!D 
t; = (AfpK- P) + AJp1 - p))/D 
t; = (AJP1 - P) + A/h- p))/D (31) 
~~ = (Alp, - h) + Alp} - PK))/D 
where D = A 1AK + A 1A1 + A1 AK. 
The set of contracts that are individually rational for any two players, say I and J, is 
described by 
j(q,J,.U I fu>o , P1 A - ~· (J; + J;KJ }u + -f(J; + J;K) "'= q,J "'= P, 
l(q,J'J;J) I fu<O ' P1 A - ~'(ft+J;J}U (32) + -f(JJ + J;K) s q,J s p, 
{(q,J'J;) J;J =Of ' 
where[, = [,1 + [,K and[, = -[,1 + hK· As before, this set describes a triangle with the q-axis. 
The three subsets are mutually exclusive (either [,1 <,>or= 0) so a given contract can belong 
to at most one of them. The new feature is that the sides of the triangle are subjected to 
parallel shifts by A1 hK and A,f,K respectively that is, the quantities of the two other contracts 
matter, because they enter jointly with [,1 in the respective agents' risk evaluations. This 
requires that any trade with K be common knowledge, or, in other words, that the three 
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contracts be coordinated. 
Solving for the bilateral core we find that the quantities should satisfy the following 
system: 
= A~:1 A;~K ~: (t] 
-AJ AK AJ+AK ~K ./;~ f ._4 
'1/1;;~) I' 
(33) 
This system exhibits linear dependence with one degree of freedom a'nct the p;ofile (J;J>!1K,£J 
is thus left undetermined. The three traders' net positions are, however, uniquely determined 
and equal to the competitive quantities above: 
and prices should satisfy 
t;" 
t.; 
~~ 
= f/J + J;K 
= J;K - J;J' 
= 
-J;K - J;K 
AJ . 
+ -1/J 2 q/J 2 q 
2 
A 
q· + ~f/J s q/J s q· 
2 
(34) 
(35) 
Note that if one quantity is fixed, say J;1, then the two other quantities are uniquely 
determined by (34) and the IR requirements on forward prices are uniquely given by (35) and 
similar expressions for q1K and q1K. 
Ph lips and Harstad (1991) propose a relatively simple non-cooperative game and show 
that the solution will satisfy (34) and (35). However, their game exhibits a continuum of 
subgame perfect equilibria and does not explain how the agents achieve coordination to pick 
one profile of three contracts that will satisfy (34). 
4.2 Strategic Bargaining 
The extension of the strategic bargaining game of Section 3.2 from two to three 
players is as follows: In any period "t, there is probability 1/3 that any two players are 
matched excluding the third from playing in that period. In each match, each of the two 
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similar expressions for q1K and q1K. 
Ph lips and Harstad (1991) propose a relatively simple non-cooperative game and show 
that the solution will satisfy (34) and (35). However, their game exhibits .a continuum of 
subgame perfect equilibria and does not explain how the agents achieve coordination to pick 
one profile of three contracts that will satisfy (34). 
r 
4.2 Strategic Bargaining ,;;-, ' .. If 
'J/t-/ ,, 
The extension of the strategic bargaining game of Sectio~. 3.2 frbm two to three 
players is as follows: In any period 't, there is probability 1/3 that any two players are 
matched excluding the third from playing in that period. In each match, each of the two 
players then have probability 1/2 of being the one to make an offer, which the other can 
accept or reject. The game then moves on to period 't+1. 
This is a stochastic game: the history at 't, h('t-1) = (hl't-1),hl't-1),hK('t-1)) can be 
summarized in a state variable, k('t) (as will be shown in due course): 
k('t) = (F(h('t-1), offerer, receiver, idle, 't), 
where F(h('t-1 )) = (F(h/'t-1)), F(h/'t-1)), F(hi't-1))). 
(36) 
k('t) consists of the profile of net-positions of the preceding period, F(h('t-1)), the identity of 
the agent who is chosen to make an offer, together with the identity of the player who is 
chosen to receive the offer and the player that is idle at 't. It also includes time, 't, explicitly 
since the number of periods left may be important for the strategies. Note that there are 
redundancies in the state variable, since 
E F(h,('t-1)) = 0 ' '<l't, (37) 
and since the identity of the idle player is known by exclusion, but the notation (36) is 
maintained since it appears more intuitive and more symmetric. Expected payoffs at 't, g('t) 
= (g(h/'t-1)),g(hl't-1)),g(hK('t-1))), depend on k('t) and on current actions, these being a 
contract offer, acceptance/rejection and a void action for the unmatched, idle player. 
The state follows a Markov process in that the probability distribution on k(n1) is 
determined by k('t) and the actions taken at 't. For example, assume that the state is 
k('t) = (F(h('t-1)) , I, K, J , 't), (38) 
and that I offers to buy a contract from Kin period 't. If K rejects (r), then k('t+1) will be one 
of the following six states, each of which has probability 1/6: 
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{ (F(h(r-1)),i,j,k;r) } (k(r+1)!k(r:),(cJ/)) E ...,. 'kE{IJK't . . k 
V l,j, , , -.f•l~);tt. 
(39) 
in that the profile of net-positions remains unchanged in case of rejection. If K accepts (a), 
then F(h(t)) = (F(hl-r:-1)) - 1, F(hi-r:-1)), F(h.:(-r:-1)) + 1) and the state wili
1
J;>e¥?;ng to: 
'• ·<l \' ~., 
(k(;;+ 1) lk(-r:),(cl,,' a)) E f .<!"/cE(h({;;l))J,t/'•.;;) k} : ( 40) 
lvz,J, , , hl;ri]iJ! /;./; -t . ,If 
Ill;;~) I' 
with transition function Pr(k(-r:+1) I k(-r:), (c1,.a)) = 1/6. In the example 'the players' action 
spaces are S1={c1,J (the right to propose a contract), SK = {a,r} (the right to accept it or reject 
it) and S1 = 0 (the right to remain silent). In general, we have the following definition: 
Definition 1: (Action Spaces) In any state k(-r:) = (F(h(-r:-1),i,j,k, -r:), the action spaces are S, = 
{c;), Sj = {a,r}, Sk = 0, (i,j,k) is any permutation of {l,J,K}. Let S = S,xSjxSk, with 
s(-r:)=(s,(-r:),sJ-r:),s.(-r:)) E S. 
In principle strategies could depend on the entire history of the game. However, for 
any subgame starting in some period ;;, only k(-r:) matters. To show this, we adapt the 
following definitions from Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) (pp. 514-5): The future at;; is the 
current and future actions <1>(-r:) ,. (s(-r:), s(-r:+1), ... , s(T)) E s'·' following choices of i, j and 
k by nature. In the following, h and h · denote two different histories. 
Definition 2: (Sufficient Partition of Histories) A partition {F( ')},"1,.,r is sufficient if ';/;; and 
'ifh(-r:-1),h 1(-r:-1): F(h(-r:-1)) = F( h '(-r:-1)), the subgames starting at date ;; after histories 
h(-r:-1) and hI (-r:-1) are strategically equivalent, i.e. 
(i) The action spaces in the subgames are identical: 'ifiE(l,J,K), 'Vt>O and V s(-r:+t-1), 
S,(h(-r:-1),s(-r:), ... ,s(T)) = S,( h 1 (-r:-1),s(-r:), ... ,s(T)). 
(ii) The players' payoffs conditional on h(-r:-1) and hI (-r:-1) are representations of the 
same preferences. 
Definition 3: The Payoff-Relevant History is the coarsest sufficient partition. 
From these two definitions we obtain Lemma 4: 
Lemma 4: The payoff relevant history is summarized by F(h(-r:-1)). 
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Proof: The claim is that a partition, H', of histories leading to the same F(h(r:-1)) is sufficient. 
Let h(-r;-1) and h '(-r;-1) be two histories for which F(h(-r;-1)) = F(h (1:-l)). The action spaces 
are time invariant, so the first condition is satisfied. We now need to show that the payoffs 
conditional on any two histories that lead to the same profile of net positions at 1:-l represent 
the same underlying preferences. The original preferences, u;(n) = -exp(-A,n), are von 
~4 )'~" 
Neumann-Morgenstern, so unique up to a linear transformation. What we n:il'ed to show is thus 
that ViE{U,K} 3(A;, 11) = ("-;[h(-r;~J),h'(-r;~J)], /l;[h(-r;~J),h}-r;~,JJ]) (iA.; >!{J) such that 
V<I>(-r;), G(h;(-r;~J),<I>(-r;)) = "-;G(h/(-r;~J),<I>(-r;)) T 11;· 'J/(1~ ': . 
' 
By the definition of G( ; ;), we have G(h;(-r;-l),<I>(-r;)) = V(h;(-r;-1)) + V(<I>;(-r;)) -
p;(F(h;(-r;-1)) + F(<I>;(-r;))) + (A;/2) (F(h;(-r;-1)) + F(<I>;(-r;)))2, where we abuse the notation slightly, 
so that V(<I>;(-r;)) and F(<I>;(c))) denote respectively i's book value and her (change in) net 
position arising from a given future <I>(-r;). It is easily seen that !l;(h(-r;), h · (1:),;) = V(h;(-r;-1)) -
V((h/ (-r;-1)) and \(h(-r;~ l),h '(-r;~ 1)) = 1, so the payoffs conditional on any history that leads 
to F(h(-r;-1)) represent the same underlying preferences: 
G(h;(-r;~J),<I>(-r;)) = G(h/(-r;~l),<I>(-r;)) + V(h(-r;~J)) ~ V(h'(-r;~J)).• 
Remark: The proof shows that payoffs after any two histories that lead to the same positions 
only differ with respect to the book value of the previously concluded contracts, which has 
no impact on future reservation prices and hence does not affect strategies in future subgames. 
Definition 4: A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a profile of strategies s' that is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and depends on only the payoff relevant history, z.e. 
H(h(-r;-1)) = H(h'(-r;-1)) =>Vi, si(h(-r;~J))=si(h'(-r;~J)). 
In view of Lemma 4 we can let strategies depend on the profile of net positions, so 
that an MPE is a strategy profile s' that is an SPE and that is measurable w.r.t. F(h(-r;-1)): 
si = si(F(h(-r;~J))), Vi. 
Let K(-r;) denote the set of feasible states after a history leading to a set of forward 
positions, F(h(-r;-1)). We have existence of MPE in the game: 
Proposition 4: There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium for the game r 3 = 
(N = (l,J,K}, -r;=l,.,T, k(-r;)EK(-r;), s(-r;)ES, Pr(k(-r;~J) k(-r;),s(-r;)), {G(h/T))}v;EN). 
Proof: The proof will be a special case of the n-person game of the later Section 5.2.11111 
Having claimed existence of equilibrium, we characterize the equilibrium as far as 
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possible without knowing the essential parameters, T and (A, ,p, ), i E {I,J,K}. In three 
propositions we show the counterpart to Proposition 1 for the two player case: there is a 
(generically unique) F(h('r:-1)) in the neighbourhood of (f;·,f;,J~) such that in all states after 
a history leading to F(h(-r-1)), there will be no trade. These absorbing states are in other 
words uniquely determined by a single combination of net positions t,bat~~etermine how close 
' -~ f ~., 
the players can hope to come to efficiency. · 
? 
y. ' i/! ,, 
Proposition 5: Trading stops if the game reaches a state where ;f';,l/ 
F(h/-r-1)) = J; + 01 
F(h/-r-1)) = J; + b, 
F(hi-r-1)) = f~ - (b1 - b) 
where (b1,b) satisfy the following six inequalities: 
A 1+A1 s -A1b1 - A1b1 s 
AI-AJ 
2 2 
l 
A 1+AK 
s (AI+AK)bl - AKbJ s A 1+AK 
2 2 
A,-AK 
s AKbl - (A,-A~b, s A,+AK 
2 2 
I' 
' 
' 
(41) 
(42) 
Proof: If RB;(-r) s RSf-r), 'rli,j , i,.j, there are no further gains from trade. Manipulation of 
this system of inequalities yields ( 41) and ( 42). • 
Remark: Generically, all states like the one mentioned in the proposition are ergodic 
(absorbing): Once that kind of state has been reached, the market stays in it in all subsequent 
periods. 
Remark: The proposition shows how close the market can get to the bilateral core: only if 
f,· and r; are integers can the ergodic states be efficient (b/ = b, = 0). 
Figures 6.a and b show the range of (bpb1 ) that satisfy the six inequalities for the two 
cases when A,= A, = AK =A (Figure 6.a) and A1 = A)2 = AK/3 =A (Figure 6.b). Note that 
it is not always the case that there is a non-binding inequality. 
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\ 
Figure 6A: The area where the requirements ( 42) are met for A1 = A,= AK 
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\ 
Figure 6B: The area where the requirements to (42) are met for A1 = A1 /2 = AK/3 
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Proposition 6: The only ergodic states (F(h('r-1),i,j,k) are those that satisfy Proposition 5. 
Proof: In order for a state to be ergodic at date "t: s T, we need RB;("t:) s RS/"t:), Vi,j, i>'j. 
This leads to the following set of inequalities: 
(43) 
where (FI>P1,P J are net positions at "t:-1 (P1+P1+P JFO). Let P1 = J/ + 1\1 and P1 = J; ~ Ill' 
where the only restriction on the li's is that when they are added to the corresponding 
efficient positions, the result be an integer. Combining (33) and (34), we get 
AJK - Af'l =PI - PK - (AI+Ajlil - AKiil, 
AJK - A7] =pi - PK -A~/ - (AJ-Ajlij 
which combined with ( 43) gives the desired result.lllll 
Proposition 7: The positions in the ergodic states are (generically) unique. 
(44) 
Proof: Let F(h("t-1)) = (P1,P1,P J be the forward positions of an absorbing state. The pair (P1 
,P1 ) thus satisfies 
There are six candidates for ergodic positions in the neighbourhood of F(h("t:-1)), namely 
(F,P1,P J + x where x E {(1, -1,0),( -1,1,0),(1,0, -1),( -1,0,1),(0,1, -1),(0, -1,1)}. Take the first 
element. If A1P1 - Aj?1 < p1 - p1 + (A1 + A1)/2, we have AlP1-l) - A/P1+1) < p1 - p1 - (A1 + 
A)/2, so (P1,P1,P J + (1,-1,0) is not an ergodic position. If A1P1 - Aj?1 = p1 - p1 + (A1 + A)/2, 
we have AlPr1) - AlP1+1) = p1 - p1 - (A1 + A1)/2, so (P1,P1,P J + (1,-1,0) is also an ergodic 
position, and there can be a cycle back and forth between the two, this adding nothing to the 
expected payoffs of I and J. The argument for the other five candidates is similar.lllll 
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4.3 An Example of a Markov Perfect Equlibrium 
To get a feel for the nature of the Markov perfect equilibrium, consider the following 
simple numerical example. Assume that the basic parameters of the model are chosen to be: 
Spot price expectations: 
Risk aversion constants: 
Time horizon: 
PI= 20.0, 
AI= 0.2, 
T=3 
p1 = 19.0, 
A1 = 0.4, 
The competitive equilibrium is found to be: 
Px = .rtl.!f; ,, 
Ax= 0.6 
.;,~ ' 4 
' , I~ 
l ' 
' 
. 213 4 •r r r 3 2 10 2 3 ) q = - = 19_, (JuJJ•JJ = (- -,-, - , 
11 11 11 11 11 
and the positions in the ergodic states are (F1, F1, FJ = (-3,1,2) (i.e. (b1 ,bx) = (2111,1/11)). 
The case fits Figure 6.b. By trading with each other, the three players can reach thirty-seven 
different combinations of forward positions at T = 3. These are illustrated in Figure 7. 
The game starts with F(h(O)) = (0,0,0) and can go to seven different "nodes" at T = 
1: (0,0,0), (0,-1,1), (-1,0,1), (-1,1,0), (0,1,-1), (1,0,-1) and (1,-1,0). From these an additional 
twelve nodes can be reached at T = 2 and further eighteen can be reached at T = 3 when the 
game ends. Each arrow represents a possible transition and to be complete the figure should 
include semi-circular arrows representing the possibility of remaining at each node. The MPE 
assigns equilibrium probabilities to each arrow conditional on being at a given node at a given 
T. Many of these probabilities are zero in equilibrium. 
The MPE is shown in Figure 8. All arrows there have probability 1/3 representing the 
probability of a match between I and J, I and K, and J and Kat each node (after each payoff 
relevant history). At (0,0,0) there is thus probability 1/3 that I buys from J leading to (-1,1,0). 
From there, the probability is again 1/3 that I buys from K leading to (-2,1,1) and from this 
node, the probability that 1 can strike another deal with K leading to the ergodic state (-3,1,2) 
is again 1/3. The probability of this path is (1/3}'. There are two other ways to get to (-3,1,2), 
so the overall probability of ending up in the desired node is 1/9. But the market can end up 
rather far from it also: If J and K are matched three times (an event that happens with 
probability 1127), the outcome will be an initial trade to (0,-1,1) whereafter trading stops. This 
is because the gains from trade between J and K are exhausted after only one trade: All paths 
in Figure 8 include at most one horizontal arrow. 
The expected payoff at T = 0 is (0.6282, 0.3065, 05125) compared to (1.0124, 0.1653, 
1.5496) in the competitive equilibrium. 
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Figure 7: Markov Lattice 
Markov 
8 8 8 '' ' 
' \ 1\ I\ I 8-8-8-8-8 
\!\!\!\ 8-8-8-8-1.1.-2 -8 
\1\1\1\1\ 8-8-8-8-8- 0·2.-2-8 
1\1\ !\!\/\ 8-8-8-8-8-8 
/\1\1\!\ 8-8-8-8-8 
1\!\1\ 
8 8 8 8 
Horizontal amlws: Trade between J and K; Left-down/Up-Right Arrows: Trade between I and K; Right-Down/Up-Left Armws: Trade hctwccn I and J. 
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Figure 8: MPE 
Markov Perfect EquilflY1rium 
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5. n Traders 
We now turn to the n;U. player case. A typical player is called I, IEN={l,2, ... ,n). As 
m the two preceding sections we first treat the axiomatic approaches in which the time 
dimension is suppressed and find the competitive equilibrium (the futures market equilibrium) 
rit 'ft_~ 
and the bilateral core (the efficiency standard). We then move on t!:l a ¥bn scale strategic 
bargaining model with a proof of existence of equilibrium 
characterization of the ergodic states. 
5.1: Axiomatic approaches: Futures market equilibrium and bilateral core 
and a 
As a benchmark, first assume that. the players form a standard futures market which 
is assumed to be competitive, yielding a single market clearing price, q '. Also assume that 
their different price expectations are common knowledge. Each player's payoff is then given 
by 
(45) 
If q' is taken as given, the agent only optimizes with respect to the net position, .t;, and 
the (futures) market equilibrium is given by 
f,. = q. - PI 
I A 
I 
q 
" E.!.. 
i-J A, 
" 
= A" \'P, 
-L._--' 
n i-J A; 
VJEN (46) 
(47) 
where A m is the harmonic mean of the risk aversion coefficients (1 /A m is the arithmetic mean 
risk tolerance). A/A m is the individual risk aversion relative to the market risk aversion. The 
market clearing price is fully revealing in the sense that it is the weighted mean opinion of 
the spot price, the weights being the agent's risk tolerance relative to the sum of the risk 
tolerances. This is the "market's spot price expectation" and it fully reflects the market 
participants' opinions weighted by their willingness to bet on them. 
Now assume that the market is one in which the participants enter bilateral contracts, 
but still disregard the time dimension. The payoff function then becomes 
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where~= }; ~; ,"if/EN. 
V;EN\{1} 
To belong to the bilateral core, the quantities have to fulfil 
? 
j,'. ' 
PJ - PI = AJI - AJJ "iil,J, /'/;f j 11 
Jlj Y;t ,, 
' 
' 
. 1/ 
(48) 
(49) 
which is satisfied only by [;, "if I. Prices should satisfy individual rationality given these 
quantities, i.e. contracts should belong to 
! ( q;j ,f,) fj > 0, Af. • - A'f} u q + -f ij ~ qij ~ q 2 'I 
l(q;j'f,) f,j < 0, Af. . - ~·r,j} u q + -f ij :s; qij s q (50) 
((qij ,f,) f,j = Ol "iii,j EN, i;<j. 
The bilateral core thus consists of n contracts where the quantities and prices satisfy ( 46) and 
(50). Note that the market equilibrium (46-47) belongs to the core. 
5.2 Strategic bargaining: the decentralized market game 
The stochastic game r. is defined by 
@ a set of players, N s (l, ... ,nj 
@ a time horizon T "i1:. 1: "t = l, ... ,T 
@ a set of states k("t) E K("t) 
@ a set of actions s("t) E S("t) 
@a transition function: Pr[k(T+l)J = Pr[k(nl) I k("t) , s("t)j 
@ a payoff function for each I EN: G(hJT); App). 
The state variable k('r:) consists of an n-vector of forward positions, F(h('r:-1)), a 
realization of the matching technology M("t) and the time index, 1:: 
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k(T) ~ (F(h(T-I)), M[Nj(T), T) ' (51) 
and K(T) is the set of states that is feasible after any history leading to a given F(h(T-I)). 
The vector of forward positions for the n players at the beginning of period T is 
defined in an obvious extension of the notation for the three player c~e~~· 
'• 41 .,, 
F(h(T-I)) ~ (F(h/T-I), ... , F(h,(T-I))). (52) 
I I If l<i,f ,'!. 
The matching technology is called M and a particular realization atJIA~d-T is ,denoted by M(T). 
Let <a,R> denote an ordered pair and letS be a set of integers wiih #S = '2K, where K is a 
positive integer. Finally, let Ms denote the set of K ordered pairs exhausting S, i.e. an element 
!1 EMs is a collection {<a,,R,>, <a2,R2>, ... , <a.,R<>} such that a,,R, E S, Vi ~ I, ., K, 
a,., ai and R1 ., Ri Vi,j ~I,., K w. i;ooj and a, ;oo Ri, Vi,j ~I,., K. 
If n = #N is even, the matching technology simply maps from the set of players to a 
set of n/2 ordered pairs: 
M: N _,. MN . (53) 
In other words, an outcome of the matching technology chooses n/2 matches and in each 
match, m (m E 11 E MN), the identity of the offerer, am, and of the receiver of the offer, Rm. 
If n is even, an outcome of M becomes M(T) = (<a,,R1>, <a2,R2>, ... , <a,12,R,12>) with a,, 
R, E N, i = I, ... , n, a, ., ai, R1 ., Ri, V i,j = I,.,n/2, i ., j, and a, ., Ri, V i,j. In the "even" 
case, the matching technology maps from the set of players to the set of possible two-
permutations of this set. The probability of a particular outcome of the map is 
plM(T) ~ !1 E MNj' = (n - 2)! = __ I_""' 
'l n! n(n - I) 
(54) 
since all outcomes are equally likely by assumption. 
If n = #N is odd, M maps from N to the space of (n-I)/2 ordered pairs plus the identity 
of the idle player: 
M: N --+ MNI!Idle!x N . (55) 
An outcome of the matching technology now determines the identity of the idle player and 
(n-I)/2 matches exhausting the n-1 non-idle players and within each match, m 
(m E !1 E MN\fldleJ), the identity of the offerer, am, and of the receiver of the offer, Rm. For 
n odd, an outcome of M becomes 
M(T) = (fl, Idle)= ({<a1,R1>, <a2JR2>, ... , <a1 •. 1112,R1 •. 11,2>}, Idle). 
The probability of a particular outcome of the map, M, is 
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Pr[M(r) ~ (f.l,ld/e) E MMfldlfxN l ~ (n - 3)! ~ l (56) 
e n! n(n-l)(n-2) 
since for each player there is probability 1/n of being idle at 't and for the n-1 remaining 
players, there are (n-1)!/(n-3)! two-permutations. rlf 't;:; 
Given an outcome of M, in each match m E f.l, the offerer, 0, tla~ ··~ction space S0 = 
{cm..J, that is, she can propose to buy or sell a contract at a pric~ of her tchoili,F, or she can 
,j, f,; . 
choose not to propose a deal, so S0 = {(q,_,l), (q. __ ,-1), (q,_,O): ,ZJ~1 !3R.}.,The receiver in m 
can accept (a) or reject (r), so SR = {a,r}. A possible idle player h~s S,dle ~ 0. The strategy 
space of a player thus depends on whether the outcome of the macthing technology makes 
her offerer, receiver or idle. In any state k('t), action spaces for the market in that state are 
if n is even 
(57) 
n-1 
S ~ (S0 x SR)_2_x 0 if n is odd. 
Given today's state, k('t), and today's actions, s('t), a new profile of net positions 
appears: F(h('t)). Given this, the probability of a state 
k('t+ 1) ~ (F(h('t)), M('r-1) = f.1, •-1) (58) 
will be (n-2)!/n! if n is even and (n-3)!/n! if n is odd. These are the transition probabilities. 
When the players have chosen the trades leading to a new F (the first element of the state 
variable at •+1, then nature chooses a new outcome of the matching technology, M(nl) (the 
second element of the state variable), and one period has passed sot= •+1 (the third entry 
of the state variable). The sequence of events in each period 't is as follows: 
6: The realization of k(L) = (F(h('t·l)), M('t), 't) becomes common knowledge (c.k.). 
1. The Offerers simultaneously propose a contract (not c.k.). 
2. The Receivers simultaneously accept or reject (not c.k.). 
3. The Idle player (simultaneously with 1 and 2) does nothing (c.k.). 
4. The actions in 1, 2 and 3 lead to F(h('t)). 
5. Nature chooses M('t+l) and k(L+l) = (F(h('t)), M(nl), 't+l) becomes c.k. 
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Lemma 4 still applies: the payoff relevant history is summarized by the forward 
positions at the beginning of the period, F(h(-c-1)). Indeed, the proof is independent of the 
number of players. We can also extend the essential proof of existence for the three person 
game, rJ, to the n-person game, rn: 
Proposition 8: There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium for the ga.fffe 'if1n~<' 
Proof: If the set of actions S were finite, the proof would be a .~yia! addptio)fl"to r" of the 
more general Theorem 13.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) (p.1J~!However there are no 
restrictions on the price an offerer can propose apart from positiv'ity, so S0 is infinite. But 
there are restrictions on the quantities that the offerer can propose, viz. to buy one unit, to sell 
one unit or not to do anything, and thus S0 = { cm,·l qm..E IR, 11 fm. E { -1,0,1} }. This means 
that there is a finite number of feasible states that can be reached during the game and 
subgame perfect equlibrium requires that the strategy be optimal at any state, be they reached 
or not. 
At T, in any feasible state k(T), Om will propose a contract to Rm that either is equal 
to Rm's reservation price if there are gains from trade to be made and which Rm then will 
accept or is IR to 0 m if not, and then Rm will reject. Reservation prices are functions of the 
state via F(h(T-1)). 
At T-1, the subgame starting there can be solved with knowledge of what is going to 
happen at Tin each of the states possible at T and of the transition function Pr(k(T) lk(T-1), 
s(T-1)). Continuing the backward recursion, an MPE appears.ll 
We also get the n-person equivalent of Propositions 4 - 6 establishing existence and 
(generic) uniqueness of the absorbing states for the three person game: 
Proposition 9: Trading stops if the game reaches a state in which 
F(h;(-c-1)) = Fi + 1\;, Vi EN, (59) 
where Vi,j the 1\;'s satisfy 
(60) 
and 
(61) 
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Proof: If RB;(1;} s RSj, \;/ i,j E N, i" j, there are no further gains from trade. Solving this 
system of inequalities yields the desired result.llll 
Remark: The ll;'s are again to be understood as the real numbers that when added to the 
respective efficient quantities of the bilateral core yield integers. We~h.~_? by the relative risk 
aversion the difference between the 1\'s of any two players should<nurlfer-ically be less than 
1/2. 
? I -"' 
./;' i,, f ' tl, 
Proposition 10: The only ergodic states k(-r:) are those that sa;~~~~rop~&'iti~n 9. 
Proof: In any ergodic state we need RB,(-r:) s RSf-r:) and RBf-r:) s RS,(-r:) for all i and j. This 
leads to the following set of inequalities: 
(62) 
where F = {F1 , F 2 , ... , F 1, ... , F.} "' F(h(-r:-1)) is the profile of net positions at -r:-1. Let 
F, ~ Fi + o., \;/ i E N where the only restriction on the 1\'s is that when added to the 
respective efficient position, the result must be an integer. From ( 49) we then get 
AjFj - A 1F1 ~ AjFi - A,F; + Ajl\j - A 11\ 1 ~ p 1 - pj - Ajl\j - A 11\ 1 
which combined with (62) gives the desired result.llll 
Proposition 11: The positions in the ergodic states are (generically) unique. 
Proof: Let F(h(-r:-1)) = (F1, ... , F.) be the forward positions of an ergodic state. F(h(-r:)) thus 
satisfies (62) for all i,j E N. Let x be an n-vector of integers such that e 'x ~ 0 where e "' 
(1, 1, ... , 1) is an n-vector too. Let x " 0. There must then be at least one element of x that 
is positive and at least one that is negative. Pick a positive element, x1, and a negative, xj, with 
the indices, i and j corresponding to the "name" of the agent. We have x1 "' 1 and xj s -1, and 
now have to show that F(h(-r:-1)) cannot be an ergodic state. From this state we have 
A/Fj- x) - AJF1 + x) ~ AjFj- A 1F1 + (Ajxj- A 1x). We know that 
so if we have strict inequality of (62), then 
so F(h(-r:-1)) + x is not ergodic. If we 
have equality of (62) by coincidence and if (x1 , xj ) = (1, -1), then 
A -A 
' 
1 
, so the state may still be ergodic.llll 
2 
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A Markov perfect equilibrium of r. can be interpreted along the lines of the two and 
three person markets, [ 2 and [ 3, which indeed are special cases. But for n > 3 a new feature 
appears: the possibility of multiple Markov perfect equilibria stemming from the possibility 
of multiple Nash equilibria at each state: when there is more than one simultaneous match in 
a given period, optimality of a decision within a given match may hinge on the outcome of 
other matches at that time. The outcome of the matching technology ~1i"cqlpq:10n knowledge, 
but the actions are not, and since the play across matches is simultaneous, problems of the 
following sort may arise: The optimality of any pairs' decision hin_g~\) 0? wh~t thllfentire trade 
vector looks like. A trade vector is ann-vector of possible {-1, o!JIJ 1\vher.e< the sum of the 
elements is zero. The entire vector determines the state in the ne~; perioll, which in turn 
determines expected continuation payoffs. So it may be optimal for one pair of agents to 
agree on a contract if and only if another pair agrees on a contract, and vice versa. 
Whether multiple MPE occurs is a matter of choice of parameters, but in general the 
set-up allows for that. 10 This introduces the possibility of coordination failure (failure to 
coordinate on the same Nash equilibrium) on top of the other inefficiencies of the market 
(stemming from indivisibilities and from not being able to control the matching process). The 
next section looks at whether one can expect convergence of the process to the efficient 
outcome as one parameter, the time horizon, T goes to infinity. 
6. Convergence and Decentralized vs. Centralized Trade 
In this section we first (6.1) discuss convergence of the Markov perfect equilibrium 
of r. to the ergodic states, which is the closest the market can come to efficiency. Then (6.2) 
we compare r. to other models of decentralized trade and conclude (6.3) with a comment on 
forward markets compared to futures markets. 
6.1 Inefficiency and Convergence to Efficiency 
Compared to a competitive standard, the outcome of r. (n > 2) is inefficient: there is 
always a positive probability that the game ends with a set of forward positions that does not 
belong to the ergodic states. The heuristic proof of this point is simple: re-order the players 
from 1 through n according to the value of p 1 /A,, sop /A 1 is lowest and Pn lA. is highest. The 
event that 1 and 2, 3 and 4, ... , n-1 and n (or if n is odd: n-2 and n-1) are matched in every 
10 It would seem that for n ;;, 4, the game generically possesses multiple equilibria, so that 
the parameter space in terms of {A,, p,} and T for which this happens is topologically large. 
How to show this formally is not clear to me. 
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period 1: = 1, . , T has a positive probability (that is decreasing in T, however). Obviously to 
be efficient, the long positions at T should be concentrated at high values of i (i E {l,.,n}) 
whereas short positions should be concentrated at low values of i. However, this is impossible 
given the outlined event. 
Generally, there are several sequences of matchings in 1: = l,.,T that can lead to 
efficient outcomes (as in the three trader example of Section 4.3) bu{~l~ several sequences 
for which the efficient positions can not possibly be reached. Wh<;tt the pr9babilities are and 
how close the market can get to the efficient positions depends ofi~dr' larg,e u4se positions 
are and how they are distributed, i.e. on {p,A} ('Vi E N), o/{ll~ one )and and on the 
matching probabilities (i.e. on n) and the time horizon, T, on the other. Indeed, one would 
expect the following conjecture to hold true: 
In a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of r. the efficient positions 
are reached almost surely as T -> oo. 
A very rough and heuristic proof of this goes as follows: 11 we have already shown that there 
is a generically unique set of ergodic states for a given T. 12 If the process converges to 
anything, it must be to the ergodic states. To show convergence implies to show that the 
process is a contraction - but it must be, since any trade reduces the aggregate gains from 
trade left for the future. 
For any given T, the MPE of r. describes a Markov chain. The reason why standard 
techniques of showing convergence of Markov chains do not work here is that as T increases, 
the transition probabilities among existing states may change and the size of the state space 
increase: there are a number of new feasible states that were not reachable for a smaller T. 
As T -> oo, the state space becomes infinity too (and actually this happens at a faster rate). 
At the risk of belabouring the last point, the problem is that even though for any 
(finite) T the state space is finite, if a period T+l is introduced, this increases the number of 
feasible states by more than one to one. To see this, consider the example of Section 4.3 and 
Figure 8: if a period T =4 is introduced, twenty-four new feasible profiles of forward positions 
pop up. For the three person case, the number of feasible nodes as a function of T is: 
11 Another argument is that Gale (1987) gets convergence to the competitive equilibrium 
in a somewhat similar set-up. The difference is that Gale has an infinite time horizon and that 
he then studies convergence of equilibrium as a function of parameters like the time 
preferences (as the traders get more patient, the equilibrium converges to the competitive 
equilibrium). 
12 Ignoring that all states that are reached at Tare ergodic in the sense that the game ends, 
so the probability of getting out of such a state is trivially zero. 
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T 
1- 6J:) (63) 
i-=1 
which clearly increases six times faster than T. In the more general n-person game, each node 
that is reachable at T-1 has number of neighbours: 
n/2 
? (n~;i)A+t 
,-I 
for n even and 
I' 
' 
' 
(64) 
(65) 
for n odd. For example, if there are twenty players (n = 20) each node reachable at T-1 has 
377,379,368 neighbours! For a larger number of players, the state space increases faster than 
for the three player case, thus emphasizing the point that the number of states grows rapidly 
as T -> oo. 
The conjecture is so much more remarkable considering that it requires the equilibrium 
to be a contraction in an expanding state space. The reasoning behind this is that the agents 
will not use the extra states (given that the ergodic states were already reachable), but will 
rather use the extra time available to get to more attractive nodes (forward positions) among 
the already existing ones: returning to the example and Figure 8, in the three player case 
F(h(3)) = (0,-1,1) could be an equilibrium outcome if J and K are matched for three 
consecutive periods. This event has probability (113/ = 1!27 ex ante. If the transition 
probabilities that are indicated in Figure 8 remain the same as T increases, then the ex ante 
probability of this deadlock decreases rapidly (exponentially) with T. The conjecture thus 
implies that when T increases, there will be few or no new nodes in Figure 8 and some nodes 
may even drop out because the probability of getting to a more attractive state increases. In 
other words, as the state space ramifies, Markov perfect equilibria effectively prune away new 
branches. 
6.2 Models of decentralized trade 
The model presented in Sections 2 through 6 is one of decentralized trade. It obviously 
has links to other models of decentralized trade. This section seeks to make the connection 
and to show the differences. 
Gale (1988) makes an important distinction between models of ex ante pricing where 
all prices are posted and known by all relevant parties before the agents get together to trade, 
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and models of ex post pricing where the agents get together before prices are quoted. Our 
model belongs to the ex post category in that the players are matched before contracts are 
proposed. 
In the framework of ex ante pricing, three papers by Ostroy and Starr (1974) and Starr 
(1976; 1986) treat points similar to ours: in a general equilibrium setting, the question 
addressed is whether a competitive equilibrium can be implemented b.y4 a tf'ec~ntralized trading 
process. The equilibrium prices (and quantities) are determined by a Walrasian auctioneer, but 
the agents are not allowed to hand the net trade vector over to J;~t; auctio6eer:(o there is no 
centralized clearing. Instead, the agents have to sort the equiJtitfum o,ut themselves in 
pairwise meetings. In each round of trading, every trader meets' every other trader in an 
arbitrary order, so the only uncertainty is with respect to the order of matches, not with 
respect to whether they get matched or not. Within this set-up, Ostroy and Starr show that in 
a barter economy it is in general not possible to find a decentralized procedure that achieves 
the competitive equilibrium, but in a monetary economy such a decentralized mechanism 
exists. Starr (1976) then shows that if barter trading can implement the competitive 
equilibrium, then there is a monetary trading procedure that does this a good deal faster. In 
fact, the non-monetary procedure may take forever to converge. Finally, Starr (1986) allows 
for 'short sales' and discusses convergence in different credit economies (commodity credit, 
trade credit and bank credit). None of these institutional set-ups do as well as the monetary 
economy in terms of convergence and even existence of a convergent procedure. 
Our model could be seen as a monetary economy with one good (a contract) and with 
ex ante pricing and indeed with the Ostroy and Starr matching technology and trading 
procedure, the competitive equilibrium could quickly and certainly be obtained in 
decentralized trading. Another way of re-interpreting our model in terms of Ostroy and Starr 
" " is that potentially there are };(n-i) = n2 - };i different goods in the forward market: a 
i==J 
contract between I and J is different from a contract between I and K and both are different 
from a contract between J and K and so forth. This is especially important for the clearing 
procedure in the 15-Day market, where having a long contract with one trader and a short 
with another does not mean that these trades net out: A trader may still have to honour both 
contracts and may thus have to bother about taking and arranging delivery. This is why most 
traders in the 15-Day market close their positions in book-outs and in daisy chains and it is 
also why the assumption that the forward market clears at maturity is not realistic for this 
market. Maturity (in the spot market) is not a point in time but rather a whole month and 
traders want to realize gains and losses before maturity in order not to deal with problems of 
delivery. This renders the market even more inefficient seen from the traders' point of view. 
The point that is made here, is that not only is the trading on the forward market 
decentralized, but so is the 'clearing at maturity' which forces the traders to clear before 
maturity! Clearly a centralization of this clearing mechanism along the lines of a clearing 
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house in a futures market is both feasible and more efficient. Note that the market is only one 
step short of this, since one major producer organizes the liftings (actual deliveries) for the 
en tire market. 
In the framework of ex post pricing, there is a huge and growing literature on strategic 
bargaining applied to markets. An unsurpassed treatment is Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). 
That our model is inspired by, and in line with, this literature, ,ilfl'\b(j, clear from the 
following quote: 
"Bargaining theory provides a natural framework within which to study pjg ibrmatibn in .~rkets 
where transactions are made in a decentralized manner via interactionS rfrh'~en pairs of agents 
rather than being organized centrally through the use of a fonnal traaiWg institii.6on like an 
auctioneer. One might describe the aim of investigations in this area as t~at of pro~iding "miniM 
micro'~ foundations for the microeconomic analysis of markets and, in particular, of detennining 
the range of validity of the Walrasian paradigm. Such a program represents something of a 
challenge for game theorists in that its success will presumably generate new solution concepts for 
market situations intermediate between those developed for bilateral bargaining and the notion of 
Walrasian equilibrium." (Binmore, Osbome and Rubinstein (1992)). 
The original paper in this strain of literature is Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) in which 
steady states of a market are investigated. The market is partitioned into buyers and sellers 
and they are matched in a stochastic process that renews the pairings every period and that 
is not in the control of the agents. The matching technology of our model can be seen as a 
special case of this. In the Rubinstein/Wolinsky framework, every seller has one unit for sale 
and each buyer wants one unit. Once a match has concluded a deal, the pair leaves the market 
and is then replaced with a new pair, thus keeping stocks of agents constant. The time horizon 
is infinite, but traders have impatient von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and thus 
an incentive to conclude a deal rather sooner than later. An important conclusion that arises 
from this model is that the market equilibrium of the decentralized market need not be 
competitive. That is, a model that (contrary to the competitive equilibrium) explains the 
formation of prices in equilibrium does not necessarily support a competitive outcome. This 
result has triggered a number of studies of when and why convergence to the competitive 
equilibrium arises (notably Gale (1986a,b; 1987) and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991 )). 
Contrary to these studies an important feature of our model is the finite time horizon, 
imposed since the forward contracts eventually mature and since this is clearly perceived by 
the traders. On the other hand, time preferences are not important (traders are infinitely 
patient), so the incentive to conclude deals is that time runs out. A third difference is that our 
equilibrium is inherently dynamic, 13 whereas most other models of bargaining and markets 
concentrate on steady states. 
13 This is also the case in Gale (1987) and in Binmore and Herrero (1988) but they work 
with an infinite time horizon. 
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6.3 Forward vs. Futures Markets - and the Future 
The model that was presented in this paper describes a decentralized, speculative 
forward market and compares the market equilibrium with that of a centralized, competitive 
market that can be thought of as a futures market. It was shown that the decentralized market 
is inferior to the centralized market in that the random matchingtfu~e& it difficult to 
coordinate on an efficient outcome: There is always a positive probability of not reaching the 
efficient outcome but this probability drops as the traders get m~t,t; time io cq~plete their 
affairs. IJ fl ~ ; ' 
. ' 
' ' Matching is not entirely random in reality, but it is not entirely under the control of 
the traders either. Endogenized matching would lead to more complicated transition 
probabilities since matching behaviour should be explained by equilibrium strategies ( cf 
Herreiner (1993)). It is not clear how this would affect Markov perfect equilibrium, but a 
conjecture is that, given the assumption of common knowledge of different priors, there 
would be faster convergence to the efficient outcome, since traders with very different beliefs 
have a common interest in getting together. 
The informational requirements that underlie both the model of decentralized trade and 
that of centralized trade are very severe: we have a game of complete information, so the 
different spot price expectations and the different risk aversions are common knowledge. In 
reality, agents face incomplete information. This leads to problems for the agents such as 
identifying who the optimists are (cf Harstad and Phlips (1993)) and, without further 
specifications of the agents' knowledge, almost certainly to results of (generic) non-existence 
of Markov perfect equilibrium or to a situation in which any outcome can be rationalized as 
the MPE for appropriate choices of beliefs. Subgame rationalizability may be all one can hope 
for. The way to model this may be to let strategies be part of a controlled process in which 
the traders try to learn the spot price expectations of the other traders and to make money at 
the same time. This is a standard learning problem, but with a finite time horizon. 
Another informational intricacy stems from the once-and-for-all nature of the spot 
price expectations. New information is likely to appear during trading so agents change their 
mind while trading, revaluing the book value of completed contracts and of future strategies. 
This could be modeled within the framework of common knowledge of different priors by 
exposing the whole vector of price expectations to (e.g. additive or multiplicative) random 
shocks, thus generating the erratic behaviour observed in Figures 1 and 2. 
While these modifications ( endogenized matching, incomplete information and 
continuous information on spot prices) are interesting in their own right, it should be clear 
that these problems by no means are assuaged by decentralized trading. It is easier to see how 
an equilibrium with incomplete, imperfect information and a continuous flow of data can lead 
to an efficient outcome in a centralized futures market than in a decentralized forward market 
- and in a futures market, matching is not an issue. It therefore remains a paradox that the 
participants in the 15-Day market accept such an inferior institution. 
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